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Abstract 
Along with the proliferation of terrorism studies that followed the September 11 attacks, 
many critical theoretical perspectives have followed. But few studies have combined 
insight into the delegitimizing aspects of the ‘terrorist’ label with its constitutive role for 
Self-identity, and even fewer have looked at the possibility of states negotiating their 
identity vis-à-vis larger collectives by representing ‘terrorism’ as a shared threat. Through 
employing discourse analysis, this thesis analyzes representations of ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorist’ by Turkish politicians and diplomats in the United Nations between 2001 and 
2012, and by Turkish military officers in the NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence Against 
Terrorism between 2006 and 2011. It asks how the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK) is represented as part of an international fight against terrorism, how these 
representations position the PKK, and how they contribute to the negotiation of Turkish 
‘difference’ vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’. It finds that both the politicians, diplomats 
and military officers represent ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon 
which there is an international obligation to fight together, rejecting distinctions between 
‘terrorists’ and tying in the PKK trough references to Turkey’s own ‘sufferings’. The 
‘terrorist’ identity is constructed through various representations that put it in a position of 
fundamental illegitimacy – as homo sacer. Together, these serve as a constitutive Other for 
the negotiation of ‘difference’. In the first years of analysis, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are 
represented as threatening ‘civilization’, a rhetorical commonplace with links to European 
discourses of Otherness, with which both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have struggled. 
After the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), ‘civilization’ 
becomes pluralized, cultural diversity is emphasized as a positive, and ‘humanity’ takes 
over as what ‘terrorism’ is mainly represented as threatening. Though representations of 
Self-identity are less consistent amongst the military officers, there are several examples 
of negotiating ‘difference’ similar to the politicians and diplomats, including the 
invocation of ‘common values’ articulated to (e.g.) ‘human rights’ and ‘freedom of 
speech’; rhetorical commonplaces used in designations of Turkish Otherness even today. 
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1. 
Introduction 
What makes a hero? Courage, strength, morality, withstanding adversity? Are these the traits that truly 
show and create a hero? Is the light truly the source of darkness or vice versa? Is the soul a source of 
hope or despair? Who are these so called heroes and where do they come from? Are their origins in 
obscurity or in plain sight? 
-  Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from the Underground, 1992 [1864] 
 
In the opening of the TV series Homeland, an American Marine Sergeant held hostage for 
years in Iraq returns to the United States. A national hero, he is welcomed by the Vice 
President at his arrival. But as the country is rejoicing, one CIA agent feels something is not 
right. By herself, she sets up a clandestine surveillance mission, trying to find out whether the 
years in captivity has made the officer into a threat to his country. As audience we do not 
know; we follow the agent along her explorations. But at the very end of the second episode 
we are shown something that the agent does not see: By himself, in a garage, the American 
officer pulls out a rug and starts an Islamic ritual of prayer. We realize his conversion of 
identity. And without being confronted with violence, intimidation or faces of fear, our 
suspicions rise that the officer has indeed become a ‘terrorist’. 1 
 
The above illustrates tellingly the role of discourse. The consistent reproduction of a 
connection between certain signifiers (e.g. ‘Islam’, ‘fundamentalism’, ‘terrorism’) in politics, 
popular culture and the media temporarily fixes reality, so that the soldier’s ‘terrorist’ identity 
can appear passively, as a connotation, without its actual enunciation. At the same time, we 
are reminded of what it means to be American. This scene is interesting not because of its 
creators’ possible intentions, but because of the underlying field of meaning that allows the 
scene to make sense. It is the naturalization of such a field into seeming objectivity that the 
discourse analyst wishes to illuminate. Though this thesis does not look specifically at 
religion, it is exactly such a field of meaning of ‘terrorism’ it sheds light on. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Created by Gideon Raff, with Fox 21 leading producer; first episode broadcasted October 2, 2011 in the United 
States, on the TV-channel Showtime. The series won six Emmy awards in 2012, including Outstanding Drama 
Series.!
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By analyzing speeches and newsletter articles by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military 
officers, I seek to identify the main representations in their constructions of ‘terrorism’ as 
phenomenon and ‘terrorist’ as identity towards an international audience, seeing how these 
involve and affect the specific conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). If we 
understand politics as creating a collective Self capable of action not only by telling people 
who they themselves are (Neumann 2001: 123), but also by explaining who the ‘others’ are, 
my analysis will also allow for insight into the construction of Self-identity through the 
‘terrorist’ Other. Most specifically, it can reveal how Turkish ‘difference’ (Bilgin 2009) vis-à-
vis both ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ can be negotiated by the ‘terrorism’/‘terrorist’ performing 
the role of “the included outside upon which a community or a society constitutes itself and 
its moral order” (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 296). The following research questions 
manifest these goals; the first general and theoretical, the other more specific and empirical: 
[1]:  How can a discourse on ‘terrorism’ render sensible violent practices committed in the 
name of a state, and how do its representations involve the identity of the Self? 
[2]:  How do the representations of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ made internationally by Turkish 
politicians, diplomats and military officers involve the conflict with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), and how does this enable the negotiation of Turkish 
‘difference’ vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’? 
These are important questions for several reasons: Firstly, they deal with a topic (‘terrorism’) 
widely discussed within international relations, even more so after the September 11 attacks in 
the United States; a topic that has framed several states’ enactment of restrictive domestic 
laws since the turn of the millennium." Secondly, the ‘terrorist’ concept is employed in 
descriptions of highly diverse actors, such as al-Qaeda, the PKK, and the anti-Muslim far-
rightist Anders Behring Breivik, whose double bomb and shooting attacks in Norway on July 
22, 2011 killed 77 people. Any attempt to subsume such diverse actors under the same 
concepts deserves critical scrutiny. Thirdly, the questions offer a way of relating a specific and 
geographically restricted conflict to a state’s ‘outside’ concerns with its identity. And finally, 
being grounded in discourse theory, my question contributes to a post-positivist perspective 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Legislation such as the Patriot Act in the United States of 2001, giving the Department of Justice freedom to 
access third-party information of private citizens and to detain/deport immigrants on grounds of ‘terrorist 
activity’, including monetary donations (McGoldrick 2008); the Terrorism Act and the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act in the United Kingdom of 2000 and 2005 respectively, allowing for detainment without trial and the 
criminalization of non-violent activity such as dissemination of ‘terrorist’ material (Kassimeris & Jackson 2012: 
182); or the revised Law on Fight Against Terrorism of 2006 in Turkey, which has  increased the legitimate use 
of surveillance and covert investigation (Jacoby 2010: 109).!
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on the topic of ‘terrorism’; respecting the contingency of social reality and emphasizing the 
power that is manifest in discourse. 
 
In this last aspect my thesis diverges from approaches that “talk about and study terrorism as 
if it had a fixed and stable content, independent of the observing and defining researcher, a 
meaning independent of time, place and the use to which the concept of terrorism is put” 
(Staun 2010: 405), allowing them to be treated as independent variables. Here it does not 
stand alone. With the proliferation of ‘terrorism studies’ that followed the September 11 
attacks on the United States (Weinberg & Eubank 2008), many critical theoretical 
perspectives have surfaced; perspectives that shed light on the way discourses mobilize the 
concepts ‘terrorism’ and ’terrorist’ (e.g. Staun 2010; Barrinha 2010; Stohl 2008; Jackson 
2005). But there has been less emphasis on the way the identity of the Self is constructed 
through these concepts, and even less on how ‘difference’ vis-à-vis international collective 
identities can be negotiated through a state’s representation of ‘terrorism’ as a ‘common 
threat’ and ‘terrorist’ as the radical Other. By focusing on this, my thesis seeks to contribute a 
growing literature on the relations between identity, threat and policy. Here it is especially 
indebted to Campbell (1998a), Jackson (2006) and Hansen (2006). Precisely because my 
focus is on the discursive role of ‘terrorism’, and not on it as a problem per se, I give no 
literature review of terrorism studies in general (though see section 2.5 for more on this). Put 
crudely but illustratively, I am less interested in saying something about ‘terrorism’ in general, 
than I am in saying something about attempts to say something about ‘terrorism’ in general.  
!
As has most likely been noticed, I consistently put ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in inverted 
commas. It should be made very clear that this does not mean that I see the concepts as 
chimeras, devoid of any descriptive value; the concepts most definitely play important roles in 
actors making sense of distinct and often shocking events that beg for explanation, and for 
affecting political practice. The use of inverted commas rather means that I acknowledge the 
concepts’ political nature and that they do not correspond “to something or praxis ‘out there’ 
in real life that is independent of time, place and borders” (Staun 2010: 403). I also do this 
with a series of other signifiers or sets of signifiers when I seek to specifically indicate their 
conceptual role, as with ‘the international community’, ‘universal values’ or ‘humanity’. 
When I use quotation marks (“), on the other hand, this indicates that I am making a direct 
citation of a portion of text that exceeds a single concept. 
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Before discussing the specific choice of Turkey as case, I should also note that by critically 
treating representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ I do not reject or underplay the repugnant 
aspects of many acts that have been labeled ‘terrorist’, including several of those perpetrated 
by the PKK in Turkey, which have led to high amounts of casualties, including many 
civilians. I seek rather to view critically how discourses distribute identities of Self and Other 
in a way that legitimizes any form of violence while unequivocally condemning others, and to 
draw attention to the naturalization of a certain way of organizing power (the nation-state), 
where securitization – the successful framing of something as a threat to ‘security’ – 
legitimizes exceptional measures taken in response (Wæver 1998). The ‘terrorist’ identity is 
especially problematic as it has grave consequences for those represented as such, who are 
often in positions where they can offer little resistance to such labeling. !
!
Though my skepticism towards ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ is theoretically grounded, this 
nonetheless constitutes a premise that should be underlined rather than muted. I agree with 
Becker (1967: 247) in biases being inevitable in research, but that they are not problematic as 
long as efforts are made to “avoid the distortions that this might introduce into our work” – 
perhaps what Nietzsche meant when stating that objectivity is not to be understood as 
“’contemplation without interest’ (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability to 
control one’s Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety 
of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge” (quoted in Campbell 
1998b: 280 [emphasis in original]). My approach does not see a clear-cut distinction between 
social science on the one hand, and (e.g.) political practice on the other, in the sense that one 
is objective while the other is idiosyncratic and strongly value-laden. Ultimately, also the field 
of the social scientist is tied to specific patterns of organizing and describing reality, through a 
set of concepts and premises deciding what is important and what is not; effectively, what we 
can learn by the concept of discourse (see section 2.3). As argued by Becker (1998: 19-20),  
in thinking about [a] phenomenon, we include in the picture we build up some notions about the 
kind of conclusion we will draw about it; the kind of paradigmatic thinking we will assimilate it to. 
These paradigms come to us out of our participation in a world of professional social scientists. 
This is the case also with the study of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’. Abstract categories are 
indispensable to research, but at the same time, such categories do injustice to whoever they 
are applied to. However, discourse theory lessens the damage done here: firstly, by entering 
research with fewer pre-defined concepts, allowing both facts and concepts to emanate 
!!
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directly from the data material; and secondly, by accepting the constructed and contingent 
nature of the social world rather than attempting to grasp the social object ‘in itself’. 
 
1.1 The choice of Turkey as case 
A first reason for focusing on Turkey is that it has for long been dealing with its own 
‘terrorists’. The violent conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has been going on 
since 1984, and before the latest cease-fire was declared on March 21, 2013, it had reached its 
highest levels of violence since PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured and jailed in 1999 
(ICG 2012). The party has for decades been declared as a ‘terrorist’ organization in Turkey 
and is also recognized as such by (e.g.) the United States (U.S. Department of State 2012), the 
United Kingdom (U.K. Home Office 2012) and the European Union (EurLex 2011). The 
conflict with the PKK offers a way of seeing how a discourse on globally fighting ‘terrorism’ 
can be linked to specific and more geographically bound conflicts, conferring legitimacy on 
practices represented as fighting it and subjecting groups to established representations of the 
‘terrorist’ identity. This is made even more important as ‘terrorism’ has often been invoked in 
Turkey without physical violence being involved at all (see section 3.2 for more on this). 
 
Secondly, though the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has made certain 
important political approaches towards the Kurdish minority during its time in power (Celep 
2010; Onar 2007: 284), Turkey has from the mid-2000s seen the juridical enactment of 
stricter measures against ‘terrorism’ and a widening of resources with which to fight it, 
similar to the tendency in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. When 
the 1991 Law On Fight Against Terrorism (Act no. 3713) was renewed in 2006, it increased 
security services’ authorities and was described by Human Rights Watch as “an ominous sign 
of the retrograde trend currently prevailing in Turkey” (cited in Jacoby 2010: 109).  
Legislative changes in this period were to a large extent modeled after ‘Western’ countries’ 
responses to the attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London (ibid.). According to 
Eccarius-Kelly (2011: 10), the “broadly-applied label of terrorism is often used to justify 
extraordinary rendition procedures permitting abusive interrogation techniques and torture”. 
There are thus good reasons to engage critically with the social reality such practices build on. 
 
Thirdly, Turkey is an interesting source for insight into the negotiation of Self-identity, as it 
has historically been in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis both ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ due to 
!!
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the outside representation of its identity. According to Tank (2006: 463), “Turkey’s sense of 
self relies on the mirror held to it by the outside world”. While discourse theory sees this as 
theoretically true of every identity (see section 2.1), the mirror held by ‘Europe’ and ‘the 
West’ has been conspicuous and multi-faceted, and it has taken part in exclusionary practices. 
Turkey has been subjected to essentialism such as ‘belonging’ to the ‘Islamic civilization’ 
while having leaders aspiring to the ‘Western civilization’ (Rumelili 2007: 65), and it is still 
viewed with ambivalence due to its perceived ‘difference’ (Bilgin 2009), related strongly to 
its almost exclusively Muslim population and its roots in the Ottoman Empire.# On the other 
hand, Turkey was member of the United Nations Security Council in 2008-2009, has a long-
standing bilateral security relationship with the United States, as well as membership in 
NATO since 1952. It was also recognized as a candidate for accession to the European Union 
(EU) in 1999, with negotiations beginning in 2005.4 The AKP has clearly expressed 
membership as a goal and accelerated EU-inspired reforms during its first years in office 
(Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy 2010: 409). According to Rumelili (2007: 68-69), Turkey occupies a 
liminal position in relation to the ‘European’ collective identity; partly inside, partly outside – 
at times represented as a radical and threatening Other.5 This makes questions of how Turkish 
actors negotiate Self-identity vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ important.  
 
Fourthly, choosing Turkey as a case offers the potential for seeing divergences in the 
construction of Self-identity in relation to ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’, due to historical antagonisms 
between civilian rule and the military in Turkey. The military has generally seen itself as a 
“guardian of the secular republic’s future, and justified temporary intervention in 
governmental affairs when the state was determined to be under threat”, which has included 
both ‘Islamization’ and ethnic ‘separatism’ (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 22-23). Concerns for such 
‘Islamization’ have increased since the mid-2000s, related to the AKPs approach to the so-
called ‘headscarf controversy’ of 2005, following the European Court of Human Rights’ 
upholding of the ban on the headscarf in public institutions (Onar 2007: 279). The growingly 
conflicting relationship is suggested also by the Ergenekon judicial process, where many 
current and former military officers have been arrested on accusations of seeking to overthrow 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 It has also become more common to characterize Turkey as a ‘Muslim country’ or ‘Muslim ally’ in the United 
States since 2002 (Østereng 2011), thus following the September 11 attacks 
4 Negotiations are still undergoing, with no new formal advances having taken place since 2005. !
5!Onar (2007: 283) argues that from the mid-2000s, grounded in an increasing focus on Islam as a cultural 
factor, it became “almost politically correct for EU and member state officials […] to express ambivalence if not 
outright hostility towards the eventuality of Turkish membership”.!
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the regime (Balcı & Jacoby 2012). The popular protests taking place at the time of writing in 
many Turkish cities (June 2013) have also in part expressed fears of increasing ‘Islamization’ 
(The Telegraph 2013a). By comparing politicians and diplomats’ statements on ‘terrorism’ 
with those of military officers, we might encounter differences in projections of Self-identity 
– of what ‘terrorism’ is represented as actually threatening. 
 
Though I am focusing exclusively on Turkish actors, the insight gained could potentially be 
put in perspective with other states, conflicts and collective identities, such as for example the 
relation between Russia and Chechen rebels on the one hand, and Russia and ‘the West’ on 
the other. My theoretical research question reflects this potential. 
 
1.2 Methodology and data material 
My method in this thesis is discourse analysis, theoretically grounded in discourse theory. I 
view these as intertwined; choosing discourse analysis as method commits to some 
epistemological principles and is best suited for some types of scientific questions. Many 
methodological aspects are therefore tied into chapter 2, which discusses my theoretical 
approach. Generally, my goal is to ask which meanings are discursively fixed to ‘terrorism’ 
and ‘terrorist’, rather than to define these concepts or use them as variables for the empirical 
testing of hypotheses. I agree with Staun (2010: 403) in that “research should instead focus on 
describing which political actors are involved in defining terrorism, how they frame the threat 
and when and why they do so”. I seek to outline discourse “through its realization in 
practices” (Laffey & Weldes 2004: 28), by departing from actual texts. 
 
1.2.1 The choice of data material 
Discourse analysis uses texts as its data material – understood in a wide sense, so that it 
exceeds the written word and can include (e.g.) speeches, TV commercials or newscasts. I 
adopt what Hansen (2006: 60) refers to as a research design model 1, which looks at “political 
leaders with official authority to sanction the foreign policies pursued as well as those with 
central roles in executing these policies, for instance high-ranked military staff [and] senior 
civil servants (including diplomats and mediators)”. The texts I use are speeches by Turkish 
politicians and diplomats in the United Nations,$ as well as speeches and newsletter articles 
by Turkish military officers in the NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 This includes both the General Assembly and the Security Council.!
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which is situated in Ankara, Turkey. I discuss the history and function of this Centre further at 
the beginning of chapter 5. For the first set of texts I have used the United Nations 
Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET) for accessing records of speeches 
(http://unbisnet.un.org/), while for the second set all the material is accessible on the webpage 
of the NATO Centre (http://www.coedat.nato.int/). As I do not contrast the representations of 
politicians, diplomats and military officers with the discourse of any ‘terrorists’, my approach 
can be considered a ‘single-Self’ study.7 According to Hansen (2006: 77), such an approach is 
suited to situations where “the Other’s ability to respond is neutralized”, which is very much 
the case for the ‘terrorists’ in the forums I study. 
 
From a perspective emphasizing the importance of discourse the position from which 
someone is speaking is fundamental (Neumann 2001: 117). As Gramsci (1971: 9) has argued, 
“[a]ll men are intellectuals […] but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals”. 
Politicians, diplomats and military officers can here be viewed as such ‘intellectuals’; 
politicians especially are in positions to shape public conceptions of reality to a much greater 
extent than, for example, middle-school teachers, speaking consistently in formal forums that 
widely attended to. Diplomats are central here due to the formal authority of the forums they 
speak through and their important role of representing state identity. Though military officers’ 
representations of ‘terrorism’ do not necessarily involve specific policy suggestions, they are 
highly relevant by taking part in a larger textual interchange where such ideas are 
disseminated and find their way into other spheres, such as policy circles, especially when 
articulated through a NATO Centre dedicated to the topic of ‘terrorism’.  
 
There are three reasons why I look at international forums and not for instance Turkish 
parliamentary debates. Firstly, I do not know Turkish, and there are significant theoretical 
problems in doing discourse analysis based on translations of texts, especially second-hand 
translations made ad hoc.% Because discourse analysis looks at the specific enunciation of 
signifiers or sets of signifiers (what I refer to as rhetorical commonplaces in this thesis), and 
at their internal relations, much will be lost, or even distorted, by not treating the texts in their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 In another sense, it is also a ‘multiple Selves’ study, as I am treating the relation between a Turkish Self and a 
‘European’ or ‘Western’ Self.!
8 Jackson (2006: 21) exemplifies how translations can distort in a good way when arguing that translations of 
Max Weber into English “sometimes make him seem like an American liberal individualist”.!
!!
!
! !
!
,!
!
original form.& Secondly, as my goal is to see the representation of Turkish identity vis-à-vis 
international identities, it is of course preferable that the audience be an international one. 
Thirdly, studying how concepts move through time and become adopted and reproduced by 
new actors is an important element of discourse analysis (see section 2.2.1 on intertextuality), 
and for the question of ‘terrorism’ this would be both more difficult and less rewarding with 
non-English texts. !
 
I view the U.N. speeches by the Turkish politicians and diplomats as reflecting the main 
discourse in my thesis, as they are taken from the most known and attended forum, and from 
where I expect representations of Self-identity to be most prominent and interesting. These 
texts span from 2001 through 2012. As argued by Neumann (2001: 57), watershed events can 
be used pragmatically to define boundaries of analysis. I have chosen the starting point due to 
the September 11 attacks in 2001 in the United States, and the renaissance of the conception 
of a ’war on terror’ by the George W. Bush Administration, which should be expected to lead 
to an increase in representations of ‘terrorism’ also by Turkish actors.'( 
 
The speeches and articles of military officers are important for two main reasons: By 
diversifying the data material, they can both strengthen or challenge the insights from the 
U.N. texts. As the military in Turkey is strongly involved in the domestic dealings with 
‘terrorism’, scrutiny of the professional discourse they take part in through such a Centre is 
warranted. Including these texts also offers grounds for seeing alternative representations of 
Self-identity, as discussed above. Here, my studied time span is 2006 – 2011. The reason this 
does not coincide temporally with the U.N. material is that the NATO Centre was not 
inaugurated until 2005.'' While this removes the grounds for comparing the military and the 
politicians/diplomats between 2001 and 2004, I nonetheless have wide access to 
representations of ’terrorism’/’terrorist’ by Turkish military officers, which is not the easiest 
to come by in English. The time span also covers the beginning of a period where identity 
conflicts over ‘Islamism’ and secularism became more marked in Turkey (Onar 2007), as well 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&)*!+,-!./0-!12!.344-*+!5467-!86*60+-4!Recep Tayyip Erdo!an I have deviated slightly from this principle, as 
his speeches at the United Nations are translated from Turkish. But as these are simultaneous and official 
translations by the Delegation, I see this as much less of a problem than if I personally translated Turkish texts.!
'(!I refer to this as a renaissance because the Administration of President Ronald Reagan had already used the 
commonplace of ’war on terror’ consistently, especially in relation to perceived ‘terrorism’ in Central America, 
West Asia and North Africa (Chomsky 2003). !
'' The reason 2012 is not included is that the NATO Centre newsletter does not include articles by Turkish 
military officers for this year.!
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as the beginning of the Ergenekon judicial process. Finally, the NATO Centre from where I 
take my material has been the subject of very little – if any – research; as of now I have not 
encountered a single study looking at it in any detail. 
  
Though I am studying Turkish actors exclusively I cannot justifiably argue to have identified 
a Turkish discourse on ‘terrorism’ (or discourses, if we regard the military officers as 
constituting a separate one). I understand the Turkish actors as having to adapt to the 
international forums they are speaking within, being dependent on shared resources for 
making meaning (such as of ‘terrorism’). It would therefore be more correct to regard these as 
a ‘United Nations discourse on terrorism’ and a ‘NATO discourse on terrorism’. This is not to 
say that the texts are not affected by the actors being who they are, which would take away 
agency. Actors can combine rhetorical commonplaces (see below) in new ways, or even 
successfully introduce new ones. This is also what facilitates the reconstruction of Self-
identity. Rumelili (2007: 15) argues that “representational practices of states […] potentially 
have the effect of changing the constructions of their identities by others” – in this case by the 
Turkish actors representing ‘terrorism’ as the common, radical Other. 
 
1.2.2 Conceptual clarifications 
‘Discourse’ is at the absolute center of my conceptual apparatus, but due to its complexity and 
its somewhat uncritical usage in a myriad of contexts, I discuss it separately in section 2.3. 
Other specific concepts that guide my analysis (nodal points, articulation, differentiation, 
interpellation and breaking) are also discussed in the same section. Here I will describe the 
two concepts representation and rhetorical commonplace, as I use them quite extensively in 
this introduction, and as they are central to understanding the other five concepts.  
 
Neumann (2001: 33) defines representations as “the most important packages of reality 
claims that a discourse consists of”, as well as “things and phenomena as they present 
themselves to us, not the things in themselves, but things filtered through that which is in 
between us and the world: language, categories etc.”.12 In other words, representations are the 
‘knowledge’ that constitutes the social world. An example of a representation could be 
‘terrorism’ as a ‘global’ threat which it is necessary to fight resolutely and in concert – which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 I am indebted to Østereng (2011) for the latter translation. The former translation is from “de viktigste 
pakkene av virkelighetskrav som en diskurs består av”. !
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we will see is prominent in both the sets of texts I analyze. What distinguishes my treatment 
of these representations from arguments is that I do not seek to counter them by proving them 
false; their identification is the goal, and from there the discussion of which broader 
discursive structures they “reflect, constitute, reproduce, and/or challenge” (Rumelili 2007: 
14), as well as what forms of practice they render sensible.'# 
 
By rhetorical commonplaces (Jackson 2006) I refer to the signifiers or sets of signifiers that 
come together to form representations within discourses, such as ‘terrorist’, ‘peace-loving 
nation’ or ‘democracy’. Such commonplaces are resources, and they need to be practically 
invoked in the legitimization of policy in order to have a function. Importantly, they also need 
to be present in the target audience. As illustratively put by Jackson (2006: 28),  
public officials cannot simply say anything that they like in defense of a policy, any more than I 
can prevail in a discussion about here we should go to lunch by discoursing at length on the 
creative genius of George Lucas, or any more than Slobodan Milo"evi# could whip up a crowd 
using nationalist language in Times Square or in downtown St. Louis.  
This understanding of rhetorical commonplaces shows that what is important here is not the 
‘beliefs’ inside people’s heads, but that on which “speakers can draw with any hope of having 
the audience follow their arguments, let alone be moved to action by them” (ibid.). I see 
rhetorical commonplaces as practically equivalent to predicates (Laffey & Weldes 2004), 
elements (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999) or objects (Foucault 1972). 
 
I should also define ontological security, a concept I use at several points in my analyses and 
discussions. I understand this as security of identity, not as physical security. As an example, 
this would refer to the existence of Turkey as a definite collective with its own identity, rather 
than the physical well-being of the individuals within its borders (see Rumelili 2011). 
 
1.2.3 Challenges 
This is the first time I write an academic paper of this magnitude, and it is the first time I do 
proper empirical analysis of an individually chosen data material. While this has been greatly 
rewarding it has also posed some challenges. Firstly, it was difficult to know where to stop, 
both in terms of the temporal boundaries of analysis, and in terms of excluding 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 I refer to the ‘structure’ of discourse in synchronic terms here only for analytical purposes; a discourse is 
always in a degree of flux– though some relations are much more stable than others (see chapter 2).!
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representations that were outside my main focus. In my preliminary analysis there was always 
something interesting ‘a little further back’ or somewhat ‘on the side’, but in the end I decided 
– for the already stated reasons – to set the starting point at 2001. 
 
Another challenge was how to deal with the name changes of the PKK. In 2002 the PKK was 
re-established as the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (KADEK), and the year 
after as the Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL), with stated intentions of political 
reorientation (see Kongra Gel 2003). Any such difference is generally rejected by national 
governments, referring to all three as different names for the same group (e.g. MFA Turkey 
2011). This a priori assumed similarity is, however, an element of discourse by itself, making 
it difficult for the PKK to escape a formerly defined identity. By not making distinctions 
myself, I in part contribute to reproducing such a representation. It should therefore be noted 
that it is not my intention to reject (nor to accept) these entities’ stated divergence from the 
PKK; I consistently refer to ‘PKK’ in this thesis as this is what is most commonly referred to 
in relation with ‘terrorism’ in Turkey.  
 
A last central challenge has been how to conceptualize the relation between ‘Europe’ and ‘the 
West’ – to what extent they should be grouped together or isolated. I of course realize that 
there are clear overlaps in common representations of the ‘European’ and the ‘Western’, for 
example in the hegemony of liberal democratic discourse, or in similar roots in e.g. the 
European Enlightenment imaginary I discuss in chapter 3. But because of the separate 
accession negotiations of Turkey with the European Union, and because the Turkish Republic 
at its inception was oriented towards the ‘Western’ but expressed skepticism towards 
European powers that had divided the Ottoman Empire through the 1920 Treaty of Sévres, I 
use both ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ to designate identities that the Turkish actors are negotiating 
their country’s ‘difference’ in relation to. However, I see these as related to an extent that both 
can be appealed to at the same time, so that it is perfectly possible to become both more 
‘European’ and more ‘Western’ at the same time (simultaneously becoming more ‘Islamic’ 
and more ‘European’ could for example be expected to be more discursively hindered). 
 
1.3 Structure of thesis 
Chapter 2 discusses in detail the theoretical underpinnings of my thesis, referred to as 
discourse theory, first on a general level, and then specifically in relation to the concepts of 
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‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’. Chapter 3 gives a conceptual background for the Turkish actors’ 
representations of the threat of ‘terrorism’, emphasizing the role of ‘civilization’. It also 
discusses interaction between Kurdish and Turkish nationalism from the inception of the 
Turkish Republic, relating this to the concept of ‘terrorism’ today. Chapter 4 analyzes 
speeches by Turkish politicians and diplomats at the United Nations between 2001 and 2012, 
focusing on discussions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’, but including as well statements 
concerned specifically with collective identity. Chapter 5 analyzes Turkish military officers’ 
speeches and newsletter articles at the NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence Against 
Terrorism, from 2006 – 2011, following the same general structure as chapter 4. The thesis 
ends with chapter 6, which summarizes findings from the analyses, discusses the 
consequences of the representations for political practice and offers concluding thoughts. 
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2. 
Theoretical Approach: Discourse Theory and the Study of  ‘Terrorism’ 
 
One of my oldest crusades is against the distinction between thought and feeling […] which is really the basis 
of all anti-intellectual views: the heart and the head, thinking and feeling, fantasy and judgment […] I believe 
that we think much more with the instruments provided by our culture than we do with our bodies, and hence 
the much greater diversity of though in the world. Thinking is a form of feeling; feeling is a form of thinking 
 - Susan Sontag, Interview with Jonathan Cott, Rolling Stone, October 4 1979 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical grounding for my analyses in chapters 4 and 5, which I 
refer to as discourse theory. The chapter builds on the premise that theory and method are not 
separate choices, but intertwined; though discourse analysis can be performed on the basis of 
several theoretical perspectives, employing it also entails some epistemological and 
ontological choices (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). As argued by Hopf (2004: 31), discourse 
analysis is “a political theory as much as a method of inquiry”. My discussions of theoretical 
and methodological principles will therefore be somewhat intermeshed throughout the 
chapter. Several of the insights are inspired by Jackson (2006), Connolly (1991) and 
Nietzsche (1873; 1997 [1886]), who do not refer to ‘discourse’ (or only to a very low extent), 
but I see these scholars as lying theoretically close to my approach in this chapter and 
therefore use their insights in relation to discourse theory. However, I do not contend to 
present the ‘one and only’ discourse theory; like for any approach there is a degree of 
theoretical eclecticism here, and I may well have marginalized some aspects that others would 
regard as central.  
 
Before discussing discourse as concept, the chapter presents two fundamental elements of 
discourse theory. Section 2.1 presents elements of a social constructionist epistemology, 
emphasizing the contingency of social ‘reality’ and the mutually constitutive relation between 
the human being and the social world. Section 2.2 discusses the ontological importance of 
language to discourse theory. Taking a post-structuralist perspective, it presents language as 
an ultimately unstable system that can never reach complete closure, where meaning arises 
differentially from the way words stand in relation to each other. Section 2.3 then moves to 
discourse as concept, building on other scholars’ insights and presenting the way I understand 
the concept in this thesis. The section also discusses other concepts central to performing 
!!
!
! !
!
$)!
!
discourse analysis. Section 2.4 compares discourse theory to other theoretical schools, 
emphasizing specifically important divergences from positivist theory. It also includes a 
discussion of the concept of ‘security’ from the perspective of discourse theory, drawing 
especially on the insight of Wæver (1998). The chapter ends with section 2.5, which discusses 
the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in light of the insights from the earlier sections. 
 
2.1 A world constructed 
Discourse theory has a constructionist view of social reality – it sees it as always in flux, 
continuously shaped through human interaction. The social world is not given a priori; it has 
no ontological existence independent of the activities of the individuals that constitute it!
(Jackson 2006: 14; Hardy et al. 2004: 20). The ‘state’, for example, would disappear if no one 
legitimized actions on behalf of it or reproduced it in some other way (Campbell 1998a) – 
though it is of course a discursive change that is very unlikely today. When departing from 
such a perspective of fundamental contingency, what is interesting is not to look for change 
occurring to stable actors and social structures, but essentially its opposite: the stabilization of 
a social reality that is always in some degree of transformation (Jackson 2006: 15). 
 
As human beings we are part and parcel of this social reality, and our identities are 
continuously formed through interaction with the social world rather than given essentially by 
nature. The identity of a subject does not exist solely inside the separate mind, but rather on 
multiple levels that are not all covered by conceptions of individual consciousness and 
rationality. Building on the psychoanalytical insight of Sigmund Freud and especially Jacques 
Lacan, discourse theory sees the subject as constructed through continuous interaction with 
images of what it ‘is’ in the social world, given by and processed through language as a 
shared social structure (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 54). Beyond such continuous 
identifications, there is no ‘real’ centre of subjectivity, and discourse theory thus challenges 
any conception of a unified subject with an essential identity (Mouffe 1993: 75-76).  When 
such conceptions are challenged, the idea of individuals representing themselves exactly ‘as 
they are’ isolated of social structures makes little sense. Every forum, private or public, 
always entails some sets of norms or expectations that the individual needs to constitute him- 
or herself in relation to; even the private sphere of e.g. the family is never unaffected by 
power in some form (Jackson 2006: 22).  
 
!!
!
! !
!
$*!
!
This does not mean that discourse theory has no room for human agency. Removing this 
would revert to a mere structuralism and make accounting for change very difficult. To the 
contrary, agency is fundamental to a dialectical view of the social world, where subjects are 
continuously both producing and being produced by their social surroundings. This allows 
ample room for both idiosyncrasies and social change – what Jackson (2006: 32) refers to as 
“unpredictable social actions [having] a meaningful effect on outcomes”. As was argued by 
Durkheim, viewing the social as more than a collection of individual consciousnesses does 
not entail anything ‘metaphysical’ (Giddens 1971: 67); the importance of the individual is 
indeed acknowledged here, but the emphasis is on construction through social interaction. 
Here there are clear contrasts to utilitarianism, which tends to treat the social ahistorically, as 
an aggregation of actions by isolated individuals (Giddens 1971: 69), and to methodological 
individualism, which sees the individual as acting rationally according to fixed interests and 
dispositions, irrespective of social conditioning (Vatn 2005: ch. 3). Though methodological 
individualism emphasizes the individual as an object of study more strongly than discourse 
theory, it actually takes away agency by making these individuals little more than carriers of 
set inputs. Agency is sacrificed for the sake of agents (Jackson 2006: 35-36). As put by 
Baudrillard (2002: 67), “the man who has this ‘rational’ choice allotted to him is no longer, 
ultimately, free to decide”. 
 
2.1.1 Contingent and relational identity  
Because of its rejection of essentialism, discourse theory sees the representation of any 
permanent and total identity as a manifestation of power and deserving of illumination 
(Connolly 1991: 66). This is not only the case with identities; any attempt to lock down a part 
of social reality as ‘objectively’ given is problematic and an object of study for the discourse 
analyst. These are important perspectives for how ‘terrorism’ as phenomenon and the 
‘terrorist’ identity are represented in my analyses in chapters 4 and 5, and this is reflected in 
my research questions. However, a distinction between the natural and the social sciences 
should be made here: While one can certainly point to theoretical issues with uncovering 
‘objective’ truths on a general level – Nietzsche (1997 [1886]) has indeed done so – such 
aspirations are much more problematic in the social sciences because of the contingency of 
social constructions (and thus human identity). As put by Fierke (2004: 38), “[t]he natural 
scientist has a freedom to impose meaning on the natural world. The social scientist does not 
because the subjects of analysis are meaning creating creatures”. 
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The definition of identities is essential to the legitimization of political action. Policy needs to 
be seen as ontologically interlinked with representations of identity; political identities do not 
exist outside of their employment in practice as justifications for policies, while policies make 
no sense unless they are related to an overarching image of which identities are at play. Policy 
and identity are “simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product” (Hansen 2006: 21). 
This entails that what is said to describe actions and their underlying motivations is not 
isolated from the actions themselves, but part of what constitutes them as what they are 
(Jackson 2006: 25). As an example, policy represented as part of a ‘counter-terrorist’ effort is 
not just undertaken in response to an objective and pre-given ‘terrorist’ threat; a given reality 
of ‘terrorism’ is reproduced by the legitimization of such policy (Barrinha 2010: 166). This 
derives from a relational view of identity: Rather than viewing identity atomistically, as 
something that can be understood outside of relations to others, it sees the delineation of a 
‘we’ as contingent on the delineation of a ‘them’ as the constitutive outside (Mouffe 1993: 84-
85). It is this principle especially that makes discourse theory suitable for seeing how the 
representations of a ‘terrorist’ Other take part in the negotiation of Self-identity.  
 
2.2 The role of language in discourse theory 
Language holds a very important ontological position in discourse theory, and the view of 
language I present here is grounded in post-structuralism. It is through language individuals 
make sense of the world, and it is therefore the medium of the social construction that I 
outlined in the above section. From the perspective of post-structuralism, meaning emerges 
not through the essence of words themselves, but through the constellations in which they 
stand in relation to other words (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 36). This entails a differential 
rather than a referential view of language; the latter which is common to mainstream 
international relations theory (Wæver 2002: 24). Following Hansen (2006: 19), meaning 
derives from both positive and negative associations between words (signifiers) – what I refer 
to as articulations and differentiations and describe further in section 2.3. Such a totality is of 
course extremely complex and must be regarded analytically rather than something that can 
be grasped in toto.  
 
Because language is social, and not something each and every individual owns privately, there 
is no way to grasp an unfiltered and completely idiosyncratic reality beyond language. This 
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does not mean that there is no real material world out there, as is often alleged of post-
structuralism and other critical theories (Marsh 2009; Keohane cited in Connolly 1991: 52-
54), but that this reality is ambiguous and multi-faceted and has to be conceived of textually 
in order to be given meaning (Neumann 2001: 37). Such meaning is dependent on already 
existing internal relations given in language. These relations are not permanent, however; a 
post-structuralist perspective sees language as an open system that can never reach complete 
closure; signifiers can never be locked in permanent relations to what they point to 
(signifieds).14 This shows an important point of departure from structuralism, which generally 
sees the underlying structure of language (langue) as set in stone (Wæver 2002: 23). 
Signifiers are thus ultimately metaphors through which we make sense of the ‘outside world’, 
rather than direct and stable referents to it. 
 
This perspective owes a great deal to Nietzsche (1873), who argued that it is self-deception to 
believe that we are unveiling truths objective and independent of human beings through the 
structures in languages, and that we can never use language to grasp the thing-in-itself, only 
in a way where it becomes intelligible and useful for us; “the metamorphosis of the world into 
man” (ibid.). 15 If this were not the case, there would not be as many languages. Building on 
this, he argued that our concepts make us believe that people have inert and individual 
‘faculties’, but that these are really metaphors for a series of separate incidents we construct 
as similar by grouping them together (ibid.):  
We call a person “honest”. Why did he act so honestly today? we ask. Our answer usually sounds 
like this: because of his honesty. Honesty! That is to say again: the leaf is the cause of the leaves. 
After all, we know nothing of an essence-like quality named “honesty”; we know only numerous 
individualized, and thus unequal actions, which we equate by omitting the unequal and by then 
calling them honest actions. 
This is an important perspective to keep in mind when studying representations of the 
‘terrorist’ identity, if understood as an ‘internal’ essence derived from a set of acts of 
‘terrorism’ (which is of course by itself such a metaphor).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 To foreshadow the understanding of discourse somewhat here, it is exactly such closure that discourses strive 
to establish (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 38). If successful, this makes it seem as if the relation between signifier 
and signified were in fact permanent.  Due to the unstable nature of language, it is a site of political practice; it is 
where identities are both created and marginalized.!
15 See http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra-
Moral_Sense.htm 
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2.2.1 Intertextuality 
When the meanings of words are seen as dependent on (unstable) internal relations, it follows 
naturally that meanings of texts are contingent on their relations to earlier texts, rather than 
just inherent characteristics of the texts themselves (Wigen 2013: 13). Texts are indeed 
individually unique, but their meaning must also be understood as “a product of other 
readings and interpretations” (Hansen 2006: 55). This is what we understand by 
intertextuality. Meaning does thus never have one unequivocal ‘starting point’. As language is 
social, words will always have been used before, and their meanings are dependent on the 
myriad of associations that have earlier been made (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 84). As 
pertinently put by Mouffe (1993: 17), “[i]t is through language that the horizon of our present 
in constituted; this language bears the mark of the past; it is the life of the past in the present 
and thus constitutes the movement of tradition”. When texts are intertextually linked, a dual 
process of legitimization takes place: The referencing text constructs legitimacy for its own 
reading, but the older text simultaneously becomes reproduced (Hansen 2006: 57). Relating 
this to the specific purposes of this thesis; when an actor reproduces a common representation 
of ‘terrorism’ given in, for example, a series of United Nations resolutions, the actor’s 
statement is not only made more ‘legitimate’ through referencing something ‘everyone can 
agree upon’; it importantly contributes to the reproduction of the representation itself – a form 
of agency which is exactly the condition of existence for discourses. 
 
Intertextuality does not make the tracing of concepts in history meaningless; it is rather the 
condition that makes it relevant. Noticing shifts in the articulations between words, and seeing 
rhetorical commonplaces used in new settings, is important in order to trace the gradual 
development of representations into ‘common sense’. This makes genealogy central to a 
discourse analytical methodology – the attempt to go backwards in time to exhume 
conceptual origins and study the specific sites of employment of rhetorical commonplaces, 
tracing in this way their development. In chapter 3 I look at the historical deployment of some 
of the concepts used by the Turkish actors in their representations of Self-identity, and in 
chapters 4 and 5 I discuss intertextual elements to how ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as Other is 
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represented.16  Tracing such origins can also give insight into who has been in a position to 
shape hegemonic representations. 
 
2.3 The concept of discourse 
The concept of discourse is essential to my empirical treatment in this thesis. Though it may 
seem paradoxical, it would be a demonstration of hubris to insist upon some clear-cut and 
unequivocal definition of the concept, exactly because discourse theory stresses contingency 
and does thus not accept locked-down meanings of words. Because it has been used in so 
many contexts, and often without theoretical commitments, ‘discourse’ has almost taken the 
qualities of a free-for-all that can mean anything (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999), and hence there 
are good reasons to counteract this by interpreting it and giving it a definition when it is 
employed, and by highlighting how various scholars have employed the concept theoretically. 
I will start by presenting five central aspects to how I understand the concept in this thesis, 
inspired mainly by Laffey and Weldes (2004), before presenting a set of definitions, including 
the one that guides my analyses. 
 
Firstly, discourses define the objects of reality and how they are ordered in relation to each 
other, directing how statements can be made and enabling certain practices. Power is manifest 
in discourses through the dissemination of representations as social ‘truths’. Secondly, 
discourses take part in producing the subjects that are acting within them. A ‘counter-
terrorism expert’, for example, knows what he or she is and does through the way both 
‘terrorism’ and ‘counter-terrorism’ are represented in discourse. Thirdly, discourses are 
political as they construct identities and put these in relation to other identities. A mutually 
constitutive relation between Self and Other entails that representing the Other will 
simultaneously reinforce the conception of the Self as something definite. Fourthly, 
discourses do not only have linguistic manifestations, but can present themselves materially, 
through structures such as institutions. The NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence Against 
Terrorism, one of the sources of my texts, is a good example in this regard. The existence of 
such an institution will reproduce the representation that there is a definite and general 
phenomenon called terrorism, and that someone is working to protect against it. Fifthly, 
discourses are about exclusion, about barring “other possibilities of world-interpretation” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Here it is mainly implicit intertextuality that is emphasized (Hansen 2006: 57-58): how historically important 
rhetorical commonplaces end up in the representations of Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers 
without this being drawn attention to. 
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(Nietzsche 1997 [1886]: 14). As argued by Græger (2007: 23), the doxa of a discourse – the 
‘taken-for-granted’ – define the actions – such as policies – that can validly be pursued. 
 
The above is supported by many scholars, though it is often put in different terms. Jørgensen 
& Phillips (1999: 9) define discourse as “a certain way of speaking about and understanding 
the world (or a part of the world)” and note that discourses refer to the way language is 
structured in patterns that our statements have to follow, but that are not the same across 
different social domains.17 Hansen (2006: 18-20) argues that policy discourses rely upon both 
constructions of problems and subjectivities, that discourses are not merely the same as ideas 
but also have a material aspect, and that discourses “strive to fix meaning around a closed 
structure”, though this fixity is never complete. Neumann (2001: 18) expands this by 
explicitly including the constitutive function of discourse, arguing that it is “a system for 
bringing forth a set of statements and practices that, through being embedded in institutions 
and appear more or less as normal, are constitutive of reality for their carriers and have a 
certain regularity in a set of social relations”.18 In all of these views we see the important 
commonality that discourse is about representing the social world as if it were unequivocally 
locked-down in some definite pattern. 
 
Because the representation of a ‘terrorist’ identity is very important to what I study in this 
thesis, and because none of the above definitions emphasize identities specifically, I here offer 
the definition that guides my analyses: A discourse is a system for generating meaning which 
both produces and builds on representations of what the world looks like and what its 
important identities are; striving to fix the ordering of these in relation to each other in a way 
that conditions what can and cannot be meaningfully said. 
 
Though I describe discourses as systems, they exist because of reproduced patterns of 
practice, not because of some essential and underlying configuration; the representations they 
contain cannot be isolated from continuous social construction. If this were not so, discourse 
would be reducible to the Saussurean concept of langue – the underlying, set structure of 
language (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 19). Discourse must therefore also be understood in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
'9!My translation, from “en bestemt made at tale om og forstå verden (eller et udsnit af verden) på”.!
18!My translation, from “et system for frembringelse av et sett utsagn og praksiser som, ved å innskrive seg i 
institusjoner og fremstå som mer eller mindre normale, er virkelighetskonstituerende for sine bærere og har en 
viss grad av regularitet i et sett sosiale relasjoner”!
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plural sense, so that one can talk of (e.g.) a ‘sports discourse’, a ‘feminist discourse’, a 
‘terrorism discourse’ and so on. This is not to say that the dividing lines between discourses 
are finite or sharp; separating discourses is a matter of interpretation and the identification of 
patterns (such as the recurrence of rhetorical commonplaces. As argued by Foucault (1972: 
33), they are “initial approximation[s]”, and they must remain open to discoveries that lead to 
the dissolution of their own outlines.  
 
Many of the above points are overlooked by scholars who nonetheless use the concept of 
discourse. Kettell (2012: 3) argues that a “discursive strategy” must stand in a plausible 
relation to the “actual conditions to which it refers”, and that the credibility of the strategy can 
be undermined if the “real” situation “on the ground” changes. Here he implies that there is 
something outside of discourse that can either be represented correctly or misrepresented, and 
used in this sense the concept of discourse is easily reduced to ‘argument’. According to the 
perspective of this thesis, it is better to view all social phenomena as discursive, but to view 
some as much more locked-down than others – which is where hegemony enters the frame. 
 
2.3.1 Hegemony 
Seeing the social world as fluid and language as inherently unstable does not mean that 
degrees of fixity do not exist. Some discursive constructions are far more stable than others – 
most often one representation of reality is dominant (Neumann 2001: 60). This is captured by 
the concept of hegemony. The discourse theoretical perspective on hegemony builds on 
Gramsci (1971: 12), who presented the concept as something that “the dominant group enjoys 
because of its position and function in the world of production”, leading to the masses 
spontaneously consenting to “the general direction on social life”. However, discourse theory 
sheds away the essentialism in Gramsci’s neo-Marxist approach, where there is an objective 
material ‘basis’ underlying the (discursive) ‘superstructure’. Discourse theory sees hegemony 
instead as the successful stabilization of meaning. In this perspective, identification with for 
example a social class does not mean that it ‘objectively’ exists, but that there is (temporary) 
closure, so that people identify with it and take it for granted (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 51).  
 
It is here we find the understanding of power in discourse theory: Power is not a thing that 
people have, but is manifested in knowledge, identities and the relations between them, as 
well as in the exclusion of other possibilities. It hides itself by dissolving into ‘objectivity’, 
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making the social world appear as though not constructed (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 49). 
Foucault (1972: 24) argued for being critical towards this: 
We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before 
any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust those 
forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; 
they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign. 
An important goal of discourse analysis is to expose such ‘ready-made syntheses’ – to show 
practically, through the analysis of texts in their proper form, how the locking-down of 
meaning is engendered by the discursive act of representation. Here we again see why the 
scene from Homeland described at the beginning of chapter 1 is important. Without an 
underlying field of meaning supporting some degree of natural relation between Islam and 
‘terrorism’, suddenly including a scene where the soldier bows down in prayer would make as 
little sense as one where he goes out to bet on horses.  
 
Two related concepts developed by Laclau and Mouffe (referred in Jørgensen & Phillips 
1999: 51-52) are important to discursive stability: myths and imaginaries. A myth offers a 
complete reading frame for social situations and is generally tied to a rhetorical 
commonplace, such as an idea of ‘Turkey’. Such myths can become exchanged radically, 
however, and a pertinent example here is Çelik’s (2000) argument that the inception of the 
Turkish Republic in 1923, and the nation-building project that followed it, entailed the 
creation of a new national myth that replaced the undermined Ottoman order, is pertinent in 
this regard. I argue that this understanding of a myth is similar to Wæver’s (2002: 31) 
understanding of different discursive layers, where some are more fundamental and stable 
than others. Wæver’s insight is important for seeing how basic elements of political discourse 
(such as the identity of the ‘nation-state’ being acted on behalf of) may be shared by 
politicians with strongly opposing views on a specific policy issue, in a way that will already 
have narrowed the spectrum of policies that can sensibly be proposed. Imaginaries are highly 
successful myths that shape an overall ‘field of intelligibility’, such as the ‘Enlightenment’ 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 15-16) – an imaginary of which I emphasize the development 
in chapter 3. The nation-state system could by itself be regarded as such an imaginary; today, 
it is indeed quite dominant in rendering the world intelligible. Its naturalization is apparent in 
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a wealth of forums: watching a newscast, a viewer is unlikely to regard the distinction 
between domestic and international news as something else than the natural order of things.'&  
 
2.3.2  The political relevance of discourse 
Discourse is important to international relations inquiry because political actors are situated 
within a larger discursive field that individual statements cannot be divorced from, and within 
which their actions need to make sense; reproduced not only by the politicians themselves but 
by (e.g.) the media or other institutions (Hansen 2006: 7). As Wæver (2002: 26) argues, “it is 
always necessary for policy makers to be able to present a convincing narrative of how the 
present trends […] point towards a future which is hospitable to an attractive vision of the 
self”. Though he is referring specifically to foreign policy, we can apply the same principle to 
how Turkish policy-makers frame the measures taken in the conflict with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK). What the PKK is, and what the conflict with it is, needs to resonate on 
some level with an idea of a Turkish Self. It is important, however, that discourses are not 
seen simply as strategic tools employed by political actors to gain support or legitimacy. 
Though it is of course important that politicians appeal to identities in order to justify policies, 
focusing on this in a narrow sense, as a form of rational manipulation, takes away the basis of 
discourse theory. Discourses take part in constituting the actors themselves, and their world-
views, as well as the conflicts themselves (Barrinha 2010: 163).  
 
While public utterances are most definitely empirically central to discourse analysis, the goal 
is not to use such data to draw conclusions about the thoughts in people’s heads – to conclude 
whether or not they ‘really meant’ what they said. Firstly, we have no way of really knowing 
whether we are right (Jackson 2006: 22); secondly, discourse theory sees it as far more 
interesting to examine the structures that condition and facilitate what actors say when they 
need to legitimize some form of action. As put by Laffey and Weldes (1997), we wish to 
identify the ‘symbolic technologies’ and social relations through which actors perform, rather 
than personal ‘beliefs’. Such beliefs are not even necessary for the performing of functions; 
one may very well employ and reproduce a discourse on ‘terrorism’ through one’s job as a 
‘counter-terrorism official’, whether or not one really ‘believes’ in what one is doing. This can 
contrasted for example with the neo-realist account of the ‘war on terror’ given by Van Evera 
(2007). Here the emphasis is unequivocally on actors in the George W. Bush Administration 
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19 I owe the credits for this example to Jørgensen & Phillips (1999)!
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making the wrong policy decisions, rather than on the resources they drew on to make such 
policies sensible towards various audiences (for example, how it was possible to represent 
Saddam Hussein as a main threat to the United States). People do of course have motivations, 
but these cannot be isolated from the shared notions that are used to make sense vis-à-vis the 
collective (Jackson 2006: 24).  
 
This view of discourse does not mean that it is something completely external to human 
beings, which decides strictly what they can say or not. Arguing this would take away agency. 
By employing and combining rhetorical commonplaces in new ways, perhaps borrowing from 
other discourses, actors will modify discourse – potentially also changing the way their 
identities are constructed by others through ‘identity-politics strategies’ (Rumelili 2007: 15). 
The degree of success in disseminating some representations and excluding others is essential 
to policy formulation. As Græger (2007: 43) puts it, “whoever wins the political battle of 
framing the discourse can to a large part also control the shaping of policy”.20 But discourses 
nonetheless significantly affect the formulation of statements. Although it could be practically 
possible to give whichever representation of a situation one would want, many of these are 
made “politically impossible by the creative and contingent ways that commonplaces [have 
been] deployed during debates” (Jackson 2006: 113 [emphasis in original]). Politicians and 
other actors in formal positions may psychologically have a series of idiosyncratic reasons for 
their actions, but as long as there are no discursive resources through which to sensibly 
represent them, they are actually of less importance when doing discourse analysis. 
 
2.3.3 Studying discourses: key concepts 
How does one identify a discourse? How does one know what is a relevant part of it, and 
what is not? Here we encounter one of the potential weaknesses of discourse theory: By 
assuming the a priori existence of a given discourse, one can end up taking part in its creation 
or reproduction, seeing everything as ‘making sense’ as a part of it. This problem is 
counteracted by letting the identification of a discourse follow from nodal points, privileged 
signifiers that serve as an intersection for chains of other signifiers (Howarth & Stavrakakis 
2000: 8), such as ‘the market’ for economical discourses, ‘the body’ in medical discourses 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 1999), or – in this case – ‘terrorism’ (or ‘terrorist’). As an example of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Translated from “Den som vinner den politiske kampen om innrammingen av diskursen kan i stor grad også 
kontrollere politikkens utforming”. 
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how nodal points are important, ‘flexible’ gets a quite different meaning in a discourse with 
‘the market’ as a nodal point, than it would in a discourse where ‘the body’ served this role. 
From the identification of such nodal points the analyst can begin to outline discourse, 
reasoning backwards from empirical manifestations in texts (Laffey & Weldes 2004: 28).  
 
Four other concepts are specifically important to my analyses in chapters 4 and 5: articulation, 
differentiation, breaking and interpellation. By articulation I refer to the linking of signifiers 
in associative chains, so that the first comes to entail the other. For example, ‘democracy’ can 
be articulated to ‘freedom’ or ‘terrorist’ to ‘fundamentalism’. In order to discover 
articulations, the discourse analyst has to look for specific rhetorical commonplaces, what 
Laffey and Weldes (2004: 29) refer to as the “main signifying elements of the discourse”, and 
then identify the “[c]hains of connotation” that articulate them together. Here it is also 
important to look for how rhetorical commonplaces are articulated to material aspects of 
discourse, such as institutions, for example the articulation of ‘counter-terrorism’ to the 
NATO. Articulation can also be referred to as joining (Jackson 2006) or linking (Hansen 
2006). The flipside of articulations are differentiations (Hansen 2006), where signifiers are 
instead contrasted with others. To use an example relevant for this thesis to illustrate these 
two concepts, a ‘terrorist’ is understood through its articulation to a large set of signifiers and 
its differentiation from others – as well as through the internal relations between these other 
signifiers as well (if ‘terrorist’ is clearly differentiated from ‘security force’ and ‘security 
force’ is articulated to ‘legitimate’, then a differential relation is established between 
‘terrorist’ and ‘legitimate’ as well). Neither articulations nor differentiations are permanently 
set in stone, but require continuous discursive labor both for their creation and their 
maintenance.  
 
When understanding identity relationally, articulations and differentiations related to the 
Other will at the same time have consequences for the discursive representation of the Self, 
through the representation of what the Self is not. For this reason, an identity can be upheld 
and represented without at all describing it directly; rather “inferred from (and assured by) its 
opposite” (Balibar quoted in Campbell 1998: 89). This is described well by Hansen (2006: 44) 
in relation to the representations of President George W. Bush: 
When Bush constructs Saddam Hussein as ‘evil’, he does not explicitly say that he, himself, is ‘not 
evil’; when the ‘Iraqi people are defined as ‘oppressed’, he does not immediately declare that ‘the 
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American people are not oppressed’. Not only would such repetitive juxtapositions make speech 
unbearably cumbersome, but also the audience to whom he is speaking is supposed not to question 
the implicit American parts of the juxtapositions.  
Differentiations must not be confused with breaking, however, which refers to the attempt to 
counter a dominant articulation between rhetorical commonplaces, so that reproducing a 
discourse will not imply certain representations (Jackson 2006: 45). In my analyses we will 
see many examples of such breaking – of the articulation between Islam and ‘terrorism’.  
 
The last central concept I will discuss here is interpellation, understood as a practice where 
identities (or subject positions) are created, and specific entities or individuals are represented 
as part of these (Laffey & Weldes 2004);‘terrorist’ being the identity par excellence in this 
thesis. The obvious example here is interpellating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) into 
this identity, which simultaneously subjects it to the discursive web of meaning within which 
‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ are placed. Interpellations can also be accepted by those subjected, 
so that they come to identify with it and reproduce it themselves. As an example of how such 
a dynamic can potentially unfold; with the increasing representation of Turkey as a Muslim 
rather than secular partner by the United States from 2002, this was eventually reproduced by 
the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) as well (Østereng 2011: 34). 
 
It is also important to identify the subject position – the abstract ‘we’ – that the speaker (or 
writer) purports to represent, such as ‘Norwegians’, ‘the international society’ or ‘the working 
class’ (I refer to this as the Self in my analyses). This can be regarded as a form of Self-
interpellation. By for example stating ‘our common civilization’, a Turkish politician would 
interpellate Turkey into this identity. Not everyone is allowed to invoke every identity, 
however; it would for example most likely be perceived as somewhat strange if a North 
Korean politician purported to be representing a ‘Western’ identity, though there is nothing 
essentially wrong about it (that Australia is generally seen as part of the ‘Western’ world 
shows the indeterminacy of geography here). Statements are contextually dependent upon the 
person – understood as the identity of the person, not the physical body – from whom they 
originate (Foucault 1972: 56). It is nonetheless this dynamic that makes possible the 
negotiation of ‘difference’. 
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It is important to underline that discourse analysis is not allegorical in the sense of taking a 
series of statements and ‘reading between the lines’ to discover their ‘actual’ meaning. It 
departs specifically from what is being said, and a given rhetorical commonplace can 
therefore not be assumed as implied in the text. By itself, the one scene from Homeland 
described at the beginning of the thesis cannot be used to infer an articulation to ‘terrorism’ 
without this actually being explicit. Its condition of possibility can however be grasped from a 
discourse theoretical perspective – as the consistent articulation between Islam and ‘terrorism’ 
in political discourse, popular culture, etc.  
 
Having presented the epistemological importance of social constructionism and the 
ontological importance of language, and having discussed the specific concept of discourse, I 
now move to positioning discourse theory in relation to other theoretical approaches. 
  
2.4 Discourse theory in the international relations discipline 
As follows naturally from the discussion in this chapter, choosing discourse analysis as a 
method for making sense of empirical data entails certain theoretical commitments. Though 
there is no universal link between discourse analysis and a given epistemology, this means 
that the method is unsuited to fulfill certain scientific goals. In the following section I will 
discuss central differences between discourse theory and other theoretical approaches to 
international relations, beginning with contrasts to positivist theory. Emphasizing such 
contrasts does not entail the rejection of other theoretical approaches as unfruitful or 
irrelevant, but the acknowledgement of some questions being better answered from some 
theoretical viewpoints. Jackson (2012) puts this well when arguing for theoretical pluralism: 
Feminist, post-colonial, and critical constructivist scholarship, to select just three examples, may 
simply not be interested in the question of whether some X is correlated with some Y; this does not 
detract from the potential validity of a claim about the relationship between X and Y, but it does 
suggest that perhaps there might be other important questions to ask that do not fit neatly into that 
neopositivist explanatory framework.21 
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21 Jackson refers to neo-positivism here. When I instead use positivism (without the neo prefix) this is most 
likely similar to Jackson’s understanding, as I am referring not to an older, Comtean conception of positivism, 
but to the form which has been dominant in international relations since the mid-20th century, and which 
emerged out of logical positivism – without adopting its very stark principles of what qualifies as proper 
knowledge (Smith 1996: 14-15). 
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In relation to ‘terrorism’ I will go one step further than Jackson, however. The reason a 
discourse theoretical approach is suitable is not only that its view of identity allows for 
important insight into what representations of ‘terrorism’ enable, but also the conviction that a 
neo-positivist explanatory framework stands in danger of reproducing a problematic status 
quo through the use of purportedly objective concepts carrying with themselves a certain 
worldview (which I of course recognize is a value statement).  
 
2.4.1 Contrasts to positivist international relations theory"" 
Discourse analysis as method is incompatible with a strictly positivist view of science where 
one attempts to get as close as possible to objective truths about a social reality seen as 
unchanging, grounded in an empiricist epistemology and relying on methods common to the 
natural sciences. For international relations specifically the two most central contrasting 
theories are neo-realism and neo-liberalism, which can both be seen as generally positivist. 
Smith (1996: 15-16) makes four important arguments regarding positivism in international 
relations that I will reproduce here, as they all are viewed critically from a discourse 
theoretical perspective. 
 
Firstly, positivist accounts believe in unity between the natural and social sciences, so that the 
same methodologies and epistemologies are applicable to both without incurring theoretical 
problems. This is contrary to the perspective of discourse theory on human beings as not 
essentially given, but embedded in a mutually conditioning and contingent relation with the 
social world. Secondly, they divide clearly between ‘facts’ and ‘values’, where discourse 
theory sees also such ‘facts’ as dependent on their discursive framing, rejecting “the once 
sacrosanct distinction between objective scientific explanations and subjective hermeneutical 
descriptions and understandings” (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 6). Thirdly, positivist 
accounts seek to uncover transcendent social regularities, where discourse theory sees 
regularities as contextually dependent. Fourthly, they believe in the validation of knowledge 
(or unsuccessful falsification) through hypothesis-testing, which discourse theory sees as 
problematic because claims of having uncovered a truth about the social world will itself take 
part in changing said world. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 An apropos should be made regarding the distinctions in this subsection. Discourse theory might also be seen 
as positivist in the sense that its ontology defines language – actual texts – as valid data, as has been stated by 
e.g. Foucault, but this does not mean that it accepts social reality as objectively ‘verifiable’ (Neumann 2001: 36).!
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I will add three more issues with neo-realism and neo-liberalism in international relations to 
the four derived from Smith’s (1996) description of positivism. Firstly, they reify the nation-
state as actor on the world arena, making this into a universal starting point for theorizing, 
disregarding the way the state is reproduced through practice and how it – like other concepts 
– have grown out of specific traditions and due to specific needs. One of the important 
strengths of discourse theory is that it offers a perspective from which to look critically at 
concepts that are often taken for granted, such as ‘democracy’, ‘the national interest’ or 
‘terrorism’, seeing them as elements of discourses rather than independent variables. 
Secondly, neo-realism and neo-liberalism seek to establish clear causal relations in a way that 
disregards the mutually constitutive nature between e.g. identities and policies (Hansen 2006). 
Thirdly, they build on pre-given and self-interested agents that act (or should act) according to 
‘real interests’, whether this is the individual or the abstract state, disregarding the way 
interests are conditioned on the way the social world and its identities are represented (Weldes 
1996). Though efforts have been made in positivist international relations scholarship to more 
consistently integrate ideational factors (e.g. Goldstein & Keohane 1993), a problem persists 
when they stick to a division between ‘ideas’ and a given, non-discursive realm (for example 
of ‘interests’), as well as by reifying ‘ideas’ and treating them as objects that can be converted 
to variables and put in traditional causal models (Laffey & Weldes 1997). 
 
Criticisms have also been directed from positivist towards post-positivist schools (of which I 
consider discourse theory to be a part). A well-known example of this is Robert Keohane’s 
seminal address in 1988 as President of the International Studies Association, where he 
distinguished between ‘rationalistic’ (e.g. his own neo-liberal institutionalism) and ‘reflective’ 
(post-positivist) schools. While he did affirm the importance of both and cast doubt on the 
“legitimacy of rationalism’s intellectual hegemony”, he criticized ‘reflective’ schools both for 
lacking a research program, and for lacking “theories of their own with a prior[i] content” 
(Keohane 1988: 392-393). While he has been rightly answered on the first point by 
representatives of such schools, advocating for staying away from ‘pure theory’ and striving 
to be able to account empirically for important social and political issues (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis 2000; Hansen 2006), his second criticism attacks ‘reflective’ schools on an unfair 
front. Keohane subjects these schools to criteria they are intent on criticizing in the first place, 
asking for a priori principles in explaining a social world that is seen as contingent. His 
willingness to accept ‘reflective’ theory thus becomes a “back-handed faux tolerance”, 
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communicating that “everyone can play if you play my game”, and not an actual recognition 
of theoretical pluralism (Jackson 2012).23  
 
A similar reflection of ‘rationalistic’ terms understood as a priori valid is seen in Kenneth 
Waltz’ concession that theories cannot grasp reality in full, but should rather be judged on the 
basis of whether they are useful, which presents ‘usefulness’ in a seemingly neutral way that 
“allows only the criteria of ‘explanatory and predictive power’ […] to govern theory 
construction and reconstruction” (Connolly 1991: 51). Though discourse analysis does not 
look to test pre-made hypotheses in order to attain objective knowledge about the social 
world, this does not mean one cannot use it for constructing meaningful knowledge; there is 
much to be derived from how representations show a social world as if it were objectively 
given. Discourse analysis is suitable for answering my research questions because it allows 
for tracing how policies come to be rendered sensible and how this affects the identities of the 
actors involved. And because of its ontological emphasis on language, it offers a source 
(texts) from which to account for both stability and change. It can even account for a form of 
causality; not in the neo-positivist sense as “the systematic correlation between factors across 
cases” (Jackson 2006: 40), but in the sense that a set of factors (dominant representations) can 
together make certain outcomes almost unavoidable. As an example drawn from my data 
material, if the representation of ‘terrorism’ as a global phenomenon that affects everyone and 
needs to be dealt with resolutely is practically unchallenged, it can be regarded as related in 
such a modified causal sense to the enactment of policies of international cooperation.24  
 
2.4.2 Discourse theory in relation to other schools 
There are important affinities between discourse theory and early sociological theory, 
specifically when it comes to emphasizing the social construction of reality. For example, 
Durkheim’s concept of the conscience collective – “beliefs and sentiments shared in common 
by the members of the society” (Giddens 1971: 75) – is similar to the concept of discourse in 
many respects.  Discourse theory also owes a lot to the theories of Marx, especially through 
the neo-Marxism of Gramsci. However, discourse theory emphasizes the ontological 
importance of language to a larger extent than sociology in general, and it has a critical 
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24 Note that such a form of ‘adequate causality’ does not say anything about whether or not an outcome would 
occur without such factors (Jackson 2006: 43).!
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attitude towards the essentialism that often follows with the use of concepts common in 
sociology (such as ‘class’). While sociology generally wishes to say something about groups; 
the way they construct their subjects, how they interact with other groups, and so on, 
discourse analysis is more interested in the practices that constitute them as groups in the first 
place; “mov[ing] the centre of social and political research from ‘ontically’ given objects of 
investigation to their ‘ontological’ conditions of possibility” (Laclau 2000: xi).  
 
Discourse theory also manifests important contrasts to some (so-called ‘thin’) constructivist 
accounts of international relations, though this is often less obvious than with neo-realism or 
neo-liberalism. While the constructed nature of the social world is emphasized by such 
accounts as well, they nonetheless often keep some factors entirely outside of discourse, 
making a clear ontological divide between ideas (as ‘thought’) and the material (as ‘reality’). 
We see the manifestations of this in arguments such as that of Hinnebusch (2009: 150), who 
states that the high levels of conflict in the Middle East is not caused by identity by itself, but 
by “its frustration by imposed material structures”; in Marsh (2009: 694-695) asking for 
giving “independent causal powers to the material realm”; or in Alexander Wendt’s treatment 
of states as unitary entities existing pre-discursively, erasing much of the distance to neo-
realism/neo-liberalism (Weldes 1996: 280). Constructivists also often rely on ‘shared values’ 
in a way that, as described above, make them seem as inert faculties (Jackson 2006: 15).  
 
A final distinction, which exemplifies that methods are not merely methods, is that between 
discourse analysis and content analysis, which have often been compared (Herrera & 
Braumoeller 2004). Though content analysis may also be empirically grounded in texts, it 
produces quantitative data and is more easily integrated into positivist accounts such as 
described above. From a discourse theoretical perspective, a problematic issue with content 
analysis is that it enters its field of study with pre-determined categories rather than letting 
them arise from the data, and has thus already contributed to reproducing the categories it 
wishes to study (Fierke 2003: 38). We see here a reason that refraining from the a priori 
content Keohane is asking for can be considered a strength of discourse analysis rather than a 
weakness, as it avoids gestures of essentialism and avoids having answers already built into 
the concepts that are being used (Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000: 5). 
 
2.4.3  Discourse theory and the concept of security 
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Much of international relations scholarship is concerned with questions of security: how 
threats are dealt with, what leads to given responses to threats, what structures are important 
for security, and so on. A discourse theoretical approach diverges from conventional 
approaches in security studies by emphasizing the process through which treats are defined as 
such in the first place. A central premise is that the portrayal of a threat by a political actor is 
not a reflection of its unproblematic existence in reality, but contingent on discursive 
positioning and the representations used (Hansen 2006: 25; Jackson 2006: 132). As Campbell 
(1998a: 2) importantly points out, the rejection of danger as an objective condition does not 
entail that no risks exist; they are out there, but not every risk is interpreted as dangerous; 
“events or factors that we identify as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an 
interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness” (ibid.). This is a very important 
distinction due to the common misinterpretation that discourse theory and other ‘post-
positivist’ perspectives contend that threats are only imaginary. For example, Neumann (2013: 
487) criticizes constructivist accounts by stating that “from this contorted perspective, Osama 
bin Laden or Saddam Hussein are merely products of Western paranoia, while Western 
approaches […] constitute a new form of global domination”. This is a far cry from the actual 
contentions here: [1] There is no unproblematic and a priori given link between a set of 
material factors and the identification of a threat; and [2] by defining something as a threat, 
the sensible response to it is to a large extent defined as well, especially when the threat is 
articulated to a clearly defined identity (Jackson 2006: 132).25 
 
The criticism from ‘rationalistic’ accounts of international relations is relevant here, because 
it is often pointed out that ‘reflective’ schools put little emphasis on material factors, 
especially when it comes to questions of security, where they need to be prioritized over 
ideational factors (see Hansen 2006: 33). Again we are dealing with a problematic 
thought/reality distinction. While it is of course true that a bullet to the head inflicts damage 
whether or not the receiver constructs it as ‘dangerous’, this is merely an isolated incident and 
quite uninteresting as a site of scientific inquiry. Something can hurt the physical body 
without being identified as a threat as such. It is for example quite unlikely for actors in the 
U.N. Security Council to refer to the ‘shared threat of cigarette smoking’, though smoking is 
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25!Weldes (1996) example of the ‘Cuban missile crisis’ is illustrative of this point: At the time of these events it 
may have seemed evident that the deployment of missiles by the Soviet Union needed a swift and clear response, 
but such conclusions followed almost passively through how the situation and its actors were dominantly 
represented (for example, that the whole event was a ‘crisis’; that the Soviet Union was ‘aggressive’ and 
‘secretive’). This was possible even though the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, noted in the 
National Security Council that he thought the missiles had no significance for the strategic balance (ibid.: 294).!
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associated with very high amounts of deaths. Purportedly objective material factors need to be 
given meaning (‘is a powerful United States a guarantor of peace or a threat the world?’), and 
it is this attribution of meaning that cannot be isolated from discursive positioning.  
 
As Wæver (1998: 50) has shown, the way the concept of ‘security’ is generally invoked in 
discussions of the political is not even in its ‘everyday’ meaning, as that of the physical body, 
but as part of a “specific field of practice […] where states threaten each other, challenge each 
other’s sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so 
on”; it is the ontological security of the nation-state that is generally represented as 
threatened. This is a very important point for this thesis, considering that part of the definition 
of  ‘terrorism’ in Turkey is “damaging the indivisible unity of the State with its territory and 
nation” and “jeopardizing the existence of the Turkish State and the Republic” 
(Legislationline 2013). When an issue is ‘securitized’ – moved into the realm of security 
politics – this is a potent political practice that claims legitimacy for dealing with the issue 
through exceptional measures (Wæver 1998: 51-54). Securitization also entails that actors 
cannot tone down the issue without incurring political costs, unless the issue is removed from 
the realm of security and into ‘normal’ politics again (desecuritization: Hansen 2011; Wæver 
1998). If something is defined as e.g. a ‘critical security threat’ and articulated to specific 
groups – such as the PKK – it will have important consequences for both the group’s 
legitimacy and for the approaches towards it. These perspectives give an important 
background for conceptualizing ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’, to which I now turn. 
 
2.5 A critical view on ‘terrorism’ 
After the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the topic of ‘terrorism’ gained 
increased attention in scholarly circles, a tendency strengthened by later attacks in (e.g.) Bali, 
Madrid and London. Many national governments allotted huge resources to research 
institutes, ‘think tanks’ and universities focusing on the study of ‘terrorism’, with an 
increasing demand for ‘terrorism specialists’ (Weinberg & Eubank 2008: 185). Though 
several attempts of understanding ‘terrorism’  as phenomenon have offered important insights 
and given due attention to questions pertaining to its definition, such as analyses of 
underlying (‘root’) causes (see Bjørgo 2005), few studies on ‘terrorism’ have been grounded 
in a discourse theoretical approach. Conventional approaches generally treat ‘terrorism’ or 
even ‘terrorist’ as independent variables that can be put into analyses of correlation or 
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causality without incurring problems (see Neumann 2013), purporting to know the ‘beliefs’ or 
‘mindset’ of the ‘terrorist’ Other (see Hoffmann 2002), or an understanding of the ‘terrorist’ 
as a basis for arguing for specific policies (see Van Evera 2007). 
 
I do not focus further here on conventional studies of ‘terrorism’ as phenomenon, simply 
because my focus is different altogether: I agree with Barrinha (2010: 168) in that the most 
relevant is “the discourse of terrorism, rather than the contested phenomenon itself”. An 
important reason that critical approaches to ‘terrorism’ are needed is to shed light on 
hegemonic renderings of it – and of its corollary ‘terrorist’ identity. Discourse theory offers a 
vantage point for such a perspective, seeing a given reality of ‘terrorism’ not as essential and 
pre-defined, but discursively dependent and changing across time. After all, at the time of the 
French Revolution, Maximilien Robespierre (1794) referred to the use of ‘terror’ (la terreur) 
as “nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible”, which is presumably a quite 
uncommon way of conceptualizing it today. As far back as 1100 BCE, the Assyrians used the 
word melammu to express purposeful terror, viewed as a necessary political tool (Fine 2010: 
272). The goal of the discourse analyst is therefore to study how a given image of reality is 
fixed by the invocation of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’, including the measures represented as 
necessary or even unavoidable in order to deal with it. It achieves this by departing from texts 
and looking for the way rhetorical commonplaces are articulated to or differentiated from both 
‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ and the Self, as well as for interpellations of groups or individuals into 
the ‘terrorist’ identity.  
 
The definition of ‘terrorism’ has been the subject of some controversy. In a 1984 study that 
asked a series of ‘terrorism experts’ about the concept, Schmid and Jungman (2005) 
discovered 109 different definitions of ‘terrorism’, with highly varying elements. However, 
they still argued that the “search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on” (2005: 1), 
offering a definition of their own – which the United Nations somewhat presumptuously 
refers to as an “academic consensus definition” (UN 2013)."$ In politics there is a low degree 
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26 For reference, since the length of the definition demonstrates the ambiguity of the concept: “Terrorism is an 
anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state 
actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly 
(targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as 
message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), 
(imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target 
of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or 
propaganda is primarily sought”.!
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of uniformity in how the concept is defined, which is illustrated by the U.S. State Department, 
the FBI, the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security all employing different 
definitions (Staun 2010: 404). From a discourse theoretical perspective this lack of a 
common, consistent definition is not seen as a token of incompetence or the lack of trying 
hard enough, but as a quite natural consequence of its nature as a rhetorical commonplace.  
 
This does not mean that the concept is a chimera and that discussing it is pointless and 
without effects. The lack of a common understanding of what ‘terrorism’ means does not 
even have to be a hindrance for extensive discussions, as it is not actually the beliefs of 
individual people that are relevant here, but the shared resources of language being employed. 
This can be illustrated by Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game’ (quoted in Jackson 2006: 24): 
 Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a ‘beetle’. No one can look into 
anyone else’s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. […] 
But suppose the word ‘beetle’ has a use in these people’s language? – If so it would not be used as 
the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a 
something: for the box might even be empty. 
Whether or not one agrees with Wittgenstein’s contention that whatever is in the box has no 
place at all in the language-game, what we at least need to acknowledge is that every person 
carrying a ‘box’ has to refer to a common pool of resources in order to describe whatever 
their ‘beetle’ is, and that there is no direct link between these resources (the signifier ‘beetle’, 
as well as its related signifiers) and whatever is in the box (the signified), which will vary 
across actors. Actors can talk about terrorism – in ways that have important consequences – 
without knowing what is in the ‘box’ of the other actors. While this is of course important for 
these actors making sense of the world, it can also have severe consequences for the 
constitution of conflicts. What should be done with ‘terrorism’, then, is what Jackson (2006: 
11) suggest for the concept of ‘civilization’: “[W]e might simultaneously affirm [it] as a 
category of political and social practice while denying it a role in our theoretical apparatus”. 
 
The concept of ‘terrorist’ as identity deserves separate attention here, as it turns people into 
activities, “as though what such people do or are likely to do makes sense, has been 
‘explained’ causally, by the kind of person they are” (Becker 1998: 44). The interpellation of 
someone into the terrorist subject position has severe consequences and is fundamentally a 
power-gesture. Barrinha (2010: 167) refers to the label as a “powerful contextualised political 
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choice”, where this power follows from the already discussed consequences of invoking the 
‘security’ thematic. A relational understanding of identity also allows for seeing how 
representations of the ‘terrorist’ Other relate to the Self. Representing the Other as the 
illegitimate ‘terrorist’ will simultaneously affect Self-identity – not in a strictly manipulative 
sense, but as the basic mechanism through which self-identities are inscribed in processes of 
social construction (Mouffe 1993). Two important points follow from this. Firstly, one cannot 
talk about ‘counter-terrorism’ without simultaneously talking about ‘terrorism’. Secondly, and 
most importantly because its workings are more insidious, one cannot talk about ‘terrorism’ 
without affecting the legitimacy of ‘counter-terrorism’. Forgetting this point makes it harder 
to challenge the self-evidence in statements such as “the [Turkish] government was forced to 
develop new military and legal methods to fight it, while remaining determined not to 
negotiate with or make concessions to the terrorists” (Alexander 2008: 75). 
 
To sum up, what this chapter has emphasized is that social truths – including identities – are 
contingent and constructed, and that discourses distribute such truths (in the form of 
representations) in ways that constrain what can meaningfully be argued politically and 
produce the subjects acting within them. The concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ must 
therefore be understood as standing in a mutually constitutive relation with Self-identity, and 
the representations they take part in must be seen as manifestations of power. Such 
representations also build on deployments throughout history – rhetorical commonplaces 
moving between actors and across countries. Identifying the direction of such movements will 
allow for seeing who is winning what Gramsci referred to as “the struggle to define the 
categories of common sense” (quoted in Weldes 1997: 280). This is one of the main concerns 
of the following chapter. Its first part focuses on the historical deployment of ‘civilization’ by 
European actors in interaction with the non-European Other, including the Ottoman Empire – 
and later Turkey. This is important for contextualizing the rhetorical commonplaces used by 
the Turkish actors in my analyses, and for seeing how they contribute to the negotiation of 
Turkish ‘difference’.  
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3. 
Situating Turkey: A Conceptual and Historical Background 
 
The goal of chapter 3 is to give a background for the representations in the Turkish actors’ 
discussions of ‘terrorism’ that are analyzed in chapters 4 and 5. The first part of the chapter 
provides a conceptual background, emphasizing primarily the rhetorical commonplace 
‘civilization’ and its employment in European and later ‘Western’ discourses of Otherness. In 
line with Campbell (1998a: 30), I hold as a premise that “previously established discursive 
strategies of otherness [can] be invoked in novel circumstances to provide powerful modes of 
understanding”. This background is important in order to see how Turkey – and the Ottoman 
Empire it emerged out of – have historically been represented as ‘outside’ of collective 
identities that the Turkish actors are representing Turkey as ‘inside’ in my analyses. This part 
is thus most important for the last part of my specified research question: the representation of 
the Turkish Self and its ‘difference’ vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’. The second part of the 
chapter gives a historical background on the Turkish Republic and the position of the Kurdish 
minority within it, stressing the destabilizing effect of Kurdish nationalism on the Turkish 
nation-building discourse. This is important for situating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
and its position as ‘terrorist’ in Turkish discourse, and thus for the first part of the specified 
research question: How the representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ made internationally 
by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military officers involve the conflict with the PKK. 
 
There are five main insights to be drawn from this chapter:  
[1] The concept of ‘civilization’ has played an important part in European, and later ‘Western’ 
designations of the inferior Other. Eventually this was manifested in law through a ‘standard 
of civilization’ that was employed against the Ottoman Empire (amongst others).  
[2] While ‘civilizational’ discourse was initially grounded in a Christian common identity, it 
survived the gradual demise of the church as a source of unity in Europe and the emerging 
Enlightenment imaginary, being instead tied to a specific (secular) way of organizing society 
in the form of the developing nation-state. 
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[3] With the emergence of ‘Western civilization’ in the nineteenth century, encompassing the 
United States and Western Europe, the progressivist idea of general ‘civilization’ was 
challenged by an essentialist understanding of cultures; an essentialism reproduced by the 
contemporary ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and narrowing the opportunity for the Turkish 
Other of moving towards both ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’. 
[4] Following the decline of the Ottoman Empire, and building on reform processes of its 
latter periods, the founding leaders of the Turkish Republic established a modern nation state 
oriented towards ‘the West’ and clearly distanced from its temporal Ottoman past. The 
Turkish nationalist myth that replaced the Ottoman order strongly emphasized state unity. 
[5] Calls for Kurdish national recognition destabilized this nationalist discourse, and 
crackdowns on rioting Kurds and purging of traces of Kurdish nationhood should be 
understood accordingly. These dynamics are manifested in the official definition of 
‘terrorism’ in Turkey today, where undermining state unity qualifies as a ‘terrorist’ offence.  
 
My perspective in the first part of the chapter is Eurocentric – for a reason: The dominant 
political language of today builds on concepts that have a European history, either through 
concepts native to other languages having ‘absorbed’ meaning through interpretations of 
European concepts, or through actual loan words from European languages (Wigen 2013: 26). 
The historical experience of Europe has been interwoven with the political language being 
used, so to speak. The fact that the Ottoman Empire – from which contemporary Turkey 
emerged – “increasingly had to legitimise [its] claims to rule by use of foreign vocabularies” 
(ibid.: 4) makes being attentive to the rhetorical commonplaces employed by Turkish actors in 
a discourse on ‘terrorism’ even more important. Keeping this in mind can also help avoid 
naturalizations that “sanitise the post-1649 era of its imperialism and the very Eurocentric 
metanarratives upon which this has been founded” (de Carvalho et al. 2011: 756). 
 
3.1 ‘Civilization’ and the Other 
The rhetorical commonplace of ‘civilization’, in either a singular or plural form, is prominent 
in the Turkish actors’ representations of the Self that is threatened by ‘terrorism’, especially 
among the politicians and diplomats analyzed in chapter 4. The main reason this is important 
here, is the experience of both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey with being represented on the 
historical side of the ‘non-civilized’ Other in confrontation with European powers. In order to 
better grasp the intertextual relevance of ‘civilization’ and how it is relevant to the negotiation 
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of ‘difference’, I will discuss its historical deployment in the following sections, beginning 
with the first experiences of Christian Europe with a true external Other.  
 
In the late-15th and 16th centuries, when the European discoverers encountered the indigenous 
population of the Americas, these did not fit into what was then an all-encompassing Christian 
framework of world-explanation. Islam had long since shown its presence, but it was 
incorporated into a Christian narrative rather than recognized as an alternative culture with a 
separate direction (Jackson 2006: 81). The indigenous were accommodated into this 
framework through two main forms of Otherness. The first distinguished between the 
‘civilized’ and superior Self on the one hand, and the ‘uncivilized’ Other who could be 
legitimately enslaved on the other. The second distinguished between ‘believer’ and 
‘nonbeliever’, but invoking the overarching identity of ‘humanity’ made possible the move 
from Other to Self, in contrast with the essential, inferior Otherness of the first account, and 
there were thus no grounds for legitimate slavery. These representations were made by Ginés 
de J. Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de Las Casas respectively at a famous 1550 debate in 
Valladolid, Spain. Though there were obvious and important differences in the Othering of 
their accounts, none of them included the recognition of equal value; the alternative to the 
Christian was either temporal backwardness or an intrinsic and permanent lack of 
‘civilization’ (Jackson 2006: 81-83; Campbell 1998a 100-101; Knutsen 1997: 66-67).27  
 
The Europe from which these discoverers departed did not collectively identify with any idea 
of ‘Europe’; it was foremost Christianity that provided the grounds for unity. But with the 
gradual decline of the church in providing a node for collective identity, the idea of 
‘civilization’ did not disappear. It was adapted to the emerging Enlightenment imaginary that 
was grounded in rational man and the secular legitimization of political power – “the 
Enlightenment project of self-foundation” (Mouffe 1993: 12) – and eventually in the nation-
state. According to Blumenberg (quoted in Campbell 1998a: 46), when the “metaphysical 
guarantees for the world” offered by the church were weakened, in its place was developed a 
“counterworld of elementary rationality and manipulability”, and the state became “an 
emerging substitute for divine providence” (Campbell 1998a: 47). This was no sudden about-
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27!The Spanish were by no means alone in these forms of Othering. For example, the Scottish philosopher David 
Hume employed the idea of the civilized – in the form of Sepúlveda – in describing the ‘negroes’ in African 
colonies: “I am apt to suspect that Negroes and in general all the other species of men […] to be naturally 
inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any 
individual eminent either in action or speculation” (quoted in Campbell 1998: 117).!!
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face, however; these were gradual responses to social conditions of their time, of which the 
devastating Religious Wars in the 16th and 17th centuries must be considered highly central 
(Toulmin 1990).28 These developments were important to the continued employment of 
‘civilization’ in the interaction with the non-European Other, and it built on a similar dynamic 
as for Christian Europe: While the discoverers’ use of ‘civilization’ in describing formerly 
unknown populations reflected the opposition between a temporal Other (‘savage’ and non-
Christian) and a ‘progressed’ Christian Self, Enlightenment Europe with its “secularized 
evangelism depending rather more on reason than on God” (Jackson 2006: 84) was again 
further progressed than its Christian past. It was primarily this latter development that 
undergirded the ‘standard of civilization’ that eventually became formalized in international 
law, and with which the Ottoman Empire interacted as ‘less-than-civilized’ Other. 
 
3.1.1 The ‘standard of civilization’ 
From the late-19th century into the 20th, related to the emergence of the United States and 
Japan as non-European great powers that gained ‘international status’, an explicit ‘standard of 
civilization’ was developed and manifested in international law (Gong 1984). The legal 
standard laid the fundamentals to which the Other would need to aspire in order to be 
accepted as a fully-fledged member of ‘the international society’. Until the standard was 
fulfilled, countries were outside “the law’s pale and protection” (Gong 1984: 6), considered 
terra nullius as lands with no state, and were thus “a free-for-all for colonial expansion” 
(Wigen 2013: 20). Gradually, countries stripped away their own standards in order to accept 
the one proclaimed by Europe – and later, by the ‘West’ – as of universal validity. Bilgin 
(2009: 115) describes the dynamic well:  
[I]n an unequal setting where the hierarchical binaries of western/eastern or civilized/less-than-
civilized were defined by the powerful, feigning similarity, seemingly becoming and being 
modern, civilized, western often emerged as a primal form of response. The non-western often 
resorted to feigning similarity, because it was on the basis of hierarchical classification of nations 
(civilized vs. less-than-civilized) that colonialism had been justified for years. 
In this way it helped to legitimize the continuation of colonial rule in other than merely 
military terms (Gong 1984: 42), which was portrayed “as an essentially benevolent effort to 
spread the blessings of civilization to all” (Jackson 2006: 84).  
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28 The oft-repeated narrative within international relations that the nation-state appeared more or less with the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia must thus be countered (Carvalho et al. 2011).  
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The standard was related to the developments in Europe described above. According to Gong 
(1984: 36), “many of the intellectual and institutional elements of what later became the 
standard of ‘civilization’ were natural outgrowths of the European states-system”. When 
‘civilization’ as a specific mode of differentiation became less important in the 20th century, 
the state kept this position; the ‘ontology of difference’ eventually became grounded in the 
“superior capacity of Western states to govern and the proper form of the Western liberal 
state” (Jones 2013: 61; 65).  
 
3.1.2 ‘Civilization’ and ‘difference’: The Ottoman Empire and Turkey 
Although the Ottoman Empire was never subjected to colonial rule proper, it was nonetheless 
portrayed as outside of the identity from which the explicit ‘standard of civilization’ 
emanated. The Empire was gradually introduced to the European international system 
between the 1699 Treaty of Carlowitz and the 1856 Treaty of Paris, but this was only as a 
provisional member of ‘international society’, and not as a fully ‘civilized’ legal personality. 
Even at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 full ‘civilization’ was not attained, and the 
Empire was identified as a ‘second-class power’ (Gong 1984: 107-115). As late as the end of 
the 19th century, Turks were at times portrayed as the lowest possible category of the races of 
mankind, with “no lower category […] possible in the science of jurisprudence” (ibid.: 49).  
 
A way of noting the impetus of ‘civilization’, and the standard to which it was tied, to the 
Ottoman Empire is that only one or two decades after the rhetorical commonplace was 
deployed in English and French writings on the Empire, the concept ‘sivilisazyon’ appeared in 
Arabic and was given its first explanation. Establishing this concept “as an integral part of 
Ottoman political vocabulary was also an aspect of 'entering' international society […] 
increasingly [using] the established standards of legitimizing policies on the international 
arena” (Wigen 2013: 21-25). The continued relevance of the standard (and the persistence of 
‘difference’) is also suggested by the so-called capitulations, various benefits that were 
originally offered by the Empire to European foreign nationals as far back as 1536, but which 
became detrimental to the Empire and important to its gradual decline relative to European 
powers (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 50; 116).29 The capitulations persisted partly because they 
became tied to the ‘standard of civilization’; the standard defining conditions under which 
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29 Gong (1984: 107) even traces the capitulations all the way back to 1193 
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nationals from ‘civilized’ countries should be treated when in ‘non-civilized’ countries (Gong 
1984: 115). A last way to observe the importance of ‘civilization’ and the explicit standard is 
by the reforms undertaken during the ‘Tanzimat era’ of the Ottoman Empire between 1839 
and 1878, led by “Europeanized Ottoman bureaucrats” with a “commitment to remake the 
governing institutions of the Ottoman Empire in the image of Europe” (Cleveland & Bunton 
2009: 82). Though it was importantly not a linear process as is often portrayed, the Ottoman 
Empire adopted West European goods, institutions and ideas partially or wholly – according 
to Kancı (2009: 361) in the attempt of preserving the state of the Empire. When the Empire 
was undergoing reforms in direction of ‘European standards’, this was accompanied by 
European insistence that “they were helping the Empire to ‘civilize’ itself” (Gong 1984: 112).   
 
Similar reforms – though more extensive – followed the establishment of the Turkish 
Republic in 1923. With the expressed motivation of distancing Turkey from its temporal 
Ottoman past and of orienting it towards ‘the West’, the one-party government of Mustafa 
Kemal (Atatürk; ‘father of the Turks’) brought forward swift societal reforms: transferring the 
capital from Istanbul to Ankara; abolishing the Caliphate that had lasted for centuries, closing 
religious schools and lessening the societal role of religion by subjecting it to governmental 
authority; 30 adopting civil and penal codes inspired by European countries; adopting the Latin 
alphabet and translating the Quran into the written Turkish language – amongst several others 
(Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 179ff). The Turkish Republic had inherited some of the concerns 
for its ‘difference’ from the Ottoman Empire due to its position as successor. Although 
Turkish ‘sovereignty’ had been recognized in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, there were 
concerns about how stable this recognition was (Bilgin 2009: 113-117).  
 
Though the ‘capitulations’ were finally abolished in 1923, which was as a significant step 
towards ‘civilized’ status, the continued representation of Turkey as ‘different’ even today 
suggests an unfinished move into ‘international society’, if understood as a collective cultural 
identity, such as the idea of ‘Europe’. According to Rumelili (2007: 18), there is a “continued 
prevalence of discourses which construct Turkey as inherently different from Europe”, a type 
of construction that has “formed [the] very basis” of interaction between the European Union 
and Turkey (ibid.: 83). According to Bilgin (2009: 122), the tendencies of negotiating 
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30!Here the principle of laicism is more precise than conventionally understood secularism. Laicism built on a 
French model of secularism (Bilgin 2008; Onar 2007) and put religion more under state control than separating it 
from the state – the Directorate of Religious Affairs serving this purpose (Onar 2007: 275).!
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‘difference’ like described above “remain essential to understanding Turkey’s present-day 
international relations”. ‘Civilization’ has been used in the discursive representation of 
Turkish Otherness as late as 2000, when former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt 
used “unsuitable civilization” as an argument for excluding Turkey from the European Union 
(Hurd 2010: 189; Rumelili 2007: 98). Its ‘difference’ has even been articulated specifically to 
‘terrorism’, as when Independence and Democracy (IND-DEM) parliamentarian in the 
European Parliament, Boguslaw Rogalski, made the argument that Turkey “could become a 
gateway for terrorism”, because it “is part of a world that is alien to us in terms of its culture 
and traditions” (quoted in Rumelili 2007: 98).  
 
For this thesis, the most important point to draw from this is that the Turkish actors’ 
representations of the threat of ‘terrorism’ must be understood in the perspective of 
negotiating Self-identity, especially when the rhetorical commonplace of ‘civilization’ is 
being used. Representing Turkey as part of a ‘civilizational’ identity with (West) European 
origins can thus be a way of diminishing the ‘difference’ discussed above. This becomes more 
difficult, however, with an increasingly prominent understanding of essential ‘civilizations’ 
(instead of just one ‘civilized’/’non-civilized’ dichotomy). Struggles with such essentialism 
are apparent in the speeches of the Turkish politicians and diplomats, especially after the 
coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In the following subsection I 
cover the development of the idea of ‘Western civilization’, which fundamentally challenged 
the progressivist idea of general ‘civilization’ (Jackson 2006: 72ff). 
 
3.1.3 ‘Western civilization’ 
The rhetorical commonplace ‘Western civilization’ became increasingly prominent in Europe 
and subsequently the United States from the late-19th century onwards. The commonplace had 
roots in a Hegelian notion of multiple worlds moving towards their separate destinies, as well 
as in German scholars’ renewed use of Abenland to denote a Christian community with 
essential characteristics? But ‘Western civilization’ became truly manifested in practice 
through the interaction between Europe and Russia, where the conception of the latter as 
essentially different included in parallel the construction of a ‘Western’ identity. Its 
dissemination was dependent especially on the interaction between Germany and the United 
States. German scholars interpellated Western Europe and the United States into a ‘Western’ 
identity with which these scholars themselves did not identify. This was picked up on and 
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brought forward in the United States, where it radically altered the American educational 
system in order to make young Americans realize their part in a ‘civilizational’ community of 
‘the West’ – what we can refer to as the Grand Narrative. These dynamics were important for 
the framing and the development of the First World War, with Germany as the ‘barbaric’ 
Other against which the United States safeguarded ‘Western civilization’ and human liberty 
(Jackson 2006: 87-104).  
 
‘Western civilization’ is first and foremost important here because of its essentialism: the 
identification of some ‘civilizations’ as fundamentally different from others. This essentialism 
made it so that “industrial capitalism, democracy, and freedom were seen as fundamentally 
Western notions, instead of being seen as universal values that happened to have manifested 
themselves in Europe” (Jackson 2006: 95), and it thus ended the dominance of an idea that all 
societies would in the end converge on the ‘universal’ values that originated in Western 
Europe. The weakening of a notion of universal accessibility could be expected to pose 
increased differences for countries formerly standing outside of ‘civilization’ in moving from 
Other to Self; especially relevant for Turkey due to its almost exclusively Muslim population. 
This is not to suggest the impossibility of representing Turkey as part of a specifically 
‘Western civilization’; the plasticity of the identity is illustrated by the fact that Germany – the 
Other par excellence in the period of World War I – became integrated into this identity after 
World War II (Jackson 2006), and is of course today highly central to common conceptions of 
the ‘Western’. However, it is most likely easier to negotiate ‘difference’ on the basis of a 
singular conception of ‘civilization’, as it is discursively more open to conversion of identity. 
My analysis in the next chapter especially will demonstrate this difficulty and how it is dealt 
with through the invocation of ‘humanity’ as node for common identity. Before getting that 
far, however, I will give a historical background on the position of the Kurdish minority 
within Turkey and the interaction between Kurdish and Turkish nationalism.  
 
3.2 Kemalism, Kurdish nationalism and ‘terrorism’: a historical background 
After the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which ended the Turkish War of 
Independence, the founding leaders of Turkey would succeed in a rapid but comprehensive 
project of constructing a modern nation-state on the Anatolian remnants of the earlier 
Ottoman Empire, including a construction of national identity that had taken European 
countries several hundred years (Wigen 2011: 46). The reforms undertaken under the lead of 
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Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were embedded in the construction of a new national identity; what 
Çelik  (2000: 194-195) refers to as a new 'myth' taking over after the collapse of the Ottoman 
hegemonic political order, reconstituting the grounds for social coherence. National unity and 
territorial integrity was represented as of the absolute essence, safeguarded by the protectors 
of the Kemalist revolution. By relating this to the developments described in section 3.1, we 
see how the European discourse on governing standards was embedded in the nationalist 
discourse of the Turkish Republic and its emphasis on the unitary nation-state structure. This 
transformation did not happen out of the blue, of course; it would make little sense for the 
political actors to suddenly make an about-face and reformulate the whole basis for collective 
identity. As touched briefly upon, the developments built on currents in the late Ottoman 
Empire, especially the ideology of Ziya Gökalp, who emphasized national belonging through 
practice and not merely essentially inherited characteristics (Wigen 2011: 40-42). 
 
Though the population of the Turkish state was religiously homogeneous, it was ethnically 
heterogeneous – a characteristic revealed by the Turkish maxim “In Turkey there are 72 and a 
half nations” (Gunter 1994: 1). This diversity was dealt with through a strict discipline 
emphasizing culturally homogeneous practice, tied specifically to the use of the Turkish 
language. As long as people accepted such loyalty through practice they were effectively 
Turks. Here we see reflected Gökalps principles of nationalism described above. 
‘Turkishness’ was also conditioned on Muslim heritage, however; religion was a central 
social marker in Turkey, with official documents having no such category as ‘non-believer’ or 
‘atheist’ As Kurds were Muslims they were therefore not recognized as a minority by the 
Turkish state, but rather included into the state-building project through the above-mentioned 
disciplinary pressure (Wigen 2011: 37-43). 
 
From the perspective this Kemalist nationalist discourse, expressed Kurdish nationhood and 
demands for recognition of rights and a separate language understandably had a destabilizing 
effect, and it was countered accordingly. A series of Kurdish (and Islamic) uprisings in 1925 – 
the biggest of them the Sheikh Said rebellion – led a series of leaders being hanged, and 
“[h]undreds of villages were destroyed and hundreds of thousands of Kurds deported” (Pope 
& Pope 2011: 246). Those Kurds failing to adopt to the nation-building principles laid down 
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by Kemalism were excluded from the state’s national life (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 530).31 
The disciplining of the Kurdish minority led to a purging of traces of Kurdish nationhood in 
Turkey. In 1924, tied in with the reform process outlined above, Atatürk banned “all Kurdish 
schools, publications and associations” (Pope & Pope 2011: 245), with the Kurdish language 
being forbidden in public life and ‘Kurdistan’ eventually being removed from textbooks. 
Later, boarding schools were established where Kurdish children were put in order to support 
their ‘Turkish identity’ (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 2-3; Marcus 2007: 26-27). These were effective 
ventures as Kurdish nationalism for a long time became marginalized in Turkey. According to 
Pope and Pope (2011: 247), the five decades following 1930 “are covered in a blanket of 
silence”; foreigners not even allowed to the Kurdish-dominated South-East until 1964. When 
Kurdish nationalism was revived in the 1960s the developments of what later became the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) began – the quintessential ‘terrorist group’ in Turkey today. 
 
The renaissance of Kurdish nationalism was tied in with the growing dominance of socialism 
in Turkey; for example, the socialist Turkish Workers' Party (TIP), established in 1971, had a 
growing Kurdish contingent; channeling “their energies into the exciting ferment of the 
Turkish left” (Pope & Pope 2011: 248). The followers of Abdullah Öcalan that formally 
established the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 1978 were rooted in a similar discourse. 
However, the military intervention in 1980, the second in less than ten years, ushered in a new 
wave of mass arrests that included many Kurds, and to the drawing of a new constitution in 
1982 where “[t]he perceived need to control, to avoid the disorder of the 1970s, shone 
through almost every article”; severely restricting freedoms (Pope & Pope 2011: 145). Again 
nationalist agitation was effectively stifled. But after the return to civilian rule in 1984 
disorder re-blossomed, and the PKK initiated its insurgency, which has since seen the deaths 
of between 30,000 and 40,000 people (Eccarius-Kelly 2011), as well as involving “the 
destruction of more than 2,000 Kurdish villages” and “the uprooting of at least 300,000 
people” (Pope & Pope 2011: 255). Before a new cease-fire was declared by PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan in March 2013, it had reached its highest levels of violence since the capture 
of Öcalan in 1999 (ICG 2012), who is still imprisoned on $mralı island in the Marmara Sea. 
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31 Such reactions have to be understood also in light of Ottoman experiences with nationalist agitation, which 
eventually resulted in significant territorial separations from the Empire and, according to Gunter (1994: 1), to its 
“gradual disintegration”. Such nationalist agitation was often supported by European powers (Cleveland & 
Bunton 2009: 75). 
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The ‘terrorist’ label as it is used in Turkey to describe the PKK has therefore been associated 
with many acts of violence deserving of strict criticism, including attacks in densely 
populated areas that have taken many civilian lives. But this is not the only way the concept 
has been invoked. Through the formalization of ‘terrorism’ as a crime in the 1991 Law to 
Fight Terrorism (Act no. 3713) – interestingly in the same year that President Turgut Özal had 
explicitly recognized the existence of the Kurdish minority (Gunter 1994: 12-13) – the fight 
for Kurdish cultural rights were effectively defined as ‘terrorist’ acts. Article 1 in the latest 
version of this law (2010) is still quite clear, defining ‘terrorism’ as (e.g.) “changing the 
attributes of the Republic as specified in the Constitution” or “damaging the indivisible unity 
of the state” (Legislationline 2013). We thus see that ‘terrorism’ has consistently been used 
also to designate acts that have entailed discursive rather than physical violence.  
 
This has affected political activity without apparent links to physical violence as well. In 
1991, when attention was drawn to two members of parliament having underlined their 
Kurdish allegiance as they were sworn in, they were called ‘terrorist’ in newspapers (Gunter 
1994: 8). Several Kurdish nationalist parties have also been closed down due to perceived 
links to the PKK, the first being the People’s Labour Party (HEP) in 1990: 
The first attempt to set up a legal representation for Kurdish nationalist sentiment in Turkey was to 
meet with serial party closures and bewildering changes of acronym […] More than 100 party 
activists were to be murdered, their most famous leaders were gaoled and most of the rest were to 
choose voluntary exile (Pope & Pope 2011: 260).  
In December 2009, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) was banned for such an alleged link 
to the PKK, and since then, there have been thousands of arrests of activists from the 
currently legal Kurdish party BDP (ICG 2012: 2). Though the AKP has made several steps 
towards political reconciliation with the Kurdish minority, there have also been moves in the 
other direction. The year 2005 saw the new Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code introduced, 
making insulting ‘Turkishness’ into a crime (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 533). In 2006 a new 
‘anti-terror’ law was enacted which widened the definition of ‘terrorism’ in a way that NGOs 
described as severely endangering freedom of expression (Onar 2007: 285).32   
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affair. Both the security forces, paramilitaries and the so-called ‘village guard’ system, consisting of Kurds loyal 
to the Turkish government fighting the PKK, have committed high degrees of violence,which has also included 
assassinations, torture and village demolition (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 10; Human Rights Watch 2003) 
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From all of these aspects to the concept of ‘terrorism’ in Turkey and the way it has been 
associated with Kurdish nationalism, it should be clear why an inquiry is warranted into how 
a regionally restricted violent conflict such as that with the PKK is articulated to a discourse 
on ‘terrorism’ as an international problem. By emphasizing the role of ‘civilization’, the first 
sections of this chapter have equally shown that there are reasons to look for the negotiation 
of Self-identity through the way the threat of ‘terrorism’ is represented. This is what the next 
two chapters seek to provide. 
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4. 
Talking ‘Terrorism’ at the United Nations, 2001-2012 
 
Having described my theoretical approach, and having given a conceptual and historical 
background for the Turkish actors’ representations of ‘terrorism’ and the common Self, the 
two following chapters will analyze specific texts. Here I am interested in identifying how 
rhetorical commonplaces come together to represent the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ and the 
identity of the ‘terrorist’, and through this the Self that is being threatened.  Both chapters 
begin by discussing representations of the Other, followed by the Self. This division is 
reflected in my specified research question: How do the representations of 
‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ made internationally by Turkish politicians, diplomats and military 
officers involve the conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and how does this 
enable the negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’ vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’? 
Chapter 4 analyzes speeches by Turkish politicians and diplomats at the United Nations from 
2001 to 2012, which I refer to as part of a U.N. discourse on ‘terrorism’. Though such a 
discourse can of course not be mapped out on the basis of one country alone, it is more 
theoretically consistent to regard it as such than as a Turkish discourse on ‘terrorism’. I expect 
the Turkish actors’ representations to be constrained by international traditions and tendencies 
of a forum where ‘terrorism’ is discussed extensively and has a long history. This does not 
remove the role of agency: By combining rhetorical commonplaces in new ways, or by 
challenging dominant articulations (breaking), actors take part in changing discourses. 
Through identity-politics strategies (Rumelili 1997: 15) they can potentially change the way 
their identities are constructed by others. It is thus in the interaction between agent and 
structure we learn the most about the representation of Turkish identity in through ‘terrorism’, 
as well as of how the conflict with the PKK is being related to representations of ‘terrorism’ 
as international problem.33  
The speeches are taken both from the General Assembly and the Security Council. I have not 
made any a priori distinctions between these, nor have I encountered any conspicuous 
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33 Note that this agent-structure divide is analytical: Discourse theory does not see these as ontologically 
separate; both are implicated in every form of social situation and do therefore not occur at different points in 
time (Jackson 2006: 34) 
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patterns of difference across the two in my analysis. As mentioned in chapter 1, 2001 is 
chosen as a starting point because of the September 11 attacks in the United States. My main 
emphasis is on speeches that specifically enunciate the nodal points of ‘terrorism’ or 
‘terrorist’, but I have also included and analyzed speeches where the actors extensively 
discuss Turkey’s position as part of a common Self, as this gives important insight into the 
negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’, tying the speeches in with the developments described in 
the previous chapter. As far as actors are concerned, I focus on Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Presidents and Prime Ministers on the political side, and Ambassadors and Deputy 
Ambassadors to the United Nations on the diplomatic side. As different actors hold these 
positions throughout, a significant selection of different persons’ speeches are analyzed. The 
three politicians from the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Abdullah Gül, Recep Tayyip 
Erdo!an and Ahmet Davuto!lu, are especially important as they are the strongest carriers of 
changes to the representations of Self-identity. 
 
Section 4.1 covers the representation of ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ‘global’ 
phenomenon, discussing how this representation enables the argument that states need to 
fighting unequivocally in concert. Section 4.2 relates this representation to the actors’ 
references to Turkey’s own ‘sufferings’ from ‘terrorism’ and criticism towards the collective 
Self for using ‘double standards’. Section 4.3 describes the constitution of the ‘terrorist’ 
identity both directly and through representations of ‘terrorism’, showing how it is 
constructed as fundamentally illegitimate. Section 4.4 discusses the intertextuality of the 
representations of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as Other in the Turkish speeches. The final section, 
4.5, then moves to the representations of the common Self by the Turkish actors, emphasizing 
the roles of the rhetorical commonplaces ‘civilization’ and ‘humanity’/’humankind’, as well 
as discussions of the role of religion. It ends by discussing the increasing prominence of 
representations of liberalist discourse along with the other developments to Self-identity. 
 
Because the representations of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as Other are generally similar between 
the politicians/diplomats and the military officers, I mostly discuss the consequences of these 
representations together, in chapter 6. As for Self-identity, where there are clearer differences 
between the two sets of texts, I make more running discussions throughout the analyses. 
 
4.1 Terrorism as a homogeneous and ‘global’ threat 
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From start to end of the period of analysis, one representation is practically unequivocal in the 
speeches in the United Nations. ‘Terrorism’ is represented, both by Turkish politicians and 
diplomats, as one homogeneous phenomenon that can be abstracted and subsumed by one 
concept. Although the actors sometimes refer to practical differences across time and space, 
events of ‘terrorism’ are still represented as manifestations of the same phenomenon. No 
attempts are made at differentiating between degrees or forms of ‘terrorism’ (this is explicitly 
rejected at several points), nor are specific groups mentioned by the actors. This 
representation of homogeneity is present at both ends of the period of analysis (e.g. Pamir 
2001: 9; Apakan 2012b: 23). To give a few telling example, Minister of Foreign Affairs $smail 
Cem (2001: 8) describes ‘terrorism’ as “humankind’s number one enemy”, arguing that “[t]he 
same terrorism manifests itself in different countries all over the world, both in the West and 
in the East”, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davuto!lu (2010: 3) refers to “the 
constantly evolving threat of terrorism”, internationally, regionally and nationally. Deputy 
U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2003: 24) shows the perspective that differences in 
manifestation are merely cosmetic, by stating that “regardless of the many shapes that it 
cleverly assumes, terrorism in our time has indeed become a burning global issue”. The year 
before (2002b: 5) he states that “[d]efinitional problems might conceal important 
philosophical differences, but the result of terrorism will be the same for everyone”.  
 
Not only is this the most consistent representation; the abstract and undifferentiated 
phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ serves as a nodal point for a series of articulations and is central to 
many other representations. A conspicuous example of this is ‘terrorism’ as being ubiquitous, 
often articulated through the use of ‘global’. In his first speech after the September 11 attacks, 
Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 8) states that “we have to be conscious of the fact that terrorism 
is a global phenomenon”. It is referred to as a ‘global menace’ (Esenli 2002: 12), as operating 
on a ‘global scale’ (Cengizer 2003: 24; Gül 2010: 24), as a ‘global scourge’ ($lkin 2005a: 6), 
as a ‘global problem’ (Erdo!an 2007: 3), as having assumed a ‘global dimension’ (Erdo!an 
2008: 11), as a ‘global threat’ (Apakan 2010c: 10) undermining ‘global stability and 
prosperity’ (Apakan 2012a: 25). U.N. Ambassador Baki $lkin (2005b: 8) refers to it as “one of 
the most serious threats to the peace, security and welfare of the global community”, and uses 
even more explicit terms in 2008:  
[T]errorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Indeed, 
it concerns all nations, large and small, and it takes its toll on human beings of every age, culture, 
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religion and nationality. In other words, we are all vulnerable to this global scourge ($lkin 2008c: 
10).#C  
$lkin’s statement gives ‘terrorism’ a universal quality by doing the same to its targets, through 
including all these classifications of human beings (age, culture, etc.). This representation of 
ubiquity is done also without the actual use of the signifier ‘global’. For example, Prime 
Minister Erdo!an (2007: 5) states that “[t]errorism continues to threaten the security of all 
free nations”, while Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül (2005: 3) argues that attacks 
“in various parts of the world proves that no country is immune to terrorism”.35  
!
4.1.1  The duty to fight in concert 
Given such a quality of the ‘terrorist’ threat, it is unsurprising that the Turkish actors generally 
infer from this that the only viable way to fight ‘terrorism’ is through international 
cooperation. This is referred to as a ‘common struggle’ (Pamir 2001: 9), a ‘common defence’ 
(Cengizer 2003: 24) or a ‘common stance’ (Apakan 2010c: 10), against a ‘common problem’ 
($lkin 2005c: 7) or a ‘common threat’ (Apakan 2010a: 23). The rhetorical commonplace 
‘global’ plays a part also here: Ambassador $lkin (2005b: 7-8) states that “[c]ombating 
terrorism should be a global and collective effort”, while Prime Minister Erdo!an refers to 
“solutions on a global scale” (2009a: 32) and ‘terrorism’ as a “a grave security threat that 
needs to be addressed with a global commitment” (2009b: 17). Ambassador Ertu!rul Apakan 
(2010a: 23) discusses the ‘global fight against terrorism’ and twice (ibid.; 2012b: 23) 
characterizes the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as a ‘historic step’. 
 
In 2002, Deputy U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2002b: 5) draws such a conclusion 
explicitly, arguing that “the only viable option” is to “intensify international cooperation 
against terrorism”. He is followed two years later by Ambassador Ümit Pamir (2004: 2), 
stating that “the quest to eradicate terrorism requires a sustained, comprehensive approach 
involving the active participation and collaboration of all Member States of the United 
Nations”  This trend continues with the politicians from the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), with President Gül (2010: 24) arguing that ‘terrorism’ “cannot be countered without 
sincere, effective, cohesive and concrete international cooperation” and Foreign Minister 
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34 I return to the rhetorical commonplace ‘scourge’ in section 4.4, due to its intertextual relevance.!
35 The rhetorical commonplaces ‘immunity’ and ’immune’  are used in this same way at several points ($lkin 
2005b: 7; Gül 2005: 3; Apakan 2009: 6; Davuto!lu 2010: 19; Müftüo!lu 2011b: 26). Such organic metaphors are 
very conspicuous amongst the military officers and discussed more closely in section 5.3. 
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Davuto!lu (2010: 2) stating that “we have to act collectively and in full solidarity with one 
another”.#$ Cooperation is even represented as something states have a duty to take part in. 
Besides Ambassador Pamir (2002c: 27) referring to this as a ‘moral obligation’ and Gül 
(2003: 4) arguing that “[w]e are duty-bound to eradicate that evil from the face of the Earth, 
and soon”, it is most clear with Ambassador Apakan, who uses ‘duty-bound’ and ‘obligation’ 
at several instances (2010c: 10; 2010a: 26; 2012a: 25). The threat is also of a kind that does 
not allow for procrastination: “Events no longer allow any slackening of our actions. We have 
to move forward with a sense of clear purpose, and we have to move fast” (Pamir 2001: 9). 
 
Two central points are illustrated by the above: Firstly, discourses are reductions of 
possibilities (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999: 37); they narrow the field of potential political 
practice (here: to full international cooperation as the only viable option). Secondly, it shows 
securitization: the moving of an issue from the realm of ‘normal politics’ into the exceptional 
state of ‘security politics’, opening for exceptional measures (Wæver 1998). Such acts of 
securitization on an international level are contingent on the established representations of 
‘terrorism’ as homogeneous and ubiquitous; without this, it would be much more difficult to 
argue for extensive cooperation.  
 
4.1.2 The one and only terrorist 
Along with the emphasis on the commonality of the ‘terrorist’ threat and the need for 
concerted efforts, there are also explicit rejections of any attempt to differentiate between 
‘terrorists’ (or forms of ‘terrorism’), as well as of any form of middle ground in fighting them. 
The following statement by Ambassador Pamir (2001: 9) on October 1, 2001 is highly 
illustrative: 
There are no grey areas in the fight against terrorism, nor are there good terrorists and bad 
terrorists. This is the time for the international community as a whole and for States individually to 
condemn unequivocally all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, 
regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations. 
In similarly clear terms, Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2003: 24) argues that “we cannot start 
to grade and arrange in some neat order the forms of terrorism; nor can we rightfully grasp the 
motivations behind terrorism. We cannot come up with degrees of leniency towards terrorism. 
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36 Abdullah Gül became President in August 2007 after having been Minister of Foreign Affairs from March 
2003 – August 2007 and Prime Minister from November 2002 – March 2003. !
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We cannot sensibly talk about ‘better terrorism’”. Though this tendency becomes less 
prominent after 2003, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo!an (2008: 11) uses similar terms in 
late 2008: “I take this opportunity to emphasize the following point in particular. We should 
now put an end to perceptions of ‘good’ terrorists and ‘bad’ terrorists, and avoid providing 
refuge to terrorists of ‘others’. Terrorism is a crime against humanity, regardless of its source, 
pretext or ambition”. It is also argued that the common fight will lose credibility or potency if 
some ‘terrorist groups’ are included while others are excluded, as when Deputy U.N. 
Ambassador Cengizer (2002b: 5) states that “we cannot sustain a credible fight against 
terrorism if we address the problem only partially and are selective with regard to the terrorist 
groups and organizations”.  
 
The representations of this section should be read in relation to the PKK-led insurgency in 
Turkey and the status of the PKK as ‘terrorist’. The next subsection looks at how Turkey’s 
own experiences are tied into the representation of ‘terrorism’ as one ‘global’ problem. 
 
4.2 Relating the PKK insurgency to ‘global terrorism’ 
The representations of ‘global terrorism’ and the need to condemn every ‘terrorist’ group 
needs to be understood in relation to Turkey’s domestic concerns with the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), which is one of the two foci of my specified research question. Successfully 
representing this specific conflict as part of a ‘common struggle’ against ‘terrorism’ has 
important effects in framing actions undertaken in the name of the Turkish state, as well as to 
what extent cooperation in fighting groups such as the PKK is politically sensible. We see this 
dynamic in its most simple form when U.N. Ambassador Apakan (2010d: 26; 2012a: 25) 
states twice that ‘terrorism’ “undermines global stability and prosperity” and therefore 
Governments have “the legitimate right” to combat it, or when Foreign Minister Cem (2001b: 
11) argues that “we are all engaged in a fight – a justifiable, correct fight against terrorism”. 
 
There are many references to Turkey’s own concerns and experiences with ‘terrorism’ in the 
data material, especially through the rhetorical commonplace ‘suffering’. Most of the time 
this is followed directly by calls for international cooperation. Deputy U.N. Ambassador 
Murat Esenli (2002: 12) refers to Turkey as “a country that has suffered extensively from the 
scourge of terrorism” right before arguing that “[t]he only way to fight this global menace is 
to act resolutely and in unison”. This is done similarly by Ambassador $lkin (2005b: 8), noting 
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that “[a]s a country which has long suffered from this scourge, Turkey has been calling for 
increased international cooperation in the fight against terrorism”, repeating the argument half 
a year later (2005c: 7). On the politicians’ side, Minister of Foreign Affairs Davuto!lu (2010: 
19) explains that Turkey’s “unfortunate and painful experience” has taught it “the 
indispensable nature of international cooperation in combating this scourge”, while Prime 
Minister Erdo!an (2007: 5) refers to Turkey as “a nation that has experienced first-hand the 
bitter consequences of terrorism” before asking “the international community for an enhanced 
collective commitment and cooperation in the combat against this threat to humanity”. When 
he further argues that “[a]n act of terror committed in any part of the world in essence targets 
us all”, this must also be understood as echoing Article 5 of the NATO’s Washington Treaty 
of 1949 (NATO 1949), which acknowledged that an armed attack on one of the countries of 
the Alliance would be considered an attack against all, directly involving the Security 
Council. The day after the September 11 attacks the Article was invoked by the United States, 
and it was decided that the Article covered these attacks, setting a precedent for ‘terrorist 
attacks’ emanating from abroad in general (NATO 2005).37 
 
Interestingly, however, there is not a single explicit interpellation of the PKK into the 
‘terrorist’ subject position in the speeches, as the Turkish actors never refer to it by name.38 I 
argue that this has to be understood by the United Nations not having recognized the PKK as 
a ‘terrorist organization’ (in contrast, the military officers, who speak through the NATO, do 
use the name of the Party). However, the articulation between ‘PKK’ and ‘terrorist’ by Turkey 
– and by other countries – is sufficiently established to consider the Party as included in these 
representations; the effect of referring to Turkish ‘suffering’ like above will affect the PKK 
accordingly. Though the name is not used, some of the references to it are indeed clear. 
Ambassador Cengizer (2002b: 5) criticizes the European Union’s current list of ‘terrorist 
organizations’ for being incomplete, arguing that “we cannot sustain a credible fight against 
terrorism if we address the problem only partially and are selective with regard to terrorist 
groups and organizations”, noting his hope that “known terrorist organizations will be 
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37 As an interesting side note here, Article 5 only includes attacks “in Europe and North America” in its wording 
(NATO 2005). This puts Turkey, with most of territory conventionally understood as in Asia, in an ambiguous 
position, especially as many PKK attacks have been launched from abroad (Northern Iraq). 
38 Except for Osama bin Laden (Müftüo!lu 2011 [2]: 26) they do not mention any other specific ’terrorists’ 
either. 
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included in that list”.#& In November 2007, Ambassador $lkin (2007b: 12-23) refers 
specifically to a recent loss of 15 victims to ‘terrorism’, urging for putting words into practice:  
Other countries which [are] going through or [have] gone through similar bitter experiences [will] 
surely agree that the only way to allay such pain [is] through a genuine display of commitment by 
the international community to resolutely combat and eradicate terrorism. The success of the 
Committee’s work [will] be gauged not by the number of resolutions it produced but by how 
effectively the international community [can] act to eradicate the threat of terrorism.40  
In the same speech he even argues that making distinctions regarding ‘terrorism’ can be 
dangerous, as if countries start “differentiating between terrorist acts targeting them and those 
targeting others […] sooner or later they [will] fall prey to the scourge of terrorism”. In 2008, 
he (2008b: 19) also criticizes the United Nations, for having allowed a photographic 
exhibition in its building, conspicuous both in its lack of naming the PKK and its articulation 
to the ‘common effort’: 
Just two months ago, a photographic exhibition took place in this building that, unfortunately, included 
pictures of the members of a terrorist organization targeting Turkey. That terrorist organization has been 
declared as such by many countries and institutions, including the European Union […] Therefore, one 
cannot help but ask why and how those photos came to be displayed under the roof of the United Nations, 
which holds a central place in our counter-terrorism efforts.C' 
Note that the problem is not that the exhibition gave a positive impression of the PKK, but 
that it included the picture at all. A way to make sense of this is that the physical 
manifestation of a ‘terrorist’ could potentially destabilize the representations that facilitate 
grouping together diverse entities into one ubiquitous and abstract phenomenon, or at least the 
articulation of the PKK to this phenomenon.  
 
There are many references in theto problems created by inconsistencies in countries’ approach 
towards the threat of ‘terrorism’, sometimes alongside direct criticism towards the collective 
for betraying Turkey’s own concerns. Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 9) refers to the 
“unfortunate de facto distinction made in the conceptual approaches of several countries 
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39 At this point, the PKK was not on the EU’s list of ‘terrorist organizations’. It was added shortly after this 
speech, on May 2, 2002 by the Council of the European Union.!
40 This quote is taken from one of the Official Records of a General Assembly session where the speakers’ 
arguments are referred in past tense, without being changed further, hence my editing of the verbs here. 
41 This was the World Press Photo exhibition of 2008 that took place in the lobby of the U.N. headquarters, 
including a picture of a PKK guerilla soldier walking in the forest with an automatic rifle.!
!!
!
! !
!
(,!
!
between ‘bad’ terrorists […] and tolerated terrorists, who, while enjoying safe haven in the 
same country, incite, plan, finance and sometimes command terrorist acts in another”, arguing 
that Turkey “has been victim of this double-standard approach”. ‘Double standards’ is 
represented as something that must be avoided by several speakers (Gül 2005: 3; 2006: 8; 
$lkin 2007b: 12; Apakan 2009: 6). Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2002c: 11) refers similarly 
to “the urgent need to put aside selective attitudes based on political motivations and tolerance 
for […] certain terrorist movements”, noting that Turkey expects “all States to pursue a 
consistent and determined approach in fighting terrorism without any leniency whatsoever. 
 
From the above findings we see that there is a consistent inclusion of Turkey’s own 
‘sufferings’ into the overall representations of ‘terrorism’ as a ‘global’ or ‘common’ threat 
that states have a responsibility to fight together – an inclusion that is dependent on the 
representation of ‘terrorism’ as one homogeneous phenomenon. Through its inclusion in this 
discourse, the PKK is also affected by the way the ‘terrorist’ identity is constructed on a 
general level, and it is to this part of the politicians and diplomats’ speeches I now turn. 
 
4.3 Fundamentally illegitimate: Elements of a terrorist identity 
The above representations of ‘terrorism’ need to be seen as in a mutually conditioning 
relationship with the constitution of the ‘terrorist’ identity: By representing ‘terrorism’ as a 
homogeneous phenomenon, the corollary identity (‘terrorist’) is made possible, but at the 
same time the continuous representations of ‘terrorist’ characteristics will affect what 
‘terrorism’ is (if for example ‘terrorists’ are represented as willing to use any means to 
achieve their goals, it will affect to what extent the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ necessitates an 
urgent international response). It follows from this relation that characterizing ‘terrorism’ will 
also take part in shaping the ‘terrorist’ identity. The Turkish politicians and diplomats make 
what I identity as three main representations affecting this identity: [1] The articulation of 
‘terrorism’ to single rhetorical commonplaces supporting an image of moral deficiency and 
illegitimacy, such as ‘evil’, ‘monstrous’ or ‘heinous’; [2] the rejection of the possibility that 
‘terrorism’ can ever have a legitimate goal; and [3] the representation of ‘terrorists’ as 
manipulative through the rhetorical commonplace ‘exploit’. 
 
4.3.1 Deficient morals 
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There are many instances of delegitimizing articulations to ‘terrorism’ in the speeches, 
especially during the first years of analysis. ‘Terrorism’ is referred to as an ‘evil’ or 
‘organized evil’ (Pamir 2001: 9; 2002d: 15; Gül 2003: 4), as a ‘monstrous crime against 
humanity’ ($lkin 2008c: 10), as ‘heinous’ (Pamir 2002a: 10: 2003b: 40; 2003d: 20; Erdo!an 
2007: 5; $lkin 2007a: 16; 2008c: 10); it is articulated to ‘coldblooded murder’ (Cengizer 2003: 
24) and to ‘oppression’ (Cem 2001b: 11); and it is described as something that believes 
“everything and anything is acceptable as long as it sows the seed of fear, panic and 
desperation in people” (Esenli 2002: 12). Ambassador Pamir (2002c: 27; 2002e: 18) also 
articulates ‘terrorism’ to ‘darkness’, the effect of which depends on the naturalization of 
dark/light as a negative/positive dichotomy.42 ‘Terrorist intentions’ are also differentiated 
from the sanity of the non-‘terrorist’: “I am sure that every sane person in the world is 
wondering what ominous developments can possibly be taking place right now in many a 
clandestine quarter at a time when modern technological devices could end up in the hands of 
individuals with terrorist intentions” (Cengizer 2003: 24). Such designations of the normal 
(‘sane’) and the abnormal (‘insane’) is a central aspect of how discourses distribute identities 
and are manifestations of power. By touching on such identities, Cengizer brings us to the 
second main element affecting the ‘terrorist’ identity. 
 
4.3.2 The impossibility of justifiable cause 
The ‘terrorist’ identity is also constructed through the representation that ‘terrorism’ can never 
have justifiable goals under any circumstances; choosing a ‘terrorist’ method immediately 
renders any legitimate goal null and void. This representation is especially prominent between 
2001 and 2005, where there is almost no discussion of ‘terrorism’ without the actors 
mentioning this.43 As telling examples of this, Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 8) states that 
“[n]o ideal, no cause and no end can justify terrorism. We should avoid spurious justifications 
for deliberate killing”, while U.N. Ambassador Pamir (2004: 2) argues that “terrorism, 
irrespective of its motivations, objectives, forms and manifestations, can never be justified”. 
This is repeated similarly by Prime Minister Erdo!an (2008: 11) when arguing that 
“[t]errorism is a crime against humanity, regardless of its source, pretext or ambition”. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 For example, the understanding of the Middle Ages as ‘The Dark Ages’ in contrast with the ‘Age of 
Enlightenment’, reflecting a backwards/developed dichotomy, is an imagery with long historical roots 
(Mommsen 1942).!
43 For reference: (Cengizer 2001a; 2002a; 2002a; 2002c; 2003; Cem 2001a: 8; Gürel 2002: 26; Pamir 2002c: 
26; 2004: 2; 2002e 18; 2003a: 18; Gül 2005: 3; $lkin 2005b: 7)!
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attacks of September 11 are represented as proving this specifically by Ambassador Pamir 
(2001: 9), stating that “[i]f there were any arguments that terrorists might also have a 
defensible cause, 11 September must have put this forever to rest”.  
 
The role of political motivation is very important in relation to such rejections of legitimacy. 
Ambassador Pamir (2002b: 26) fights the drawing of attention to such motivations when 
stating that “terrorism cannot be construed, let alone understood, as a potent tool in the pursuit 
of political ends. Violence and terrorism cannot and will not yield results”. Deputy 
Ambassador Cengizer (2003: 24) does this similarly by making the following argument:  
The world has had enough swayers, false prophets and spin doctors, all condoning, in one way or 
another, the inducement of fear and revulsion in the masses of innocent people as  a viable and 
genuine political method – and more often than not influencing States in that regard […] When we 
look into the history of terrorism, we clearly see that whenever political considerations exalt the 
idea of righteous murder, the basic truth of coldblooded murder is immediately adulterated.  
Again the role of the PKK must be regarded as central, especially attempts of establishing the 
PKK under new names with more explicit political orientations. On November 15, 2003 the 
PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan People’s Congress  (KONGRA GEL), declaring its 
belief “that the political, social, cultural and economic rights of the Kurds can only be attained 
through democratic political struggle” (Kongra Gel 2003), and the year before it had already 
been re-established as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK). The 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to these changes as the PKK’s “policy of appearing 
as a born-again legitimate organization and to convince the international community 
accordingly”, characterizing the stated political (as opposed to violent) orientations as 
“merely a make-up” (MFA Turkey 2011). KONGRA-GEL and KADEK’s stated divergence 
from the PKK is equally rejected by other countries, such as the United States (National 
Counterterrorism Center 2013). 
 
It is interesting that the tendency of rejecting legitimate motivation slows down from 2006 
and out, though it is still mentioned at some instances, primarily by diplomats at the General 
Assembly ($lkin 2007b: 12; 2008c: 10; Çorman 2008a: 11; Apakan 2010a: 23). Except for the 
one clear instance by Prime Minister Erdo!an cited earlier in this section, the AKP politicians 
do not make such explicit references to motivations. The absence of this could potentially 
make the search for underlying factors – ‘root causes’ – more politically sensible, opening for 
!!
!
! !
!
)%!
!
alternative representations and widening the field of potential action. Indeed, in parallel with 
this development, there is an appearance in some of the speeches of the argument that causes 
that lead to ‘terrorism’ must be fought as well. Ambassador Apakan (2009: 6) states that 
“while all forms of terrorism should be condemned unequivocally, the conditions conducive 
to it must be addressed”, while Deputy Ambassador Fazli Çorman (2010: 10) argues that 
measures to prevent ‘terrorism’ can be effective only by addressing numerous “social, 
economic, political and other factors” contributing to its existence. President Gül (2010: 23) 
also touches on this, stating that the “root causes of conflicts ought to be addressed early on to 
create the conditions for sustainable peace and stability”. It is important here that the AKP has 
made certain political approaches towards the Kurdish minority, such as expressing solidarity 
by Erdo!an visiting Diyarbakır, one of the biggest predominantly Kurdish cities (Onar 2007: 
284), and by allowing the Kurdish-language TRT6 state channel in 2009 (Pope & Pope 2011: 
274), as part of the so-called ‘Kurdish opening’ or ‘Kurdish initiative’ launched by the 
government that year.44  
 
Before 2006, the actors only point to underlying factors in relation to other (non-PKK) 
conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Pamir 2003e: 6; 2003d: 20). The exception 
to this is a statement by Foreign Minister Cem (2001: 9), but the way he points to underlying 
factors is quite different. Cem represents this as something ‘terrorism’ uses for its purpose, as 
the active subject rather than the passive result, arguing that it “feeds on deteriorating social, 
economic and political conditions”. Such represented opportunism brings us to the third main 
element constructing the ‘terrorist’ identity by the Turkish actors: ‘terrorists’ as exploitative. 
 
4.3.3 The ‘exploiting terrorist’ 
Though there are not very many instances amongst the politicians and diplomats of referring 
to ‘terrorists’ as ‘exploitative’, I include this representation here because of [1] its significant 
intertextual relevance (see section 4.4); [2] its strong delegitimizing potential; and [3] its 
widespread use amongst the military officers analyzed in chapter 5. In two speeches in 
subsequent days in 2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs $smail Cem (2001a: 10; 2001b: 11) 
states that the “terrorist network” has “taken root” in Afghanistan by “exploiting the Afghan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 The increasing emphasis on addressing underlying factors could potentially be explained also by a scholarly 
focus on ‘root causes’ of ‘terrorism’ (see e.g. Bjørgo 2005), gradually becoming prominent in political discourse 
as well. 
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people’s plight”. After this, there are no mentions of ‘exploit’ until 2010, when it re-emerges. 
Foreign Minister Davuto!lu (2010: 2) argues that “terrorists have proved to be extremely 
resilient in their ability to adapt to changing circumstances and to exploit every gap or 
loophole they find in our common stance”; that they “exploit opportunities and use every 
available technology presented to them in today’s world”; and that they “benefit from 
freedoms inherent in our societies and exploit them for their own purposes, namely, to 
terrorize audiences and breed radicalization […]”. According to Apakan (2010d: 26), 
“terrorist groups in various parts of the world attempt to exploit […] a humanitarian approach 
to gain international acceptance and recognition”, repeating this two years later (2012a: 25). 
 
What we see here are three ways that ‘terrorists’ are represented as exploitative: [1] by using 
inconsistencies in the approach of the collective Self in order to escape punishments and 
perform ‘terrorist’ acts; [2] by treating socioeconomic factors and problems instrumentally, as 
a way to gain support; and [3] by illegitimately claiming freedoms for furthering their causes. 
Again the understanding of ‘terrorist’ acts rests on an a priori assumption of ulterior motives 
and the conception that these are antithetical to the purposes of societal rights and freedoms. 
We see that these freedoms are conditioned on not being used for the ‘wrong’ purposes when 
Apakan (2012b: 23) states that “like all democratic rights, freedom of speech should not be 
abused. Incitement to terrorism, violence, racial/ethnic hatred and discrimination, or 
glorifying such acts, cannot be accepted or condoned”. 
 
Having now gone through the three main elements that discursively position the ‘terrorist’ 
identity in the speeches of the Turkish politicians and diplomats, the representation of 
‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon, and the relation of the PKK 
through references to Turkish ‘suffering’, I will discuss the intertextuality of these 
representations. This shows clearly that the language used by the Turkish politicians and 
diplomats cannot simply be considered ‘their own’.  
 
4.4  Elements of intertextuality 
The rhetorical commonplaces invoked by the Turkish actors do not arise out of nowhere, but 
reproduce components of earlier texts (such as earlier speeches by representatives of other 
states at the United Nations). Not everything can sensibly be said in every forum; the actors 
have to draw on common resources for making meaning. Tracing the historical deployment of 
such resources will also suggest something regarding who has been in positions to shape 
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discourse. This section will identify intertextual relations in the Turkish actors’ 
representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ as Other. Intertextuality is of course central to the 
representations of Self-identity as well, but as it is exactly this I seek to identify in these 
representations (it is through the appeal to historically used modes of differentiation that 
Turkish actors are able to negotiate ‘difference’), I have integrated this into the general 
discussion of the Self in the section following this one. 
 
As a first example of intertextuality, the representation of ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous 
phenomenon is present in all the United Nations resolutions concerning ‘terrorism’ since the 
first was adopted on December 18, 1972. From Resolution 40/61 (UN 1985), the specific 
phrase “terrorism in all its forms” appears, and from Resolution 48/122 (UN 1994), this 
changes to “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations” – an exact phrase used by many of 
the Turkish actors (Pamir 2001: 9; Çorman 2008b: 16; Müftüo!lu 2011b: 26; Apakan 2012a: 
25).  It is reproduced in many Security Council resolutions on ‘terrorism’ as well (e.g. UN 
1998; 1999). In the latter of these it is also referred to as “terrorism affecting the international 
community as a whole” – a phrase which also used by Pamir (2001: 9).45 
 
A second element of intertextuality is seen by the rhetorical commonplace ‘scourge’, which is 
used a plethora of times by the Turkish politicians and diplomats.C$ The use of ‘scourge’ has 
been widespread also outside of the United Nations. In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald 
Reagan used the rhetorical commonplace several times, referring to “the evil scourge of 
terrorism”, which had its origin in “depraved opponents of civilization itself” (Jackson 2005: 
155). President George W. Bush, as well as members of his administration such as Colin 
Powell, also referred to “the scourge of terrorism” (ibid.: 73). ‘Scourge’ is found also in a 
series of United Nations resolutions, as in the aforementioned 40/61 (UN 1985), where it is 
referred to as “this criminal scourge”, a rhetorical commonplace repeated in many of the 
subsequent resolutions. On the main page of the “UN Action to Counter Terrorism” (UN 
2010), the organization writes that “[c]ountering this scourge is in the interest of all nations 
[…]”, while NATO (2012b) writes that it “will continue to fight this scourge, individually and 
collectively, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter”. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 See ,++;<==>>>?3*?14D=+-4414607=4-01A3+61*0?0,+7A!/*E!http://www.un.org/terrorism/sc-res.shtml f14!/AA!
12!+,-0-!4-01A3+61*0?! 
46 For reference: (Cem 2001: 9; Cengizer 2002b; 2003; Pamir 2002a: 10; 2003c : 2; Gürel 2006: 26; Esenli 
2002: 12;  $lkin 2005b: 7; 2007b: 12; 2007c: 21; 2008b: 19; 2008a: 33; Erdo!an 2007: 5; Apakan 2010a: 23; 
Davuto!lu 2010: 19).  !
!!
!
! !
!
)(!
!
Lastly, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) repeatedly refers to 
“terrorism, a scourge of our times” (OSCE 2001). Such consistent repetition of the 
articulation between ‘scourge’ and ‘terrorism’ contribute to fixing the reality that ‘terrorism’ 
is a ‘scourge’, contributing to its position as a homogeneous phenomenon and to the urgency 
that is conferred upon measures to deal with it.  
 
A third intertextual element can be identified through ‘exploit’. Looking at the 2003 National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism of the George W. Bush administration, the way ‘exploit’ is 
used is very similar to that of the Turkish politicians and diplomats. The Strategy argues that 
many ‘terrorist organizations’ “have little in common with the poor and destitute masses [and] 
exploit these conditions to their advantage” (The White House 2003: 22), and that they “will 
exploit global systems of commerce, transportation, communications, and other sectors to 
inflict fear, destruction and death, to compromise our national security, and to diminish public 
confidence and weaken our will to fight” (ibid.: 25). The 2006 Strategy writes that 
“[d]efeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed 
[…] diminishing the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit” (The White House 2006: 
10).C9 This last phrase is found, reproduced verbatim, in many of the representations of 
Turkish military officers as well (see chapter 5). ‘Exploit’ can even be identified as used in a 
very similar way in academia: Hoffmann (2002: 312) refers to ‘terrorists’ who “seek[s] 
constantly to identify vulnerabilities and exploit gaps in U.S. defenses”. 
 
So far, the sections of chapter 4 have all focused on representations of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as 
Other, and thereby on the first part of my specified research question.  I will now move to 
addressing the second part of this question – how representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ 
are related to the representation of Self-identity, and how this enables the negotiation of 
Turkish ‘difference’ vis-à-vis the ‘European’ and ‘Western’ collective identities.  
 
4.5 Constructing the common Self 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 There are countless examples of the use of ‘exploit’ in the two Strategies.  The 2003 version writes (e.g.) that 
“terrorist groups have become increasingly self-sufficient by exploiting the global environment to support their 
operations” (Bush 2003: 8); that they “exploit vulnerabilities within our critical infrastructure” (ibid.: 9). The 
2006 Strategy writes (e.g.) that “[o]ur terrorist enemies exploit Islam to serve a violent political vision” (Bush 
2006: 5); that ‘terrorists’ see “individuals as objects to be exploited” (ibid.: 10); and that they “exploit [the 
Internet] to create and disseminate propaganda, recruit new members raise funds and other material resources 
[…]” (ibid.). !
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Chapter 3 emphasized the historical role of ‘civilization’ in European countries’ designation 
of the ‘non-civilized’ Other – including the Ottoman Empire – eventually manifested in a 
formalized ‘standard of civilization’ defining the principles of ‘international society’. We also 
saw how ‘difference’ persisted with the more ‘Western’-oriented Turkish Republic. In the 
speeches analyzed in this chapter, the rhetorical commonplace of ‘civilization’ does indeed 
play a central role for Self-identity, represented as what ‘terrorism’ is threatening. Eventually 
‘civilization’ becomes pluralized (‘civilizations’) by the actors, with ‘humanity’/’humankind’ 
moving to the position of what is mainly being threatened. 
 
4.5.1 A threat to ‘civilization’ 
The first clear reference to Self-identity appears just a few weeks following the September 11 
attacks in 2001, and it involves ‘civilization’. U.N. Ambassador Pamir (2001: 8) refers to “the 
carnage to which the United States and our civilization was subjected to on 11 September”, 
suggesting thus that besides the United States as state, the common identity of ‘civilization’ 
was also targeted – a collective including Turkey. Later in the same speech he states that the 
threat of ‘terrorism’ “is to our common civilization and the United Nations is our common 
house”. Two weeks later, Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2001b: 11) repeats that “[t]he 
carnage that the United States and our civilization was subjected to on 11 September was 
beyond any description”, and in April the following year he is equally clear (2002b: 4), stating 
that “[w]e know without a doubt that terrorism poses a very great danger to civilization as we 
know it”. In October (2002c: 10) Cengizer points to ‘civilization’ again, arguing that 
‘terrorism’ is “a threat to the very existence of individuals, of nations and of human 
civilization as a whole”. His most conspicuous use of the rhetorical commonplace, however, 
is in 2003: “No longer does terrorism only strike at the very core of democracy and civil 
society; no longer does terrorism only hamper social and economic development. It does more 
than that. It has started to kill the very essence of civilization” (Cengizer 2003: 24). The 
image of ‘terrorism’ and ‘civilization’ being diametrical opposites is strengthened also by 
Deputy Ambassador Esenli (2002: 11), arguing that “terrorism does not have a set of rules to 
which the members of civilized societies in this room can relate”.  
 
We see here the continuation of what Bilgin (2009: 121) refers to as “the [Turkish] founding 
leaders’ efforts to locate Turkey in contemporary civilization”. The consistent invocation of 
‘civilization’ in this way serves to secure Turkey’s role on the ‘right side’ of the 
‘civilizational’ identity that needs to be protected against ‘terrorism’. We also see the role of 
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‘terrorism’-as-Other in this dynamic. Similarly to how Campbell (1998a) argues that state 
identity is reproduced through ‘discourses of danger’, ‘civilization’ – and Turkey’s position 
within it – is here reproduced through ‘terrorism’ as antithesis; as the constitutive Other. This 
simultaneously shows the adoption and naturalization of a rhetorical commonplace with roots 
in European practices of Othering, illustrating clearly the principle of hegemony. It is 
interesting here that Foreign Minister %ükrü Sina Gürel (2002: 26), in his one speech in my 
analysis, reproduces something close to the idea of a universal ‘standard of civilization’, 
referring to the United Nations as “establishing standards that should apply to all”. According 
to Jackson (2006: 84), the idea of ‘civilization’ as defined by Europe was indeed central to the 
founding of the United Nations. Ambassador Pamir (2003c: 2) suggests the universal validity 
of the values safeguarded by the ‘civilizational’ Self when stating that “terrorism is a means 
of oppression directed at the very existence of human life, civilization and our common 
values – values distilled from the moment the human adventure started on Earth”. In the last 
chapter I discuss problematic aspects of such value universalism.  
 
4.5.2 ‘Civilizations’ plural: dealing with essentialism 
The way ‘civilization’ is represented above is not characteristic for the whole period of 
analysis; from mid-2003 and out, significant changes take place in the representations of Self-
identity. Gradually, the singular conception of ‘civilization’ loses almost all its presence. In its 
place there is an increased emphasis on a plural understanding of the rhetorical commonplace 
(‘civilizations’). In parallel, the politicians and diplomats begin to strongly emphasize cultural 
and religious diversity as very important positives. ‘Civilization’ also becomes marginalized 
in relation to ‘terrorism’, with’ terrorism’ primarily being represented as opposing ‘humanity’ 
or ‘humankind’ instead. 
 
These changes coincide with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) in Turkey in late-2002. The first speech of an AKP politician – that of Foreign Minister 
Abdullah Gül in September 2003 – can actually be seen as marking a divide in the material. 
Gül (2003: 4-6) refers to the promotion of “harmony among civilizations” in relation to a 
meeting initiated by Turkey between the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). He does refer to ‘civilization’ singularly as well, but in a quite different 
way than the diplomats cited above. He uses it to refer the Middle East as “one cradle of 
civilization that had enjoyed peace and prosperity for centuries”, directing in this way the 
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focus away from any exclusively ‘Western’ understanding of the concept. Gül also argues for 
many other ‘challenges’ besides ‘terrorism’ being important to deal with, adding ‘racism and 
xenophobia’ to this list.  
 
After this speech of Gül, there are only two more instances where AKP politicians use 
‘civilization’ singularly, by Prime Minister Erdo!an (2008: 12; 2011: 30). But in the first of 
these he simultaneously uses ‘civilization’ in its plural sense, and in the second he refers 
critically to ‘civilization’, arguing that “[n]o one can speak of peace, justice or civilization if 
the cry rising from Somalia is left unheard”. After 2005 ($lkin 2005c: 7), the diplomats stop 
using ‘civilization’ singularly as well. Simultaneously, references to ‘civilizations’ cease to 
revolve around ‘terrorism’ as identity opposite, instead taking part in representations of inter-
civilizational dialogue and harmony as essential to the common Self of ‘humanity’. This 
includes being able to fight together: Deputy Ambassador Ersin Erçin (2005: 23) argues that 
“challenges and threats to the peace, security, welfare and progress of the world today have 
certainly made the need for a genuine dialogue among different cultures and civilizations 
more essential than ever”. In 2009, Prime Minister Erdo!an (2009: 35) states that 
each culture and civilization flourishes through the inspiration provided by the successes of other 
cultures and civilizations. As a matter of fact, our common values today, as well as our science, 
law and art, have been influenced not only by the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations, but also 
by ancient Eastern civilization.!
By stressing the importance of ‘Eastern’ inspiration for ‘common values’, Erdo!an challenges 
a unitary focus on ‘Western’ values in a way similar to that of Gül above.  
 
There are also many references like the above that do not involve ‘civilizations’ specifically 
but have a plural focus on cultures instead. According to President Gül (2008: 21), “[w]e must 
indeed remain extremely vigilant against the risk of further alienation between different 
cultures and religions”. Prime Minister Erdo!an (2009: 35) follows this by stating that it is 
“essential to regard and understand diverse cultures not as the other, but as individual 
elements of humankind’s cultural inheritance”. Ambassador Apakan (2010b: 5) argues that 
today, “stereotypes continue to shape our perception of the other – the other who has a 
different way of life, cultural values or religious beliefs; the other who indeed enriches our 
life”, noting further that “[a]s long as we value cultural diversity as a common heritage of 
humankind, we can attain the quest for social peace and harmony”, and the year after (2011: 
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6) – quite similarly – that “cultural diversity is an integral part of the common heritage of 
humanity and an asset for the advancement of humankind”.   
 
We see here a conspicuous emphasis on ‘humanity’ and ‘humankind’ as nodal points for 
common identity. It is therefore of great interest to note that they take over the role as what 
‘terrorism’ is mainly represented as opposing (instead of ‘civilization’). Ambassador $lkin 
(2005c: 7) argues that ‘terrorism’ “obstructs the development of humanity”, while Prime 
Minister Erdo!an (2005: 39) refers to it as “the enemy of humankind”, and two years after 
(2007: 5) as “a heinous crime against humanity”, repeating this the year after (2008: 11). This 
phrase is also repeated thrice by $lkin (2007a: 16; 2007b: 12; 2008c: 10) as well as by 
Ambassador Apakan (2010a: 23) and Foreign Minister Gül (2003: 4).!
 
The discursive developments described here have a clear material manifestation in the United 
Nations Alliance of Civilizations (AOC), which was established in 2005 on the initiative of 
the Turkish and Spanish Prime Ministers, along with former Secretary-General Kofi Annan. 
When the Turkish politicians and diplomats are referring to the AOC, it reveals both the 
pluralization of ‘civilization’ and the emphasis on common ‘humanity’. Indeed, the tagline 
associated to the AOC logo is quite illustrative: “Many cultures. One humanity” (UN 2012). 
The first reference to the AOC is made by Deputy Ambassador Ersin Erçin (2005: 24), 
referring to it as “a genuine effort to prove that peoples of the world are not divided along 
cultural and religious lines, but bound by universal values that are derived from the 
foundation of humankind’s collective wisdom, conscience and drive for progress [emphasis 
added]”. His statement underlines that essential cultural difference is not incompatible with 
universal values and common identity, using ‘humankind’ as anchor for such an identity. 
Foreign Minister Gül (2006: 7) does this similarly, arguing that the AOC wishes to 
“emphasize the elements that unite various societies around our common humanity”, while 
Deputy Ambassador Fazli Çorman (2008a: 11) states its importance for “promotion of 
dialogue, tolerance and understanding among different cultures and religions”. The AOC is 
even represented as a way to counter the threat of ‘terrorism’ itself: “The initiative, which is 
aimed at building bridges among diverse cultures and religions through our common values 
and ideals, could in fact be one of the most effective ways of dealing with all forms of 
extremism, including terrorism” ($lkin 2008c: 10).  
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I argue that four main perspectives can be taken towards these developments to the 
representation of Self-identity, and I will discuss these in the following section.!
!
4.5.3 Reading the developments to Self-identity!
Firstly, the plural conception of ‘civilization’ and the emphasis on ‘humanity’ and 
‘humankind’ can be seen in relation to the idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’. After the 
September 11 attacks there was an increased focus in public and political discourse on 
‘essential’ differences between ‘civilizations’, strongly related to many viewing these attacks 
(as well as bombings in Bali, Madrid and London) as proving Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ thesis (Neumayer & Plümper 2009: 712), a thesis assuming ‘civilizations’ as 
being monolithic and homogeneous, and seeing ‘Islamic civilization’ as defined by its ‘anti-
Westernism’ (Said 1998).48 The increased prominence of such essentialism could challenge 
representations of Turkey, with a population that is almost exclusively Muslim, as part of one 
common ‘civilization’ along with ‘the West’ – something that has traditionally been a goal of 
the Turkish political and military elite (Tank 2006: 464). By emphasizing diversity as an asset 
rather than a challenge, and by reconfiguring the basis of common identity to ‘humanity’, this 
can be counteracted.49 An essential point here is that ‘terrorism’ continues to serve the role as 
the constitutive Other, by being represented as external to ‘humanity’ rather than to 
‘civilization’ in the Turkish actors’ speeches. 
 
A second way to conceptualize the positive emphasis on cultural and religious diversity is in 
relation to the ‘Islamist’ background of the AKP and the historically secular character of the 
Turkish Republic. According to Tank (2006: 464), the rise of the AKP has led to questions 
over the ‘Western’ quality of Turkey’s identity, increasingly emphasizing its character as a 
“progressive, democratic, Muslim state”. From 2002, Turkey was increasingly represented as 
a Muslim rather than secular partner by the United States, with the AKP gradually accepting 
this definition as well (Østereng 2011: 34). Critics have been pointing to the AKP as 
continuation of political Islam in different clothing (O!uzlu 2010: 676), though the Party, 
“despite its pro-Islamist roots[,] has wholeheartedly embraced the goal of Turkey’s EU 
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48 Huntington himself has even commented that his thesis predicted the context from which the September 11 
attacks emerged (Pew Forum 2006). !
C&!The dynamic here is actually reminiscent of Bartolomé de Las Casas’ representation of the indigenous Other 
described in chapter 3, where replacing the ‘civilized’/’non-civilized’ dichotomy with ‘humanity’ opened for 
commonality through making possible a move from Other to Self (‘believer’/’nonbeliever’), and – importantly – 
delegitimized enslavement. !
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membership and taken the political reform process in Turkey the farthest” (Rumelili 2007: 
92).50 Though they have been directed mostly towards perceived authoritarianism, such 
skepticism has received an added impetus with the popular demonstrations against the 
government that are ongoing in Turkey at the time of writing (June 2013). With the discursive 
drawing of attention towards such  ‘Islamist’ characteristics, one would expect a need to 
reconstitute ‘commonality’, or at least to explain ‘difference’. 
 
A third perspective on these developments is the articulation between ‘terrorism’ and 
religion/Islam, which has been increasingly made after the September 11 attacks. Noor (2010: 
56) argues that the “image of the all-pervading and all-powerful Muslim terrorist […] feeds 
the discourse of the ‘war on terror’”, while Gunning and Jackson (2011: 369-370) argue that 
the term ‘religious terrorism’ has become “ubiquitous in public debate”, and that the relation 
between violence and religion has “a long genealogy in Western scholarship”. The more such 
an articulation becomes established, the harder it is to reproduce an international discourse on 
‘terrorism’ without at the same time reproducing this relation. Interestingly, there are many 
examples of the Turkish politicians and diplomats breaking this articulation. Already in 
November 2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs $smail Cem (2001a: 8) states that “terrorism does 
not have a religion”, and that “[t]o identify terrorism with any religion is a sacrilege against 
all religions”. This breaking is repeated by subsequent Foreign Minister %ükrü Sina Gürel the 
year after (2002: 26). There are even more instances during the rule of the AKP, alongside the 
already cited statements on religion and culture (Gül 2005: 3; 2006: 8; Apakan 2009: 6; 
Çorman 2010: 10; Müftüo!lu 2011b: 26). 
 
A fourth – and alternative – way of looking at these developments in Self-identity is that of 
Tank (2006: 466-468), who asks “whether Turkey’s ‘forgotten’ Islamic identity can prove to 
be instrumental in its relationship with the West [emphasis added]”, referring to the “utility of 
having a selective identity”. In this account, Islamic identity is a ‘marketable’ attribute – a 
positive to begin with given the today’s situation, rather than a stumbling block that needs to 
be overcome. Tank argues that Turkish politicians are emphasizing Muslim identity in order to 
represent Turkey as a interlocutor between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’, a trait useful for a United 
States’ led democratization project in the Midde East, writing that Erdo!an and Gül argued in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50!Skepticism has also involved Prime Minster Erdo!an specifically. Though he stated that he had broken with 
radical Islamism during the campaign leading to the 2002 elections, he had nonetheless earlier been excluded 
from parliamentary politics due to “perceived Islamist provocation” during a 1997 rally (Pope & Pope 2011: 
322).!
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2002 for Turkish inclusion in the European Union on the basis of its Muslim identity, rather 
than despite it (ibid.: 470). Turkey can thus become the ‘necessary Other’ rather than just the 
Other (ibid.: 476). The differences to the other points made in this section must not be 
overstated, however: ‘Humanity’ can still play the same role in this account, contributing to 
“blurring the ‘civilizational’ boundary and weakening the essentialism of cultural attributes 
ascribed to East and West”, as Tank argues herself (ibid.). 
 
Before moving to chapter 5 and the analysis of Turkish military officers’ representations of 
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’, I will discuss one more aspect of the representations of Self-
identity by the politicians and diplomats, namely the continuation – even increase – in 
reproduction of liberalist discourse across the developments discussed above.  
!
4.5.4 The persistence of liberalist discourse!
The pluralization of ‘civilization’ and the emphasis on cultural and religious diversity in the 
politicians’ and diplomats’ speeches from 2003 is somewhat deceptive, to the extent that it 
gives a clear impression of challenging ‘European’/’Western’ hegemony. Though several of 
the actors focus on the value of diversity and emphasize ‘Eastern’ inspiration, this takes place 
alongside the reproduction of elements of liberalist discourse, which has roots in the 
Enlightenment imaginary of Europe I discussed in chapter 3 (Mouffe 1993: 9-13) – and thus 
similar roots as the aspects of Othering manifested in the ‘standard of civilization’. I identify 
this reproduction through the invocation of rhetorical commonplaces such as ‘human rights’, 
‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘good governance’, often in associative chains. After the 
coming to power of the AKP there is a strengthening rather than a challenging of such 
commonplaces.  
!
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s (2003: 5) first speech at the United Nations is again 
illustrative. While he points to the Middle East as a ‘cradle of civilization’ and emphasizes 
‘spiritual values’ as compatible with ‘contemporary living standards’, he also states that 
“[m]y government’s reforms at home reflected a sustained effort to promote democracy, 
human rights, the rule of law, civil society, good governance, accountability and gender 
equality to the highest standards set by the United Nations and the European Union”, 
suggesting the subordination of the ‘Eastern’ cultural factor to these ‘standards’. This is even 
clearer in a statement by Prime Minister Erdo!an (2009: 35). While he does argue that “our 
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common values […] have been influenced not only by the ancient Greek and Roman 
civilizations, but also by ancient Eastern civilizations”, he argues that the Alliance of 
Civilizations should contribute to “shaping a global civilization based on universal values 
centered on democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights, gender equality, 
young people and media”. The representation of equal inspirational value thus becomes 
subsumed to a significant extent by reproducing a discourse with strong ‘Western’ origins, 
hindering the universally valid in being a synthesis of equally important ‘Western’ and 
‘Eastern’ inspiration.  
 
Considering for example ‘good governance’, its liberal (and ‘Western’) origin is clear. The 
term became prominent in the early 1990s as part of donor agencies designating conditions 
that needed to be met by donor recipients, a policy led by the World Bank. According to 
Harrison (quoted in Nanda 2006: 275), the Bank’s “liberal worldview” has been imposed on 
states – foremost in Africa – through promotion of governance reform. Jones (2013: 50-51) 
argues that ‘good governance’ has been part of a discourse that “reproduces a racialized 
imagination deeply entrenched in the structures of Western thought. If we follow Jones’ 
assertion that ‘good governance’ is fundamentally tied to the idea of ‘failed states’, then it is 
equally important that the debate on ‘failed states’ has revealed “a dogmatic assumption and 
wishful thinking that all states will – in the long run – converge towards a model of Western 
liberal democracy” (Hagmann & Hoehne 2008: 43). Again we see quite clear parallels to the 
way ‘civilization’ became increasingly articulated to governance reform in its use by 
Enlightenment Europe (see section 3.1).   
 
Chains of such commonplaces, including ‘human rights’, ‘the rule of law’ and ‘good 
governance’ amongst others, are reproduced by several others than only Gül and Erdo!an in 
the later years of analysis (Davuto!lu 2009: 9; Apakan, 2010c: 8; 2012a: 25; Müftüo!lu 
2011a: 13). This increasing invocation is interesting considering the AKP’s orientation 
towards the European Union and criticisms from European countries regarding for example 
Turkey’s human rights record (Rumelili 2007: 66). By emphasizing ‘human rights’ in relation 
to the fight against ‘terrorism’, such criticism could potentially be somewhat alleviated. There 
are even several references to ‘terrorism’ being a threat to ‘human rights’ specifically (Pamir 
2001: 9; Cengizer 2002c: 10); Gürel 2002: 26; $lkin 2005c: 7; Apakan 2010a: 23; 2010d: 26; 
2012a: 25). It is also interesting to see that such liberalist discourse is reproduced in parallel 
with the Turkish actors emphasizing the value of cultural and ‘civilizational’ diversity, 
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because of the universalism of liberalism (Mouffe 1993: 13). If we follow Onar’s (2011: 465) 
point that discourses do not need to be internally consistent and can display internal tensions, 
however, it is perfectly possible for the Turkish actors to make both these representations at 
the same time. A last reason why liberalist universalism is important here is the way it affects 
the discursive position of the ‘terrorist’, through its proclivity for conceptualizing antagonism 
as radical and threatening Otherness (Mouffe 1993). I elaborate on this in the final chapter. 
 
4.6 Summary 
Having reached the end of chapter 4, we can sum up the main insights from my analysis of 
Turkish politicians’ and diplomats’ representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’. I identify six 
main points; three related to the Other and three to the Self.  
[1] The politicians and diplomats represent ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ‘global’ 
phenomenon that can only be viably fought through unequivocal international cooperation, 
rejecting distinctions between ‘terrorists’. 
[2] The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is tied into this ‘global’ phenomenon through 
references to Turkish yearlong ‘suffering’ from ‘terrorism’ and the castigation of other states 
for using ‘double standards’ in their treatment of ‘terrorists’  
[3] The ‘terrorist’ identity is discursively affected by three elements especially: the 
representation of moral deficiency, the rejection of any possible legitimate cause, and the 
references to ‘terrorists’ as ‘exploitative’ in various ways. 
[4] In the first 2-3 years of analysis, ‘terrorism’ is represented as a threat to a ‘common 
civilization’, securing Turkey’s position of the ‘inside’ of an identity that has been historically 
important in designating Ottoman – and Turkish – ‘difference’.  
[5] From 2003, ‘civilization’ becomes pluralized (‘civilizations’) and there is increased 
emphasis on cultural and religious diversity being positives to the common Self, which is 
centered on ‘humanity’/’humankind’, still with ‘terrorism’ as constitutive Other. These 
changes should be understood in relation to the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis and the 
articulation of ‘Islamism’ to the AKP. 
[6] Discursive elements with ‘European’/’Western’ origins stay intact through these 
developments by the persistence – even increase – in the use of rhetorical commonplaces 
common to liberalist universalist discourse.  
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5. 
‘Terrorism’ and the Turkish Military, 2006-2011 
 
Chapter 5 has two goals. The first is to strengthen the insight into the representations of 
‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ as Other, and how the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is tied into 
this, by diversifying the data material from that analyzed in chapter 4. The second goal is to 
examine whether a different Self-identity is represented in opposition to the ‘terrorist’ Other 
by the Turkish military actors, compared to the politicians and diplomats, and to see whether 
there are traces of negotiating ‘difference’ vis-à-vis ‘European’ and ‘Western’ collective 
identities also here. I discuss the reasons to expect such differences below, in section 5.1. 
 
All of the data analyzed in chapter 5 are taken from the NATO Centre of Excellence: Defence 
Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), which was inaugurated in June 2005 in Ankara, Turkey. It is 
one of 18 NATO Centres of Excellence, but the only one focusing on ‘terrorism’ 
specifically.F' Among many activities, the Centre arranges courses, workshops and symposia 
on ‘terrorism’ which are widely attended; as an example, the 2010 symposium had 600 
participants from 80 different countries. Though the Centre is manned by personnel from 
several countries the bulk of the officers, and all of the civilian workers, are Turkish (COE-
DAT 2013). There are two main reasons for choosing this Centre as source: Firstly, it offers a 
way of accessing Turkish military officers’ representations of the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ 
in English, which are not in overabundance; secondly, it is a Centre which has been subjected 
to very little – if any – scholarly research.  I analyze the opening and closing speeches at three 
of the Centre’s biannual symposia on ‘Global Terrorism and International Cooperation’, 
which are held by high-ranking Turkish officers, and I analyze all articles written by Turkish 
military officers in the 21 issues of the Centre’s newsletter between 2007 and 2011. 2012 is 
not included because in this final year the issues no longer include such articles. All of the 
data are accessible on the Centre webpage: http://www.coedat.nato.int/. 
 
The chapter is structured similarly as chapter 4, beginning with the main representations of 
‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon, and ‘terrorist’ as a fundamentally 
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51 The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) that supervises all these Centres of Excellence is situated in the 
United States (NATO 2012).!
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illegitimate identity. After this I move to the construction of the Self, comparing this to the 
representations of the politicians and diplomats. Before moving to the actual representations, 
however, I will discuss why the military texts could be hypothesized to offer alternative 
representations of ‘terrorism’ and Self-identity, especially as compared to those of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) politicians. 
 
5.1 Background: Clashes over Turkish identity 
The relationship between civilian rule and the military in Turkey has often been strenuous. 
There were military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, and the military has generally had 
a significant presence within the state apparatus (Çelik 2000).F" According to Eccarius-Kelly 
(2011: 23), the Turkish military has acted “as an independent power broker and 
operate[d] beyond the constitutional controls of democratically elected governments”. The 
traditional role of the military in safeguarding Kemalist nationalism and secularism is 
important here; the 1980 intervention and the social engineering that followed it were built on 
the belief in a “permanent Kemalist blueprint for Turkish society”; the military emphasizing 
the duty of saving ‘state unity’ as a pretext for interventions (Pope and Pope 2011: 152). 
 
However, the 1999 acceptance of Turkey as a candidate country to the European Union 
ushered in a wave of reforms that reduced this role of the military. Such reforms were brought 
forward even more strongly after the coming to power of the currently ruling AKP in 2002 
(Gürsoy 2012: 191-192; Kanci 2009: 368). As an example of reform, civilian control was 
given over military institutions, including the transformation of Secretary General of the 
National Security Council through a 2003 constitutional change (Kanci 2009: 368; Müftüler-
Baç and Gürsoy 2010: 415).  Though the military still plays an important role, “a new modus 
vivendi has been reached between the armed forces and the civilian government” (Müftüler-
Baç and Gürsoy 2010: 415). By itself this shows one of several possible sources of tension 
between the military and the (AKP) politicians.  
 
The approach to the ’Kurdish question’ is another point of possible divergence. Kemalism has 
historically been central to interpreting the PKK as an existential threat to the state, a 
tendency going all the way back to the inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923, with its 
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52 In addition to these interventions, the ending of Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party government in 1997 has 
been referred to as a ‘post-modern coup’ (Onar 2007: 276), intended to “curb the rise of political Islam” (Pope & 
Pope 2011: 311-312).!
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emphasis on ‘unity’. Considering that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo!an argued in 2005 
that every Turkish citizen shared a common supra-identity but could legitimately proclaim 
also another sub-identity (such as being Kurdish), as well as being the first head of state to 
refer to the ‘Kurdish problem’ (Onar 2007: 277-284), anathema to ardent Kemalists, we see 
grounds for discursive conflict that could be manifested in representations of the PKK and 
‘terrorism’ in general. 
 
The role of religion in society is also an important aspect here. The Turkish military has 
generally been a guarantor of the secular (laicist) character of the Turkish state, protecting the 
principles established by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s government in 1923, where nationalism 
displaced religion and traditionalism “as sources of political unity and legitimization” (Çelik 
2000: 195). According to Tank (2006: 466), the military has historically feared that if traces of 
past Muslim identity (from the ancien regime of the Ottoman Empire) are not suppressed, 
they could “destroy the achievements of the secular state”. When the AKP came to power, the 
military establishment expressed concerns for its ‘Islamist’ ambitions, with party leader 
Erdo!an having been arrested for ‘Islamist sedition’ in 1997, after having read an Islamist 
poem at a political rally (Cleveland & Bunton 2009: 532). The association of the AKP to a 
reversal of secular trends was especially marked after controversies relating to the role of the 
headscarf in 2005, when the European Court of Human Rights upheld the Turkish ban, with 
Kemalists criticizing Prime Minister Erdo!an’s reaction to this as revealing a hidden project 
of ‘Islamization’ (Onar 2007: 279-280). Judging from the large demonstrations in many 
Turkish cities that are ongoing at the time of writing (June 2013), which – besides being 
directed towards perceived authoritarianism from Erdo!an – have also included expressions 
of fears for increasing religious conservatism (The Telegraph 2013a), this seems to be a point 
of growing importance. The military officers could thus be expected to put less emphasis on 
representing cultural and religious diversity positively than what we saw of the politicians and 
diplomats, as well as on breaking the articulation between ‘terrorism’ and Islam.  
 
The question of accession to the European Union is also a source of potential conflict. Though 
the military declared its support for the accession to the European Union in 2003, many 
Kemalists have generally been skeptical to the EU and ambivalent to Turkey’s relation with 
‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ An important reason is the circumstances from which the Turkish 
Republic arose, with the European victors of World War I dividing up most of the remaining 
Ottoman Empire through the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, ushering in the Turkish war of 
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independence. According to Onar (2007: 284), criticisms of Turkey by European actors have 
been increasingly read through “the prism of the Sèvres syndrome” relating to this 
dismemberment at the hands of Europe, with committed nationalists believing that plans to 
partition the Turkish Republic have never ended in the eyes of Europeans (Pope & Pope 2011: 
55). The AKP, on the other hand, stated from the outset its intention of being accepted to the 
EU (O!uzlu 2010), going on a “whirlwind tour of European capitals in pursuit of a date for 
accession negotiations” (Onar 2007: 278) right after its coming to power. The pro-EU 
discourse of the AKP at its inception emphasized ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and ‘individual 
rights’ – which we have seen reflected in the analysis in chapter 4 – and this could therefore 
be expected as less prominent amongst the military officers. 
 
The perhaps clearest manifestation of tensions between the AKP and the military is the now 
more than five-year long investigation into the alleged existence of a clandestine network 
called Ergenekon, with ties to the Turkish military and with the goal of overthrowing the 
current AKP government (Today’s Zaman 2013a; Balcı & Jacoby 2012: 137). The judicial 
process is approaching its 300th hearing, currently with 275 defendants. Critics have been 
pointing to the investigation as an elaborate political stifling of secular opposition (Jenkins 
2009: 10); by the main opposition party CHP it has been referred to as “an ‘inquisition’ of 
government critics” (Reuters 2012). It is of utmost interest here that several of the high-
ranking military officers in my analysis are currently accused, or have been convicted, as part 
of the Ergenekon process or as part of the related Balyoz court case, which deals with an 
alleged coup plot dating back to 2003.53 In relation to these cases, the ‘terrorist’ label has 
interestingly been invoked, for example by “membership of an armed terrorist group” being 
one of the allegations made against two former high-ranking generals in July 2008 (Balcı & 
Jacoby 2012: 138).  
 
Before moving on, a caveat should be made: A discussion like the one above easily 
reproduces essentialist notions of how various ‘camps’ are fundamentally incompatible with 
each other – eternally so – as they represent different interests. This is not in any way my 
intention. I am pointing to various oppositions and tensions in Turkey that have been 
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53 Retired General and former Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun was arrested in March 2012 as part of the 
Balyoz case (Hürriyet Daily News 2012), while retired General and former Chief of Staff $lker Ba&bu! was 
arrested in January 2012 for allegations of planning to overthrow the government (NYTimes 2012). In addition 
to this, retired General and Deputy Chief of Staff Aslan Güner was referred for arrest at the end of February 2013 
for his role in the 1997 ‘postmodern coup’ (Today’s Zaman 2013b).  
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repeatedly pointed to, as these offer nodes through which to compare the representations and 
look for manifestations of difference. In this view Kemalism, Islamism, secularism, 
modernism are all discourses, not static variables (Çelik 2000) – but of course discourses that 
can be highly conflicting. 
 
I now move to dealing with my specified research question, one the one hand analyzing 
representations of ‘terrorism’ as phenomenon and ‘terrorist’ as identity, seeing how the 
conflict with the PKK ties into this, and on the other analyzing the representation of Self-
identity and whether this suggests the negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’. Section 5.2 covers 
the representation of ‘terrorism’ as homogeneous and ubiquitous, consistent with that of 
chapter 4, showing how the PKK is related to this ‘global’ fight. Section 5.3 discusses the 
construction of the ‘terrorist’ identity. While this is also quite similar to that of the politicians 
and diplomats, here it includes the use of organic metaphors where ‘terrorism’ as ‘illness’ or 
‘infection’ is threatening the healthy social ‘body’, and the construction of the identity is more 
direct (rather than benig done through ‘terrorism’). Section 5.4 looks at the representations of 
the common Self by the Turkish military officers. Although the officers emphasize the role of 
the nation-state more than the politicians and diplomats, and though some of them explicitly 
challenge the idea of ‘universal values’, the similarities are more conspicuous than the 
differences. However, the impression of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ serving as the constitutive 
Other for negotiation of ‘difference’ is strengthened, with many instances of breaking the 
articulation between Islam and ‘terrorism’. 
 
5.2 The common threat and the common duty 
The representation of ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ubiquitous threat, though there may 
be differences in manifestation, is present amongst the Turkish military officers like it was 
amongst the politicians and diplomats. The perspective offered is thus that two states can be 
fighting the same ‘terrorist’ phenomenon though the conflicts are taking place in different 
parts of the world and with different groups. General and Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök’s 
(2006a: x) statement at the first NATO Centre symposium that “we must admit that there 
exists a single type of ‘terrorist’ threatening our lives, our values and the stability all around 
the world” is illustrative here. In a similar fashion, General Aslan Güner (2010: 157) states 
that “the terrorist threat has been transformed into a real threat to the entire world”, while 
Colonel Özden Çelik (2010: 36) argues that “terrorism can be seen everywhere, in every 
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nation and society, regardless of level of development, political system and demographic 
structure”. Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 7) shows the perceived homogeneity clearly by 
arguing that  
Today we are faced with a new kind of terrorism that does not emanate from one country, one 
religion or even one group, but from the networks than span the globe from East to West and North 
to South, irrespective national boundaries and frontiers. The attacks so far have left victims from 
over 80 countries, and suspects have been arrested in 60 different states. Since this new terrorism 
is dynamic and amorphous by its nature, efforts to combat terrorism today must be flexible, 
comprehensive and coordinated. 
The rhetorical commonplace ‘global’ plays a central role also here, articulated as ‘global 
terrorism’, ‘global phenomenon’, ‘global dimension’ or ‘global threat’ at several points (e.g. 
Tokgöz 2011: 32; Büyükanıt 2008: 3; Güleryüz 2007: 25; Özkök 2006a: x) Amongst the 
military officers, homogeneity is represented through the ‘terrorist’ identity as well, foremost 
by the assumption that all ‘terrorists’ think or act similarly. Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 14) 
refers to “the terrorist mindset”, while Colonel O!uz Kulpcu (2010: 21) refers to the “nature 
of terrorist behavior”. Though it is admitted that no empirical findings shows this form of 
homogeneity, this is discussed not as a theoretical impossibility, but in a way suggesting that it 
could be found, given sufficient evidence: “Claims that terrorists all have the same 
psychology and mindset have not been proved yet” (Çelik 2011: 28); or “[t]here is as of yet 
no identified universal terrorist personality pattern” (Ersen 2008: 23). 
 
The representations of ‘terrorism’ as homogeneous and ‘global’ enable the argument that all 
states are threatened, that they cannot remain passive, and that there is an obligation to take 
part in the common fight. General Ya&ar Büyükanıt (2008: 9), Chief of General Staff from 
2006-2008, argues that “no nation has the luxury of being indifferent to the events developing 
even in the remotest parts of the world”, while Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 13) states that it 
“threatens all countries to the same degree without making any distinction between developed 
and developing ones”. Many countries “haven’t taken their lessons yet” (Denizer 2008b: 8), 
and “those who pose an indifferent attitude towards it, sooner or later would be drown [sic] in 
the blood of terrorist victims” (Özkök 2006a: xiv). Even if countries might not be suffering 
right now, the fight against it is still important “to all nations in the world which may suffer 
from it in the future” (Kiliç 2007: 20). Because of this all-encompassing threat, states are 
responsible for recognizing “every kind of terrorist organization as a common target without 
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making any discrimination among them” (Özkök 2006a: xiv); acting “as if they have a 
common enemy – the terrorist” (Güleryüz 2001a: 24).  
 
5.2.1  The ‘new terrorism’: The September 11 attacks  
Several of the military officers represent the attacks of September 11 as proving ‘terrorism’ as 
having a specific nature – including this ubiquitous character – or as initiating a new phase in 
the fight against it. According to Colonel Ahmet Tuncer (2007: 3), the attacks revealed 
‘terrorism’ as an “asymmetric threat […] with a changing profile” and were a reminder of 
“the transterritoriality, transnationality and unpredictability of terrorism”; they made it 
“absolutely clear that the world was never going to be the same, and that it faced something 
new” (Kulpcu 2010: 20). By General and Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 255) this 
is underlined most clearly:  
The messages that can be deduced from the 9/11 attack could be listed as follows: None of the 
states of the world is exempt from terrorism. Terrorism occupies a position that cannot be confined 
to a single state or region […] and therefore [i]nternational cooperation is required in struggling 
against it. It was only after 9/11 that people all over the world were able to comprehend what 
terrorism was, and what they were confronted with. 
Because the September 11 attacks happened how they did and where they did, they could 
happen to anyone, marking a new phase characterized by an increased need for cooperation 
and the realization of what ‘terrorism’ really is. When conclusions are represented as self-
evident in such away, one should be conscious of the interpretative effort that behind the 
cause itself: the attacks did not have to be read in any definite way.  Such readings open up a 
whole range of possibilities for action – and, importantly, marginalize others. Campbell 
(1998a: 15) argues that invoking “the advent of a new phase in world politics” leads to the 
acceptance of a given rendering of the past, conferring legitimacy on whoever makes such a 
representation (he is discussing the United States). The same argument can be applied on 
representations of what the new phase is about; it takes part in shaping the anvil on which 
policies are forged – including the response to events, such as the September 11 attacks. This 
reveals how Turkey can be represented as part of a Self that is collectively struggling with this 
(‘post-9/11’) phase, which opens for including the conflict with the PKK. Before showing 
how the military officers make this inclusion, I will show how they express concerns for the 
lack of a universal definition of ‘terrorism’. 
 
!!
!
! !
!
+%!
!
5.2.2 Definitional concerns 
One aspect of ‘terrorism’ that is practically absent amongst the politicians and diplomats but 
subjected to in-depth discussion by the military officers is that of defining ‘terrorism’. The 
argument made generally consists of two elements: [1] The acknowledgement that there is no 
consistent, general definition of ‘terrorism’ available, and that states operate with diverging 
definitions according to their own interests;FC and [2] the relating of this to a weakened 
international collective effort in fighting ‘terrorism’, often described as the ‘main reason’ for 
failure, advocating for finding a definition for future cooperation (e.g. Sarica 2007: 15; 
Güleryüz 2007a; Büyükanıt 2008: 20). There are no instances of characterizing the search for 
a universal definition as a theoretical impossibility or a futile endeavor for any other reasons. 
As argued by Colonel Özden Çelik (2011: 15), “[t]he fact that the international community 
has failed to reach a generally-accepted [sic] definition of terrorism does not mean that the 
concept of terrorism is indefinable”. Rather, in most instances where the issue of definition is 
brought up, it is argued that efforts should be made to find such a definition. Using the lack of 
a definition as argument against a common struggle is explicitly rejected by Chief of General 
Staff Ya&ar Büyükanıt (2008: 20) and Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 227). 
 
Notwithstanding the acknowledgment of issues related to the definition of ‘terrorism’, some 
of the officers seem to take no issue with offering idiosyncratic (and quite colorful) 
definitions. Colonel Kenan Tokgöz (2011: 31) argues that “terrorism can be perceived as the 
‘killing of innocent people inhumanly by some psychopathic persons for reasons that never 
can be legitimized’”, while Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 7) follows his discussion of the 
definitional problem by stating that “[n]evertheless, for the purposes of this analysis terrorism 
is defined as an act and a tactic used by a small set of extremists to fight against an 
overwhelmingly powerful opponent while surrounded by a large population who mostly just 
want peace and quiet”. Captains Ibrahim Can and Nesip Ö!ün (2008: 23) argue that it is the 
lack of a common definition that forces every state to find one of its own: “What should a 
government do to combat terrorism in the absence of an internationally accepted definition of 
terrorism? The answer is straightforward: every country needs its own definition and 
legislation”.  
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54 At several instances, the officers actually illustrate their argument by referencing the study of Schmid’s and 
Jongman’s (1988) that was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5 (Özkök 2006a: ix; Tokgöz 2011: 32; Çelik 2011: 
17) !
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A statement by Colonel Çelik (2011: 15) suggests a central premise in the discourse within 
which the military officers are speaking and writing: A consequence of not finding a 
definition is that “the perpetrators of violent acts could continue to raise the defence that they 
are not included within the definition of terrorism”. If a group that is characterized as 
‘terrorist’ successfully refuses this label, this reveals a loophole in the current definition of 
‘terrorism’, rather than bringing up a discussion of whether or not the label is justified in the 
first place. Though the officers are speaking abstractly and unspecifically, this shows a priori 
understanding of such groups being ‘terrorist’ in reality – it is just a question making this 
official. The PKK is exactly one of these groups that the officers argue need to be 
unequivocally recognized as such. 
 
5.2.3 Turkish ‘suffering’: Interpellating the PKK 
Though the PKK was never referred to in name, the analysis in chapter 4 revealed a consistent 
relating of the conflict with the PKK to abstract and ubiquitous ‘terrorism’, specifically with 
references to Turkish ‘suffering’. Such references are present also amongst the military 
officers, but there are two differences especially as to how the PKK is implicated. Firstly, the 
PKK is mentioned explicitly by the military officers; secondly, the criticisms of other states 
for not unequivocally condemning it are stronger; with the officers more clearly fighting 
alternative identities for the PKK. In most of the articles of the newsletter, the PKK is never 
mentioned, but this should be expected from the general technicality of the articles (writing 
for example specifically on topics like ‘money laundering’), and from their having a narrower 
audience compared both to the symposia speeches and the U.N. speeches. The instances of 
explicit interpellations are however very clear.  
 
The connection between the PKK and the homogeneous phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ is made 
quite clear already in the opening speech at the first Centre symposium by General and Chief 
of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2006a: x): 
We are a nation who has suffered from terrorism and a nation with thousands of martyrs because 
of terrorism […] For the past 35 years, Turkey has become the target of terrorism fueled by 
ideological, ethnic and religious hatred […] and more than 30 thousand Turkish citizens have been 
the victims of the bloody terrorist organization PKK/KONGRA-GEL? Being one of the countries 
that suffered a lot from terrorism, Turkey quite well understands the pains and the agony felt by 
the nations targeted by terrorism. 
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Özkök is communicating that the conflict with the PKK is a manifestation of a general 
phenomenon, by suggesting Turkish identification with other countries as a result of its own 
experiences with ‘terrorism’. General and Chief of Staff $lker Ba&bu! (2010: 8) reiterates this 
relation when stating that “Turkey has been fighting against PKK terrorist organization [sic] 
for more than 30 years”, arguing further that “[s]tates and nations have to be ready to pay this 
price when necessary, as well”. Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 227) even argues 
that the PKK “constitutes a threat not only for Turkey but also for the international 
community at the same time”. In a newsletter article, Colonel Halil Sarica (2007: 18) refers to 
Turkey as “a country suffering from terrorism for almost 40 years”, arguing that “cooperation 
can only be possible by recognizing and evaluating every kind of terrorist organization as a 
common target without making any discrimination among them”, while Captain Baki Gündüz 
(2009: 18) writes that “Turkey has been facing the terrorist threat from the 
PKK/KONGRAGEL terrorist organization for over a quarter century”.  
 
The rhetorical commonplace ‘martyr’ in General Özkök’s above quote is worth stopping by. It 
is used also with reference to the casualties of Turkish soldiers at the hands of the PKK in the 
“General Overview of the Terrorist Activities” for the months October – December 2009 (Ak 
& Akyol 2009: 10), referring to “[s]even soldiers martyred during an armed attack”. This is 
repeated in the Overviews for April – June 2010 (Erün & Akyol 2010: 8) and July – 
September 2010 (Erün & Özkan 2010: 12). ‘Martyr’ is also use by Colonel Tuncer (2008: 11), 
referring to “soldiers martyred in the conflict”. When the military officers are articulating the 
commonplace to the fight against ‘terrorism’ in this way, it represents higher justifiable cause 
through its traditional association to (divine) self-sacrifice. This point is made even more 
interesting as in the article directly following that of Tuncer, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 15-
17) refers to ‘martyrdom’ – here in relation to ‘terrorist’ motivations and the way it provides 
“religious approval and glorification” – as something that “has a strong logic [but] not one 
that most of us can relate to”, and which “runs counter to ‘our’ sense of logic”.  
 
The PKK is also included into the general representations of ‘terrorism’ through criticisms of 
unspecified ‘nations’ or ‘European states’ for being inconsistent in their condemnation of 
‘terrorist’ groups and not always including the PKK.  Chief of Staff Büyükanıt (2008: 10) 
refers to “continuing irrational practices and tolerance” which “harm[s] the security 
environment we strive to establish”, arguing that “UN sanctions should be imposed on such 
countries”. Deputy Chief of Staff Saygun (2008: 227) likewise states that European States 
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“turn a blind eye to the activities [of] the PKK and protect it”. ‘Double standards’, a rhetorical 
commonplace used by many of the politicians and diplomats, is used also by the military, 
referred to as something that must be avoided (Güleryüz 2007a: 21), or as “the biggest 
obstacle in front of the international efficient defence strategies against terrorism” (Denizer 
2008a: 8). The quintessential example of such criticism, however, is given by Lieutenant 
Colonel Kenan Tokgöz (2009: 31), who replicates his point twice in practically verbatim form 
(2010: 37; 2011: 32): 
Nations have been condemning terrorism with the harshest available terminology when they suffer from 
it, but otherwise prefer to turn a blind eye to the sufferings of other nations. For example, the PKK 
Terrorist Organization, which is responsible from deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens including not 
only the soldiers and police officers, but also civilian people, women and children and even babies, is in 
the list of terrorist organizations of both the EU and the US, but when we look at the certain media 
channels in these countries, they still present the PKK as a guerilla or insurgent group. 
Tokgöz is specifically rejecting the alternative classification of the PKK as a ‘guerilla group’ 
or as ‘insurgents’ – rhetorical commonplaces belonging to or at least intersecting with other 
discourses. He even refers to the idea of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter” as an “illness” (Newsletter, July 2009). The annual repetition of this point by Tokgöz 
shows the continuous struggling with such alternative classifications. This same 
‘terrorist’/’freedom fighter’ opposition is problematized by several other officers (Özkök 
2006a: ix; Denizer 2008a: 40; Kulpcu 2010: 25). The rejection of such alternative identities is 
understandable in the sense that their acceptance would be a challenge to the legitimacy that is 
conferred on state practices represented as part of a fight against ‘terrorism’ (e.g., for acts of 
‘counter-terrorism’ to make any sense, they need to successfully be related to ‘terrorism’).  
 
Having covered how the conflict with the PKK is articulated to ‘terrorism’ as homogeneous 
and ubiquitous, the next section will analyze representations relating to the construction of the 
‘terrorist’ identity, dependent upon ‘terrorism’ being a homogeneous phenomenon. 
 
5.3  The illegitimate ‘terrorist’ identity 
The main representations positioning the ‘terrorist’ identity follow by and large the same 
pattern as by the politicians and diplomats, with similar main elements: [1] ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorists’ as morally deficient, [2] the condemnation of ‘terrorist’ motivations, and [3] 
‘terrorists’ as being ‘exploitative’. There are some differences, however. Firstly, the 
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representations of deficient morals are more explicit, to a higher degree involve the ‘terrorist’ 
identity directly, and include an extensive use of dehumanizing organic metaphors. And 
secondly, instead of rejecting the possibility of legitimate motivations, the military officers 
primarily make a series of allegations as to what the driving forces behind ‘terrorism’ are. In 
the following, I will go through these three main elements, adding a separate subsection for 
the organic metaphors due to their gravity and extensive use. 
 
5.3.1  Vicious and remorseless 
 
The articulation of ‘terrorist’ (or ‘terrorism’) to recurrent rhetorical commonplaces that place 
it on the negative side of crude moral dichotomies, contribute to constructing a strong enemy 
image. Captain Olcay Denizer (2008b: 9) refers to the “vicious circle” of terrorism, while 
Captains $brahim Can and Nesip Ögun (2008: 23) characterize it as a “vicious threat” 
(Newsletter, May 2008). General Ya&ar! Büyükanıt (2008: 6) refers to “the terrorists’ evil 
purposes”, while Deputy Chief of Staff Aslan Güner (2010: 160) point to “their corrupted 
ends”. The destructive nature of ‘terrorists’ is also unpacked in more elaborate terms. 
Discussing qualities that are central to ‘terrorists’, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 10) mentions 
the lack of “[e]motions of [p]ity or [r]emorse”, and the capability of “killing innocent, men, 
women and children in cold blood”, while Major and Course Director at the NATO Centre, 
Ümit Güleryüz (2007b: 26) proposes that “[t]he ideology or psychology of a particular 
terrorist group may lead to fascination with poisons and disease”. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel 
U!ur Ersen (2008: 28) argues that ‘terrorist organizations’ “feed on terrorist events and 
destruction”, and if individuals attempt to leave such organizations, “as a minimum, they are 
exposed to physical and psychological torture”. 
 
‘Terrorists’ are also represented as lacking compromise. The same Ersen (ibid.) argues that 
‘terrorists’ “have a tendency to see things in black and white”, while Colonel Özden Çelik 
argues that “[t]here is no set target for the terrorists; you are either with them or against them” 
(2011: 23); a quote that gets an interesting hue in juxtaposition with George W. Bush’s quote 
in relation to the ‘war on terror’ that “[e]ither you are with us or you are with the terrorists” 
(CNN 2001). A rather bizarre story by Ersen (2008: 30), referring to the PKK, illustrates 
further the ‘terrorist’s’ lack of remorse: 
There was a demonstration in one of the cities in eastern part of Turkey [sic] and the terrorist 
organisation  provoked the population for aggresion [sic]. They provoked the children, placed 
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them in front of the group and instructed them to throw stones to the police. The children threw 
stones to the police but the police reacted in a very different way. While defending themselves 
with shields, they started to distribute bananas to the children. The children stopped throwing the 
stones and ate the bananas. Of course, this may not be applicable in every occasion. 
The ‘terrorists’ are remorseless to the extent that they will use children both as weapons and 
shields. The police view children differently and are apparently already equipped with 
bananas, giving them away as an act of reaching out, while using actual shields to protect 
themselves. This representation of using civilians as ‘shields’ is quite established in relation to 
‘terrorism’; for example, representatives of the Israeli state have repeatedly referred to Hamas 
in such a way, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs interestingly making this description 
through the reference to Hamas as ‘exploiting’ civilians (MFA Israel 2009). 
 
In some instances in the officers’ accounts, ‘terrorists’ are even discursively stripped of their 
human qualities, either in a direct sense, by representing ‘terrorism’ as ‘inhuman’ (Ba&bu! 
2010: 8), by referring to ‘terrorism’ as a ‘monster’ (Özkök 2006a: XIII), or by likening 
‘terrorists’ to animals. As an example of the latter, Lieutenant Colonel U!ur Ersen (2008: 28) 
compares ‘terrorists’ to dogs, noting that a test where dogs are repeatedly subjected to 
electrical shocks in order to make them change their behavior “provides remarkable results”, 
arguing that it “may be a good example for the psychological conditions of the terrorists 
inside the organization”. The most extensive contribution to the dehumanization of the 
‘terrorist’, however, is through a set of organic metaphors to represent both Self and Other, 
which I discuss in the following subsection.  
 
5.3.2 The social body and the illness of terrorism 
There is an extensive use of organic metaphors in the military officers’ representations that 
deservee special attention because they strongly delegitimize and dehumanize ‘terrorists’ by 
representing ‘terrorism’ as ‘virus’ or ‘illness’ to the healthy social ‘body’; and because they 
illustrate the central role of intertextuality. In the opening speech at the first NATO Centre 
symposium, Chief of Staff Özkök (2006a: viii) describes ‘terrorism’ as “the gravest social 
illness of our century”, while General Büyükanıt, (2008: 11), subsequent Chief of Staff, refers 
to ‘terrorism’ as “the pestilence of our era”. In the newsletters, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 
19) characterizes “[s]uicide terrorism” as a “virus which has now mutated out of control”, 
while Captain Nesip Ö!ün (2008: 20) refers to “the terror that spreads throughout the world 
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like a vermin”. In relation to the definition of ‘terrorism’, Colonel Kenan Tokgöz (2011: 32) 
argues that “[d]efining a problem means diagnosing an illness. To be able to treat the illness 
effectively, you should first diagnose it properly”. Lieutenant Colonel Ersen (2008: 25-26) 
makes a portrayal of ‘infection’ with more ‘scientific’ terminology, arguing that 
[w]hen the target population is difficult to reach, the terrorist organisations use the infection 
method. In this model, a trusted agent is inserted into the target population to influence potential 
recruits through direct, personal appeals […] Infection is likely to be most successful in large 
governmental organisations such as the policy or the military. 
The idea of ‘terrorsim’ being alive (thus with a potential of being ‘killed’) is supported also 
by its articulation to rhetorical commonplaces such as ‘lifeline’ or ‘nourish’, representing it as 
needing ‘oxygen’ and living within an ‘ecosystem’. A statement by Chief of Staff $lker 
Ba&bu! (2010: 10) serves as an example: “The terrorist organizations try to shape the 
ecosystem they are in […] Therefore, a major aim must be to transform the ecosystem feeding 
terrorist organizations into a system that shortens the life of these organizations”. Lieutenant 
Colonel Ergün Erün (2010: 16) writes in a similar fashion that “ungoverned regions” provide 
“fertile ground for terrorist to nourish”.55 
 
If ‘terrorism’ is an ‘illness’, it needs a target for such ‘infection’. This target is a metaphorical 
understanding of the Self as a healthy body, of which ‘terrorism’ is naturally not a part. A 
statement by General Büyükanıt (2008: 12) is perhaps the most illuminating: “It is certain 
that, as long as [terrorism] remains within our body like a cancer cell, wasting our efforts in 
seeking to name terrorism, instead of wiping it out, will merely spread the cell to our whole 
body and worsen the pain”. General Özkök (2006b: 263) argues that it attempts to “infect our 
world without minding time, place and power”, making the goal of the collective “not to 
acquire immunity to this virus, but to destroy the virus completely as one of the greatest 
shame [sic] of history of mankind”. Besides the obvious potential for delegitimization in 
describing the Other as ‘illness’ or ‘infection’, one should be attentive to the way the 
metaphor of the social ‘body’ affects the general representation of conflicts. This type of 
bodily metaphor “renders complex problems simplistically [… and] mandates (often violent) 
intervention as the appropriate course of action that will result in a cure” (Campbell 1998a: 
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55 The rhetorical commonplace ‘fertile ground’ can be identified in the 2003 U.S. National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism as well, which states that “we will […] ensure that the conditions and ideologies that 
promote terrorism do not find fertile ground in any nation” (White House 2003: 23). It is an often articulated 
commonplace to ‘terrorism’ in general (a Google search on ‘terrorism fertile ground’ is revealing).!!
!!
!
! !
!
+,!
!
75). Acts of securitization also become more effective when the referent object can be 
represented as something whose survival is threatened; responses must be given, or else “the 
unit […] will no longer exist as an independent and sovereign body” (Staun 2010: 412-413).  
 
This representation of a social collective (generally the state) as a body with multiple 
interdependent parts, and the Other as an ‘illness’, has strong historical linkages. The body 
politic metaphor dates at least back to antiquity and was consistently used throughout the 
Middle Ages, but more importantly in this regard, such a representation has been reproduced 
throughout modern political history, often with derogatory Otherness following along 
(Musolff 2010; Campbell 1998a: 75ff). Winston Churchill, for example, described 
‘Bolshevism’ (a form of Communism) in a way quite similar to the Turkish military officers 
above: “[I]t is not a policy; it’s a disease. It is not a creed; it is a pestilence […] It breaks out 
with great suddenness; it is violently contagious; it throws people into a frenzy of excitement; 
it spreads with extraordinary rapidity; the mortality is terrible, so that after a while, like other 
pestilences, the disease tends to wear itself out” (quoted in Campbell 1998a: 156). Without 
making any further comparison beyond pointing to similar derogatory Otherness, such 
metaphors to describe the illegitimate Other were also used by Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf, 
referring to the Jew as “a parasite in the body of other peoples […] a sponger who like an 
infection bacillus keeps spreading […] as soon as a favourable medium invites him. And the 
effect of his existence is also similar to that of spongers: wherever he appears, the host nation 
[…] dies out after a shorter or longer period” (quoted in Musolff 2010: 25).  
 
The historical role of the metaphor becomes even more interesting when we see it directly 
related to how Turkey has been portrayed by representatives of  ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’. In 
1914, British Prime Minister Lloyd George described the Turkish people as “a human cancer, 
a creeping agony in the flesh of the lands which they misgoverned” (quoted in Pope & Pope 
2011: 59), and in 1919, The New York Tribune wrote that “the Turks have always been a 
parasite and a stench in the nostrils of civilization” (ibid.), which also shows the role of 
‘civilization’ in this drawing of identity boundaries. The metaphor also found its way into the 
political discourse of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. One of his statements is paraphrased by many 
of the military officers in my analysis: “Mankind is a single body and each nation is part of 
that body. We must never say ‘What does it matter to me if some part of the world is ailing?’ 
If there is such an illness, we must concern ourselves with it as though we were having that 
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illness” (COE-DAT 2013). Atatürk uses the metaphor as an argument for cooperating against 
bodily ‘ailments’: ‘terrorism’ being such an ailment in military officers’ representations.  
 
5.3.3  The motivations of terrorists 
As briefly noted already, the military officers make a series of allegations as to what the 
motivations of ‘terrorists’ are, in slight contrast with the politicians and diplomats, who 
generally reject the idea of legitimate motivation. These motivations of ‘terrorists’ are 
generally represented as symbolic, with the ‘terrorist organization’ wishing to “affect the 
masses with its activities” (Özkök 2006a: viii) in a way that “destroy[s] the regime’s 
authority, ability to govern and legitimacy” (Tokgöz 2009: 32), or that “prov[es] that officials, 
institutions and symbols can be attacked without being able to defend themselves” (Tokgöz 
2011: 34). What this effectively does is “to drive a wedge between the people and the 
authorities”, leading to a situation where “the terrorists are seen as freedom fighters” (Kiliç 
2007: 16). The way this is discussed again shows an a priori understanding of ‘terrorist’ 
illegitimacy: Though ‘terrorist’ acts are not legitimate in reality, the audience might believe 
that they are if the ‘terrorists’ are successful in driving this ‘wedge’. General Saygun (2008: 
230) shows this perspective when stating that “[t]he terrorist organizations try to prove that 
their terrorist acts are legitimate, that their acts are supported by large masses of people, and 
that they are engaged in justifiable conflicts, by alleging that they represent large groups”. 
 
The officers’ discussion of motivations often reads the ‘terrorist’ through a form of distorted 
cost-benefit rationality where both the protraction of conflict and a high amount of casualties 
become positives to the ‘terrorists’. Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 17) argues that the “whole 
point of the terrorist attack is to do something horrific to provoke massive retaliation”, and 
that they “usually want a protracted war”, while Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 16) – 
commenting on the low costs of ‘suicide operations’ – argues that “this modest sum yields a 
very attractive return: on average, suicide operations worldwide kill about four times as many 
people as other kinds of terrorist attacks”. Such characterizations depend upon a given 
understanding of the ‘terrorist mindset’, allowing for the argument that “the actual damage to 
the people, even their supporters, is a benefit, not a cost of terrorist action” (Kiliç 2007: 16). 
Establishing this mindset facilitates the placing of the whole burden of casualties in a conflict 
on the side of the ‘terrorists’, although by 2002 in the case of Turkey and the PKK, more than 
four times as many PKK fighters had been killed than military soldiers (Jacoby 2010: 99-
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100). Captain Baki Gündüz (2009: 18) refers to the PKK as “responsible for killing more than 
30.000 Turkish citizens”, while General Özkök (2006a: xiii) argues that “more than 30 
thousand Turkish citizens [have] been the victims of the bloody terrorist organization 
PKK/KONGRA-GEL”. The total death-toll in this conflict is generally put at between 20,000 
and 40,000 (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 19; Pope & Pope 2011: 255). 
 
A striking side to these discussions of motivations is that there are almost no mentions of 
motivations beyond the creation of fear or the undermining of public trust in authorities. 
Though political goals are mentioned at a few points, they are not discussed with any degree 
of specificity. When there is such an emphasis on protraction or destruction, but not on any 
ultimate motives, the result is a circularity where the ‘terrorist’ fights to prove the legitimacy 
of a fight that ultimately consists in proving legitimacy. From this it becomes almost a given 
what practices (e.g.) the security forces can sensibly undertake; when specific identities are 
distributed, the right approaches easily become defined at the same time (Weldes 1996).  
 
5.3.4  The manipulative terrorist 
Thus far, we have seen ‘terrorists’ being represented as morally deficient, as ‘illness’ hurting 
the healthy social ‘body’, and as having motivations mostly restricted to the undermining of 
public trust and the protraction of violent conflict. The last element I will emphasize here is 
the representation of ‘terrorists’ as manipulative, often including the rhetorical commonplace 
‘exploit’ that we saw used in chapter 4. However, as there are also many instances of 
representing a manipulative nature that do not include ‘exploit’ specifically, I will go through 
examples of these first.  
 
There are three main ways that ‘terrorists’ are represented as manipulative. The first is the 
manipulation of public opinion. In his 2008 symposium speech, General Büyükanıt (2008: 6) 
argues that “[t]errorist organizations constantly manipulate international public opinion 
through the biased information that they circulate, and that “[t]rapped by the misinformation 
of terrorist organizations public opinion may, therefore, serve the terrorists’ evil purposes”. In 
a similar fashion, Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 20) writes that ‘terrorists’ realize that the 
government needs the trust of the people “and can use fiendishly clever strategies for eroding 
this trust and fomenting resentment and hatred”. The second way is related to freedoms that 
the ‘terrorists’ cannot legitimately claim. Deputy Chief of Staff Ergin Saygun (2008: 226) 
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states that “wanted terrorists can manipulate the freedoms provided to them by the democratic 
system for their own ends, using as a pretext the basic shared values of the civilized world 
such as minority rights, individual rights and liberties, and freedom of speech [emphasis 
added]”, while General Büyükanıt (2008: 10) refers to the supporters of ‘terrorism’ “acting 
under the guise of freedom of speech [emphasis added]”. The third involves recruitment to 
‘terrorist’ organizations. As an example, Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 8) argues that “[t]errorist 
organizations gain the youth through social and psychological methods in line with the face-
to-face propaganda”. In all of these arguments we see the reproductive nature of discourse: 
The characterizations of ‘manipulation’ build on an existing understanding of what the 
‘terrorist’ identity is (and what the nature of the mentioned freedoms is), but at the same time 
the invocations of such representations in practice serves to reproduce them.  
 
By looking to a 1946 statement by U.S. Senator James Eastland (quoted in Jackson 2006: 134 
[emphases added]), speaking about the position of Germany vis-à-vis ‘Western civilization’, 
we see an aspect of intertextuality also for such representations of manipulation: 
[T]he time has come for the American people to be told what it would mean if Germany […] were 
to be incorporated into a totalitarian tyranny, masked under the guise of a modern democracy, 
manipulated by a vicious and sadistic minority of totalitarian Communists who have preached 
openly throughout the world the doctrine that there is nothing left in western civilization worth 
preserving […]  
Note the highly similar way that the ‘outside’ is separated from the ‘inside’ both in the 
representation of ‘Communists’ and ‘terrorists’ as the Other. Many of the same rhetorical 
commonplaces (‘under the guise’, ‘manipulate’) are even invoked in order to do this. Rather 
than seeing such similarities merely as expressions of a ‘universal’ human tendency of 
castigating the Other, a discourse theoretical perspective will emphasize how rhetorical 
commonplaces are reproduced throughout time and find their way through various contexts.  
 
The rhetorical commonplace ‘exploit’ plays a central part for such accounts of manipulation, 
following the same thematic pattern as above. The intertextual links to the U.S. National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2003 and 2006 are even clearer here than amongst the 
politicians and diplomats, as the specific phrase “to diminish the underlying conditions that 
terrorists seek to exploit” (The White House 2003: 6, 23; 2006: 10) is virtually copied by 
Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 12) and Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 18). There are also other 
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references to this ‘exploiting’ of socioeconomic factors for recruitment. Ekmen (2007: 8-9) 
argues that “the economic social and psychological needs” of young people are “being 
exploited” for recruitment by “terrorist organizations”, while General Büyükanıt (2008: 5) 
refers to “people […] living on the brink of starvation”, and that “[t]his state of affairs is 
exploited most effectively by terrorist organizations” As a final example, General Özkök 
(2006a: xiii) refers to stopping the ‘exploitation’ of “political, economic and social problems” 
in the Middle East.56  
 
Having now covered all the main representations that form the ‘terrorist’ identity, some 
general observations can be made: All of them contribute severely to delegitimizing this 
identity, and thus whoever is successfully interpellated into it. When ‘terrorists’ are (e.g.) 
manipulative, intent on prolonging conflict and without compromise, this also discursively 
marginalizes any question of whether ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘terrorism’ can be mutually 
reproductive; ‘terrorism’ becoming so detached from Self that there is no real ground from 
which to argue that the actions undertaken by the Self might in fact stimulate ‘terrorism’. 
Instead we see questions such as that of Kiliç  (2007: 15), asking whether we are “capturing, 
killing, deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the terrorists are recruiting, 
training and deploying against us”. And simultaneously as the ‘terrorist’ is delegitimized, the 
Self is relationally legitimized. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I turn the focus to this 
Self that is opposing ‘terrorism’, and thus to the last half of my specified research question: 
How do the main representations of ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ enable the negotiation of Turkish 
‘difference’ vis-à-vis ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’? 
 
5.4  Representing the common Self 
The goal of this section is to consider which collective identities the Turkish officers draw on 
in their representations; either strengthening or diversifying the insight from chapter 4 into 
how the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ can take part in constituting Self-identity. By 
the politicians and diplomats, Turkish ‘difference’ was negotiated through 
‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as the constitutive Other. Turkey was initially represented as part of the 
collective Self of ‘civilization’, which after 2003 gradually was both pluralized and 
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exploitation, without this being described in any further detail by the actors. It is however necessary for the 
stability of the ‘terrorist’ identity, as ‘terrorist’ and (e.g.) ‘humanitarian worker’ are mutually exclusive identities. !
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marginalized in favor of ‘humanity’/’humankind’. There was also an increased emphasis on 
cultural and religious diversity being positives to the common Self, and on breaking the 
articulation between ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism’. Through these changes, a discourse with 
‘Western’ origins was upheld through the prominence of liberalist universalism, even as the 
AKP politicians drew attention towards ‘Eastern civilizational’ inspiration.  
 
At the outset, I expected significant divergences from the above in the military officers’ 
representations of Self-identity. These expectations were met to a partial degree at best. Apart 
from explicit criticisms of ‘universal values’ by General and Chief of Staff Ya&ar Büyükanıt 
(2008) and Captain Olcay Denizer (2008), a generally stronger focus on the role of the nation-
state amongst the officers, and less use of both the plural and singular form of ‘civilization’, 
similarities to the accounts of the politicians and diplomats are actually more conspicuous 
than differences. For example, there is extensive reproduction of liberalist discourse and 
several instances of breaking the articulation between Islam and ‘terrorism’, with the 
negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’ being performed in a similar fashion as in chapter 4. I will 
begin by discussing the critical accounts, though they are not representative of the whole 
material, as this is where the divergences from chapter 4 are most clear. 
 
5.4.1   Rejecting universality: an alternative representation 
Though the military officers are consistently referring to ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and 
common threat that needs to be fought in concert, some of the officers express skepticism 
towards this commonality being one centered on any conception of ‘universal values’. In 
these accounts the Self is mainly characterized as a collective of nation-states. The strongest 
carrier of this representation is General Ya&ar Büyükanıt (2008: 8). The following statement is 
indeed clear: 
[D]eveloped countries are manipulating some values in the name of ‘universal values’, in line with 
their interests. While trying to translate the values presented as universal values into practice, 
microstructures in developing countries are activated. Because of this, the developing countries, 
which are quite susceptible to outside intervention during their transition process, experience 
major trauma and chaos  
Here we see that ‘trauma’ (another organic metaphor) is not articulated to ‘terrorism’, but to 
the intervention of ‘developed countries’ into ‘developing countries’, under the pretext of 
‘universal values’. Even ‘manipulation’ is articulated to this same subject position. Büyükanıt 
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furthermore argues that “[t]he prosperity created by the developed nations has enabled the 
formation of a common identity among the communities in those nations, an identity that 
ensures the continuation of their prosperous state” (ibid.), which needs to be understood as 
implicating some conception of a ‘Western’ identity. Büyükanıt is clearly representing Turkey 
not as part of this identity, in contrast to the general pattern in the United Nations speeches. 
His arguments underline a given way of mobilizing rhetorical commonplaces (‘universal 
values’) for a purpose (continuation of a ‘prosperous state’), one that is exclusive of many of 
the statements of the politicians and diplomats, where common values are represented as 
universal (e.g. Pamir 2003c: 2; Erdo!an 2009: 35).  
 
Büyükanıt offers an alternative representation of Self-identity where the fight against 
‘terrorism’ – though still global – is centered on the ‘nation-state’ as lowest common 
denominator. Rather than an opposition between ‘terrorists’ and ‘universal values’ (or even 
any common ‘civilization’), the ‘terrorist’ is contrasted with the nation-state as Self: 
[T]errorist organizations perceive the nation-state structure to be the biggest obstacle threatening 
their very existence. The aim of the terrorist organizations is to damage, shake and then destroy 
this structure […] Because of this, as nation-states we have to think internationally and act 
regionally (2008: 7) 
This is communicated similarly when Büyükanıt (ibid.) argues that the “major guarantee 
against [terrorism] is again the nation-state with its strong institutions, as well as international 
organizations for cooperation formed by the nation-states”. Notice that Büyükanıt does indeed 
point to a supra-national collectivity, but that this is explicitly bound to the nation-state, not to 
common ‘civilization’ or ‘universal values’. Büyükanıt does also invoke ‘humanity’ as a 
larger collective identity, but this is still a collective centered on the nation-state. He (2008; 7, 
9) argues that that “humanity needs an entity like a ‘state’ which transcends individuals”, and 
he paraphrases the statement of “the great Leader Atatürk” mentioned in section 5.3.2, of 
‘mankind’ as a unified body where the ‘organs’ are nations.  
 
Considering statements given domestically by Büyükanıt, the above accounts are 
unsurprising. In Turkey he has argued that “universal values like human rights and rule of 
law” have been “used as a shield to protect terrorists” (Hürriyet Daily News 2001);57 rather 
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57 Note that!Büyükanıt is employing here the very same ‘shield’ metaphor that I discussed  in relation to 
‘terrorists’ in section 5.3.1
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than what should be safeguarded in the fight against ‘terrorism’, such values are making the 
fight harder. In a speech at the opening of the 2007-2008 educational year of the Turkish 
Military Academy, he stated that “there is no power strong enough to divide Turkey”, 
emphasizing that the “national and secular state […] is and will continue to be our very reason 
for existence” (Hürriyet Daily News 2007). And though Büyükanıt was the one to declare the 
Turkish Army’s support for joining the European Union (EU), he referred to the EU as “the 
geo-political and geo-strategic ultimate condition for the realization of the target of 
modernization which Mustafa Kemal Ataturk chose for the Turkish nation”, while also 
underlining as counterproductive “the efforts of foreign circles to achieve their own goals in 
Turkey by putting forward the supreme ideals of the EU and bringing the Turkish Armed 
Forces into the agenda on every occasion”. In these statements we see traces of what Onar 
(2007: 284) refers to as the ‘Sèvres syndrome’; the continued fear of European intentions of 
undermining Turkish state ‘unity’, from which follows a skepticism towards any narrowly 
defined universal value-collective. This impression is strengthened by Büyükanıt’s statement, 
during the same declaration of support, that “so-called friendly countries, instead of 
supporting our fight against terrorism, protected the leader of a terrorist organization […] and 
used the values such as human rights and the rule of law as a shield against these enemies of 
mankind” (Hürriyet Daily News 2003).   
 
Büyükanıt is not alone in expressing this discursive opposition. Chief of Staff and General 
Hilmi Özkök (2006a: ix) – though his accounts are much more ambivalent – argues that the 
fight’s most important parameter is that “each nation should respect the political, economic, 
cultural and religious sensitivities in another country, especially the border security and 
territorial integrity of all other countries”, expressing thus a similar concern for the 
ontological security of the nation-state. In the Centre newsletter, Captain Olcay Denizer 
(2008b: 8) argues that ‘terrorists’ try to ‘erode’ and ‘destroy’ the nation-state structure. He 
also makes a longer critical statement in an earlier article (2008a: 41), which is both clearly 
critical and includes the role of the PKK: 
[I]t is hard to believe that people, global civil societies, states or international organizations show 
the same interest, sensitiveness or ‘consciousness’ to every similar case. It was not until May 2, 
2002 that the European Union finally entered on its list of banned terrorist organizations the two 
deadliest networks directed against Turkey: the PKK and DHKP-C, which killed thousands of 
innocent people. Why did the EU wait so long? […] What about the global norms? […]It is not the 
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‘global, universal norms’ that force the states to act, it is the national interest. In other words, 
every nation has its own concerns and every nation follows in its own interest. 
Nations are interacting in a self-help environment, and they act according to the ‘national 
interest’, not according to some overarching norms that bind them together; a quite ‘realist’ 
view of international relations – and a contrast to the reproduction of liberalist universalism of 
many of the other officers. It is the ‘terrorist’ challenging of the ontological security of the 
nation-state that is central to radical and threatening Otherness, not any opposition to 
‘universal values’. In section 5.4.3 we will see contrasts to this in the references to values by 
the high-ranking officers (besides Büyükanıt). Before this I will move by the ambiguous 
attitude towards ‘common’ or ‘universal’ values in the newsletter articles. 
 
5.4.2 The newsletter articles: ambiguous identity 
While the criticism towards a common identity centered on ‘universal’ or ‘common’ values is 
quite clear in the above statements, this is far from unequivocal amongst the military officers. 
It is not even the dominant trend: In total there are very few explicit criticisms towards such 
conceptions amongst the military officers. But at the same time there is little clear embracing 
of such conceptions, making the overall impression ambiguous. This is primarily true for the 
newsletter articles, which do not always define the Self from which the Officers are writing 
(the officers invoke a common ‘we’, but often without defining it). This suggests that the 
negotiation of ‘difference’ plays a less important role here. Again the articles’ technical 
nature, discussing for example the phenomenon of ‘suicide bombing’ or ‘money laundering’, 
and their narrower audience must be seen as explanatory. When the officers do define a 
common Self-identity opposing ‘terrorism’, this is seldom articulated to values. The following 
statement of Colonel Arif Ekmen (2007: 11) is typical here: “Terrorism threatens all states, 
their allies, interests, and the world community”. There is both a set of states with separate 
interests and allies and a ‘world community’, but this is not explicitly oriented towards 
‘common’ or ‘universal’ values.  
 
Having said that, some statements reproducing both a singular conception of ‘civilization’ and 
rhetorical commonplaces from liberalist discourse are worth stopping by, especially the 
account of Lieutenant Colonel Halil Sarica. He (2007: 15) refers to ‘terrorism’ as a threat to 
“our security, to the values of our societies and to the rights and freedoms of our citizens”, 
arguing (ibid.: 18) that “good governance and the rule of law, with professional police and 
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security forces who respect human rights” is a central part of “our global counter-terrorism 
effort”, as well as that “human rights and the rule of law should be core values for our counter 
strategy”, which if sacrificed by the common Self, will be “handing a victory to the terrorists” 
(ibid.). Sarica (ibid.: 5) also makes a very interesting reference to a singular conception of 
‘civilization’, central to the negotiation of ‘difference’, arguing that “[t]he target of terrorism 
is not a single society culture or civilization, but the whole ‘humanity and civilization’”. 
During World War I the Allied Powers referred to the mass killings of Armenians during the 
War as “these new crimes by Turkey against humanity and civilization” (U.S. Department of 
State 1915). These are events that have ever since been a headache for the Turkish state due to 
strong international condemnation and references to this as a ‘genocide’ – a word which used 
in Turkey still is a reason for getting arrested (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 25). By differentiating 
this from ‘terrorism’, Sarica is simultaneously moving Turkish identity inside of it. This exact 
same statement is repeated by Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2006a: x) as well. 
 
Having discussed briefly how the newsletter articles give an ambiguous impression of Self-
identity and its relation to ‘common’ values, I move to the other high-ranking officers besides 
Büyükanıt holding speeches at the symposia, where there are clearer references to ‘common 
values’, reproducing liberalist universalism in a similar way as the AKP politicians. 
 
5.4.3 Embracing ‘common values’ 
Divergences from the account championed primarily by Büyükanıt and Denizer in section 
5.4.1 are most apparent with the other high-ranking officers. In his 2008 speech, General 
Ergin Saygun does not at all mention the ‘nation-state’ in relation to Self-identity, but he does 
reproduce a chain of rhetorical commonplaces reflecting liberalist universalism, representing 
these as common to the collective, ‘civilized’ Self, by referring to “the basic shared values of 
the civilized world such as minority rights, individual rights and liberties, and freedom of 
speech […]” (ibid.: 226). By Saygun mentioning ‘civilized’ here we see how these discourses 
intersect. Former Chief of Staff and General $lker Ba&bu! (2010: 7) makes a similar 
representation when stating that “[t]errorism threatens the common human values, democracy, 
freedoms, human rights, including the right to live, which are the products of centuries-long 
giant efforts and sacrifices”, himself also omitting the ‘nation-state’. Ba&bu! (ibid.: 8) even 
shows a multi-faceted understanding of the concept of ‘security’ itself, stating that it is “a 
holistic entity […] an all-out renovation initiative which aims to place human needs in the 
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locus of new security” – reproducing here an idea of ‘human security’ with liberal 
underpinnings (see Begby & Burgess 2009). The day after Ba&bu!, Deputy Chief of Staff 
Aslan Güner (2010: 157) asks “how to fight terrorism while preserving our human rights and 
liberties, democracy and shared values”, referring also to ‘terrorism’ as constituting “the 
greatest challenge to human rights and international peace and security” (ibid.: 161). 
 
It is very interesting to see these high-ranking officers speak about ‘terrorism’ in a way that 
converges significantly with the politicians of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
especially considering that Ba&bu!, Güner and Saygun have all been arrested since January 
2012 on allegations of participation in plans of overthrowing the government (Güner for 
involvement in the 1997 ‘post-modern coup’). It is also of interest due to earlier interventions 
of the Turkish military and the changes these ushered in. After the 1971 intervention, elements 
of the constitution were curtailed due to concerns for state security, leading to the repression 
of trade unions and restrictions on the freedom of university campuses (Pope & Pope 2011: 
104). And after the 1980 intervention, Chief of Staff Kenan Evren stated that “we have to 
sacrifice some personal rights for the security of the community” (Marcus 2007: 84). 
Somewhat confusingly, however, there is apparently no perceived incompatibility in 
emphasizing ‘democracy’, ‘freedoms’ and ‘human rights’, and at the same time stating that 
though “the freedom of the press […] should be respected in every way, it should be kept in 
mind that freedoms must have their limits especially when they start damaging the society” 
(Ba&bu! 2010: 12).  
 
Rather than seeing these accounts by the high-ranking officers solely as manifestations of 
personal beliefs, they should be considered to reveal discursive constraints; the officers are 
speaking within an international discourse which most likely diverges significantly from a 
Turkish military discourse on domestic security concerns, conditioned by certain ways of 
discussing ‘terrorism’ and the collective Self. This is not to say that the officers cannot have 
gradually adopted such a discourse domestically as well – the accession process to the 
European Union and the fact that most rhetorical commonplaces from liberalist discourse are 
prominent in the last years of analysis suggests a possible change across time. If so, the 
concept of ‘Europeanization’ would be pertinent to describe this. Though the concept is often 
used in a way that makes the ‘European’ appear as a thing that gets put into political actors’ 
minds, leading to certain policies (Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy 2010) or in a way that sees the 
orientation towards “EU foreign policy norms and practices” through the prism of rational 
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calculation which hides decision-makers’ ‘true’ nature (O!uzlu 2010: 658), we could instead 
adapt it to discourse theory by understanding it as the gradual socialization into a discourse.   
 
In any case, the adoption and employment of rhetorical commonplaces such as ‘human rights’ 
and ‘rule of law’ is a way of negotiating ‘difference’, as for example Turkey’s ‘human rights 
record’ in relation to the Kurdish minority and the fight against domestic ‘terrorism’ has been 
subjected to repeated international criticism and been a source of differentiation from the EU. 
As argued by Pope and Pope (2011: 38), the language used by ‘the West’ in such criticism is 
very similar to that used by 19th century Europe against the Ottoman Empire. When the high-
ranking officers are talking about ‘terrorism’ as a threat to ‘basic shared values’ of the 
‘civilized’ world, or as a threat to ‘democracy’, ‘freedoms’ and ‘human rights’, they are thus 
shifting the perspective and becoming the safeguard of such principles against the Other 
threatening to undermine them. What the ‘real intentions’ of these officers are (for example, 
whether they are ‘faking’ it or not) is less interesting; we are interested in the actual 
enunciations that construct the reality of the fight against ‘terrorism’.  
 
5.4.4 Breaking in the name of religion 
Because of the traditional role of the Turkish military in safeguarding the secular (laicist) 
characteristics of the Turkish state, with the military even today suppressing traces of Muslim 
identity so as to not endanger the achievements of secularism (Tank 2006: 466), one could 
expect the representations of religious factors in relation to ‘terrorism’ to reveal clear 
differences to those of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) politicians, especially as my 
studied time span (2006 – 2011) covers a period of increased skepticism from Kemalism 
regarding the possible ‘Islamist intensions’ of the AKP (Onar 2007). 
 
Only certain aspects of these representations are reflected in the material. Divergences are 
seen by there being very few references to plural ‘civilizations’ and none to the importance of 
(e.g.) ‘Eastern’ inspiration to the common Self, as well as few references to religion in general 
– especially in the newsletter articles. But these divergences notwithstanding, there is not a 
single instance of reproducing an articulation between Islam/religion and ‘terrorism’ (though 
Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök (2006a: xiii) does mention ‘religious hatred’ as one of the driving 
forces behind ‘terrorism’ at one point). There are however many instances of breaking such 
an articulation, as well as expressed concerns for conflicts deriving from cultural difference. 
!!
!
! !
!
$-$!
!
Colonel Arif Ekmen (2008: 19) argues that religion “must not be made to seem synonymous 
with terror”, and that “[t]he focus should not be on Islam”, while Captain Olcay Denizer 
(2008b: 9) – one of the two officers expressing skepticism towards ‘universal values’ – writes 
that the term ‘Islamic terror’ leads to unconscious association of those with religious identity 
to ‘terrorism’, which makes “different cultures go away from each other rather than 
combining them”.  
 
Similar concerns are expressed by the high-ranking officers. Özkök (2006a: xiii) argues that 
identifying some cultural codes in the world as more prone to terrorism […] will not only make it 
difficult to understand the real causes of terrorism, but also serve the radicalization of the masses, 
which have nothing to do with terrorism […] At the point reached so far, the most frightening 
development should be a clash of civilizations![…] Shouldn’t the mankind who managed to split 
atom [sic], be able to overcome the prejudices of people against each other? 
Here we see an explicit fear of the Huntingtonian ‘clash of civilizations’ that I discussed in 
section 4.5.3; a representation that became more salient in political discourse after the 
September 11 attacks. Four years after Özkök, Chief of General Staff $lker Ba&bu! (2010: 8) 
even argues that articulating ‘Islam’ to ‘terrorism’ would even serve the purposes of the 
‘terrorists’, noting that “identification of the heavenly religion of Islam with terrorism would 
also serve the political aim of global terrorism”. Even General Büyükanıt,who has earlier 
warned that ‘fundamentalism’ in Turkey has “acquired dangerous proportions” (Onar 2007: 
280), and who warned that the military would protect Turkish secularism from ‘centres of 
evil’ in relation to the election of Abdullah Gül as President in 2007 (Minority Rights Group 
International 2011), breaks this articulation, though he is more indirect:  
[A] number of researchers, when categorizing terrorism, put certain adjectives in front of the word 
terrorism which will lead people to think that certain cultural codes are more prone to terrorism. 
Such an approach may give rise to dangerous results, such as the emergence of prejudices in 
determining the real sources that feed terrorism […] because some fixed ideas are far from 
scientific objectivity (2008: 8-9). 
A conclusion to draw from this is that the negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’ vis-à-vis 
‘Europe’ and ‘the West’ due to its Islamic character, is more important than the safeguarding 
of secularism and explicit distancing from the discourse of the AKP politicians. If they so 
wished, it would most likely be possible for the officers’ to represent the increasing role of 
religion in societies as offering (e.g.) a ‘breeding ground’ for ‘radicalism’ and ‘terrorism’, but 
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instead of observing anything like this, we rather see those types of argument represented as 
supporting ‘terrorism’, as in Ba&bu!’s account above.  
 
5.5 Summary 
Before moving to my final chapter, I will briefly reiterate the main points of chapter 5. Again 
there are six main points to emphasize: 
 
 [1] The military officers represent ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon 
very similarly to the politicians and diplomats, expressing the need for a ‘common struggle’ 
which there is an obligation to take part in. 
[2] The PKK is linked to this abstract phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ through many references to 
Turkish ‘suffering’, including several clear criticisms of other countries’ approaches towards 
‘terrorist groups’, sometimes explicitly implicating ‘European countries’. In contrast with the 
political/diplomatic accounts, the PKK is here consistently mentioned in name. 
[3] The ‘terrorist’ identity is constructed as fundamentally illegitimate through representations 
of moral deficiency; dehumanizing organic metaphors; allegations of motivations where 
protratcted war and high casualty counts become positives; and as ‘manipulating’ or 
‘exploiting’ socioeconomic factors, freedoms and people.  
[4] In the representations of Self-identity there is an alternative representation that is not 
present with the politicians and diplomats, carried foremost by Chief of Staff from 2006-2008, 
Ya&ar Büyükanıt, expressing skepticism towards an idea of ‘universal values’.  
[5] While the main tendency amongst the officers, especially in the Centre newsletter, is one 
of few explicit references to Self-identity, there are several instances of negotiating 
‘difference’, including the reproduction of elements of liberalist discourse in a way quite 
similar to the (AKP) politicians and diplomats. 
[6] Contrary to my initial expectations, there are very few signs of the military officers 
demonstrating a different approach to the relation between ‘terrorism’ and religion/Islam to 
that of the politicians and diplomats, with many of the officers breaking this articulation. 
   
 
 
!!
!
! !
!
$-&!
!
6. 
Representing ‘Terrorism’: Discussion and Conclusions 
To put all living things that aren’t human into one category is, first of all, a stupid gesture – 
theoretically ridiculous – and partakes in the very real violence that humans exercise towards 
animals. That leads to slaughterhouses, their industrial treatment, their consumption. All this 
violence towards animals is engendered in this conceptual simplification which allows one to 
say ‘animals’ in general. 
    - Jacques Derrida, in the documentary Derrida!
The goal of this thesis has been to analyze how Turkish politicians, diplomats and military 
officers represent ‘terrorism’ as phenomenon and ‘terrorist’ as identity internationally. I 
wanted to see how these representations tie in the particular conflict with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), as well as how they contribute to the construction of the Turkish Self, 
especially the negotiation of its historical ‘difference’ vis-à-vis a ‘European’ and ‘Western’ 
collective identity. The goal of this last chapter is to summarize the findings from my 
analyses, to discuss how representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ can affect political 
practice, and to offer concluding remarks – including a tentative view towards the future of 
the conflict with the PKK. 
 
6.1 Summary of the politicians’ and diplomats’ representations 
The politicians and diplomats speaking at the United Nations between 2001 and 2012 
unequivocally represent ‘terrorism’ as a homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon – a threat 
with a ‘global’ reach that affects everyone either now or eventually. This is tied to the 
conclusion that the only way to fight ‘terrorism’ is through a ‘common struggle’, of which 
there is a duty for all members of the collective Self to take part. There are no attempts to 
distinguish or differentiate between 'terrorists', and even several instances of rejecting such 
distinctions, arguing for the avoidance of ‘double standards’ and for condemning ‘terrorism’ 
in ‘all its forms and manifestations’. The references to ‘terrorism’ are unspecific, as it is not 
explained what makes a given event a ‘terrorist’ event, and as no specific actors are 
mentioned (except Osama Bin Laden once). Though the PKK is only pointed to indirectly, for 
example as “a terrorist organization targeting Turkey” ($lkin 2008b: 19) or “a terrorist 
separatist organization” (Çorman 2008a: 11), it is tied into these representations through 
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references to Turkish yearlong ‘sufferings’ from ‘terrorism’. Several times the politicians and 
diplomats do this while criticizing the use of ‘double standards’, of which Turkey has been a 
victim, arguing for “the urgent need to put aside selective attitudes based on political 
motivations and tolerance for […] certain terrorist movements” (Cengizer 2002c: 10).  
 
The representation of the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ makes possible a unitary ‘terrorist’ 
identity. I argued that this identity is affected by three aspects in particular: [1] the articulation 
of ‘terrorism’ to rhetorical commonplaces supporting a crude image of immorality, such as 
‘evil’, ‘heinous’ and ‘carnage’; [2] the rejection of the idea that ‘terrorism’ can ever have a 
legitimate motivation, including seeing political goals as any form of justification; and [3] the 
representation of ‘terrorists’ as ‘exploitative’, taking advantage of socioeconomic factors or 
‘democratic’ rights and freedoms to further their illegitimate causes. While these 
representations are contingent on an established position of the ‘terrorist’ as a priori 
illegitimate in the discourse, illustrated by the many intertextual links to (e.g.) U.S. ‘counter-
terrorism’ strategy, they take part in reinforcing this very same position. Through its 
implication in the representations, the PKK is also discursively affected by these aspects of 
the ‘terrorist’ identity. 
!
As for aspects pertaining to Self-identity, ‘terrorism’ is represented mainly as a threat to the 
existence of common 'civilization' at the beginning of the period of analysis; as put by Deputy 
U.N. Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2003: 24), “it has started to kill the very essence of 
civilization”. This ‘civilization’ is tied to common values represented as universal, as when 
Ambassador Ümit Pamir (2003c: 2) refers to them as “distilled from the moment the human 
adventure started on earth”.  I showed that by invoking ‘civilization’ in this way, the Turkish 
actors are reproducing a rhetorical commonplace historically rooted in European discourses of 
Otherness, to which both the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have been subjected. Representing 
‘terrorism’ as a threat to common ‘civilization’ serves as a way of moving Turkey closer to 
both ‘Europe’ and ‘the West’, securing its position on the ‘inside’ of the boundaries of 
identity. In this way, it is a continuation of what Bilgin (2009: 122) refers to as the Turkish 
founding leaders’ of negotiating ‘difference’ through “lifting Turkey to the level of 
contemporary civilization”. 
 
From mid-2003, however, the singular form of ‘civilization’ gradually loses its presence in 
the United Nations speeches. This development coincides with the coming to power of the 
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Justice and Development Party (AKP) in late-2002. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s first 
speech (2003) marks a divide in the material , as he pluralizes ‘civilization’ while also 
pointing to ‘spiritual values’ and adding ‘racism and xenophobia’ to a list of threats that 
includes ‘terrorism’. Alongside the increased use of ‘civilizations’ from this point, there is a 
strong emphasis on the value of cultural and religious diversity, with several references to the 
U.N. Alliance of Civilizations (AOC), of which Turkey was one of the initiators. By 
Ambassador Baki $lkin (2008c: 10) the AOC is even represented as a way to deal with 
‘terrorism’ specifically. There are also several instances of pointing to the importance of 
inspirations from ‘Eastern civilization’ to the common Self. As part of these developments, 
‘civilization’ – both its plural and singular form – is marginalized in opposition to ‘terrorism’, 
with ‘humanity’ and ‘humankind’ taking over the role as the main uniting identity for the 
common Self, and thus as what ‘terrorism’ is represented as threatening. I argued that this 
must be understood in relation to the ‘Islamist’ character of the AKP, as well as to the 
increased focus on essential ‘civilizational’ differences and the articulation of 
‘religion’/‘Islam’ to ‘terrorism’ after the September 11 attacks. The invocation of 
‘humanity’/’humankind’ deals with the potential hurdle presented by the recognition of 
essential ‘civilizations’, ensuring the continued negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’, still with 
‘terrorism’ as the constitutive Other. There are also many specific attempts by the Turkish 
actors of breaking the articulation between ‘terrorism’ and Islam. 
 
The last important point emphasized in chapter 4 was that even though the politicians and 
diplomats increasingly point to the importance of different cultures and ‘Eastern’ inspiration 
from 2003, there is actually a strengthening of the hegemony of liberalist universalism, a 
discourse with origins in the European Self that the Ottoman Empire grappled with. I 
identified this through rhetorical commonplaces such as ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, ‘good 
governance’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘civil society’. Prime Minister Erdo!an’s (2009: 35) statement 
that the AOC should bring forth one “global civilization based on universal values centered on 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance, human rights, gender equality, young people 
and media” is illustrative of this continuation of universalism.  
 
6.2 Summary of the military officers’ representations 
In most respects, the military officers speaking and writing through the NATO Centre of 
Excellence: Defence Against Terrorism represent the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ and the 
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‘terrorist’ identity similarly to the politicians and diplomats, with ‘terrorism’ being a 
homogeneous and ubiquitous phenomenon – a common threat – that necessitates urgent 
cooperation. Distinctions are rejected also here, as there is a “single type of ‘terrorist’” 
(Özkök 2006a: x), and one “terrorist mindset” (Kiliç 2007: 14). Several of the officers 
represent the September 11 attacks as events that revealed the ‘true’ nature of ‘terrorism’. 
There is however an explicit concern with the definition of ‘terrorism’ amongst the officers, in 
contrast to the politicians/diplomats. The lack of a common definition is acknowledged and 
problematized, but as a practical and temporary rather than theoretical obstacle. It is thus 
argued that the search for a definition should continue, and that the lack of such cannot be 
used as a reason not to cooperate. 
 
 Like in the United Nations, the military officers consistently relate Turkish ‘suffering’ from 
‘terrorism’ to this joint struggle, but here the PKK is referred to in name. The PKK is even 
represented as a threat in and of itself to ‘the international community’ (Saygun 2008: 227). 
There is also harsher criticism towards other countries (never specified more than ‘European 
states’) for not unequivocally condemning the PKK, in a way that shows the officers rejecting 
alternative identities for the PKK, such as ‘guerrilla’ or 'insurgent’ group. As was the case 
with the politicians and diplomats, ‘double standards’ are consistently represented as a 
problem and an obstacle for cooperation. The repeating of such arguments across years (even 
by the same actors) shows the persistence of such a discursive struggle (e.g. Tokgöz 2009: 31; 
2010: 37; 2011: 32).  
 
The ‘terrorist’ identity is generally formed by the same three elements as described above for 
the politicians and diplomats. But in addition to these there is an extensive use of 
dehumanizing organic metaphors, representing ‘terrorism’ as ‘illness’ threatening the healthy 
social ‘body’; a metaphorical language with clearly identifiable intertextual links, including to 
European and ‘Western’ designations of the inferior Turkish Other. The identity is also to a 
larger characterized directly rather than affected by characterizations of ‘terrorism’, as is 
generally the case by the politicians and diplomats. And instead of rejecting the possibility of 
legitimate motivations, the officers make allegations as to what the motivations of ‘terrorists’ 
are, establishing a cost-benefit rationality where high casualty-numbers and protracted war 
become positives to the ‘terrorist’. The signifier ‘exploit’ is present also amongst the military, 
here with the specific phrase “diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 
exploit” (Ekmen 2007: 12; Kiliç 2007: 18) exactly copying the National Strategy for 
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Combating Terrorism of the George W. Bush Administration (The White House 2003: 6; 
2006: 10). 
 
I argued that for several reasons related to the historical position of the Turkish military in 
safeguarding Kemalism, and to the ‘Islamist character’ of the AKP having become an 
increasing topic (Onar 2007), there could be divergences in how the military represent Self-
identity in relation to ‘terrorism’. However, my analysis showed this only to a lesser extent. 
Though the officers emphasize the role of the nation-state more strongly than the politicians 
and diplomats, though the invocations of ‘civilization’ or ‘civilizations’ are much less 
consistent, and though there are some explicitly critical perspectives towards the idea of 
‘universal values’ (Büyükanıt 2008; Denizer 2008), similarities are more conspicuous than 
differences. There are several attempts at breaking the articulation between ‘Islam’ and 
‘terrorism’, and many invocations of rhetorical commonplaces reproducing liberalist 
discourse, similar to those described for the politicians and diplomats. The latter is especially 
clear with the three high-ranking officers to hold the last symposium speeches at the NATO 
Centre (Generals Ergin Saygun, $lker Ba&bu! and Aslan Güner). Their convergence with the 
AKP politicians’ representations of (e.g.) ‘shared values’, including ‘human rights’, 
‘individual liberties’ and ‘freedom of speech’, is interesting for three reasons: [1] All of these 
three have been arrested since January 2012 for alleged participation in plans to overthrow the 
government (Güner for his participation in the ‘post-modern coup’ of 1997); [2] during earlier 
military interventions, leading officers have represented the curtailing of ‘individual liberties’ 
as justified; and [3] international critique of Turkey’s approach towards the PKK has involved 
exactly rhetorical commonplaces such as ‘human rights’ or ‘democracy’. 
 
In total, the main conclusion to draw from the representation of Self-identity is that the 
negotiation of Turkish ‘difference’ and the conditioning effects of the discourse within the 
officers are speaking are stronger than any need to express fears of ‘Islamization’ and 
divergence from the AKP. Besides the above, there are two other interesting instances that 
suggest the negotiating of ‘difference’ through ‘terrorism’ as constitutive Other: ‘Terrorism’ is 
represented as threatening ‘humanity and civilization’ (Sarica 2007: 15; Özkök 2006a: x), 
which is the exact combination of rhetorical commonplaces used by the Allied victors of 
World War I to condemn the Ottoman Government in contemporary Turkey for mass killings 
of Armenians during the war. 
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6.3 Representing the terrorist Other: consequences 
Having given a summary of both my analyses, I will discuss the way the Turkish actors’ 
representations of the Other, which are mostly consistent across the two sets of texts, can take 
part in shaping a policy field. This is important, as discourse analysis does not merely wish to 
expose representations of identity; it sees identity as ontologically interlinked with policy, and 
political discourse as the striving for creating stable connections between the two (Hansen 
2006: 17ff).58 Throughout, I exemplify my arguments with statements from the data material. 
 
6.3.1 Legitimizing the Self 
The way the Turkish actors construct ‘terrorism’ as phenomenon and ‘terrorist’ as identity has 
significant consequences for framing the Turkish government’s and security forces’ approach 
to the conflict with the PKK. The invocation of an all-encompassing but unspecific 
phenomenon of ‘terrorism’, and the representation of this as a critical ‘security’ threat that 
involves the whole world, confers legitimacy on those in positions to enact policies in 
response (Hansen 2006: 35). Such legitimacy is even explicitly claimed in my analysis, as 
when Deputy U.N. Ambassador Huseyin Müftüo!lu (2011a: 13) refers to “the legitimate right 
of Governments to combat terrorism”, or when Foreign Minister Cem (2001b: 11) argues that 
“we are all engaged in a fight – a justifiable, correct fight against terrorism”. 
 
Several of the Turkish actors’ statements are acts of securitization par excellence, such as 
arguing that ‘terrorism’ has “become one of the most pervasive and critical threats to the 
security of the world” (Can & Ö!ün 2008: 30). Such statements most definitely put political 
pressure on dealing with the issue quickly and effectively; creating a ‘state of exception’ 
where normal political rules do not apply and emergency measures can be taken (Hansen 
2011: 529; Wæver 1998; Agamben 1998).59 Through the articulation of the conflict with the 
PKK to the general phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ we see how this can include geographically 
restricted conflicts. When the articulation between ‘terrorism’ and (e.g.) ‘critical security 
threat’ becomes fixed, it also allows for a high degree of urgency, illustrated by Deputy U.N. 
Ambassador Altay Cengizer (2003: 24) arguing that “endless theorizing” cannot “hijack the 
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58 This relation importantly goes both ways: Identities are reproduced through the enactment of policy as well 
(Campbell [1] 1998; Hansen 2006).  
59 Parts of the Kurdish-dominated South-East in Turkey have indeed been referred to as subjected to a “Turkish 
state of exception” (Öktem quoted in Jacoby 2010: 107).  
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practicalities of our common defense against this enemy of mankind and civilization”; the 
threat is too immanent and important for splitting hairs or discussing needlessly. 
 
The exceptional state can also allow for representing efforts taken in response to ‘terrorism’ 
as not constituting armed struggle or acts of war, though they involve many casualties and 
severe infrastructural destruction, but rather as part of an unavoidable fight or a higher cause 
(where government soldiers become ‘martyrs’, as seen in the analyzed newsletter). This 
argument is made by Deputy Ambassador Müftüo!lu (2011a: 13), stating that responses to 
‘terrorism’ “do not constitute armed conflict and cannot be considered as such” (2011a: 13), a 
stand taken also by Ambassador Ertu!rul Apakan (2010d: 26; 2012c: 25). The use of organic 
metaphors by the Turkish military officers contribute to this same effect, as when Chief of 
Staff Ya&ar Büyükanit (2008: 11-12) refers to ‘terrorism’ as “a cancer cell” and “the pestilence 
of our era”; the fight becomes the remedy against a disease rather than war or armed battle 
against a conventional enemy.  
 
By comparing the Turkish actors’ representations of ‘terrorism’ to how Deputy U.N. 
Ambassador Fazli Çorman (2011: 30) represents the issue of ‘climate change’, we see some 
interesting parallels that shed light on the role of securitization: 
There can be no doubt that climate change continues to be one of the most pressing and complex 
issues facing humankind today. It is vital to find a global solution to this problem. We have 
absolutely no time to lose […] It is also very clear that the risks posed by climate change cannot be 
met by any single State. We are faced with a common challenge and we must tackle it with a spirit 
of shared responsibility […] This long-term dedicated effort will also contribute to development, 
prosperity, peace and security on our planet 
Çorman uses a very similar selection of rhetorical commonplaces as those used in relation to 
homogeneous ‘terrorism’ (it is a ‘common challenge’ that cannot be fought single-handedly 
by states; there is no doubt that it is one of the most severe issues of our times; there is no 
time to lose for the sake of ‘security on our planet’). The de-territorialization and 
securitization of ‘climate change’ is similar to that of ‘terrorism’, both represented as 
overarching and critical threats that absolutely need concerted efforts, but without any true 
degree of specification. When they blend together discursively like this into abstract concepts, 
it marginalizes the human aspect of the phenomenon of ‘terrorism’. One could argue that 
there are actual similarities between the two in that their manifestations often take place 
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unexpectedly both geographically and temporally, but firstly, this is not the case for 
everything labeled as ‘terrorism’; secondly, so do many acts enacted by national governments; 
and thirdly, it takes the homogeneous understanding of ‘terrorism’ as premise, dissolving 
differences between (e.g.) the September 11 attacks and violence committed in a domestically 
or regionally restricted insurgency like that of the PKK. And such an argument 
notwithstanding, any political act successfully represented as countering ‘terrorism’ will 
appear more legitimate through its articulation to this global and abstract security imagery. 
Note that many of the Turkish actors’ speeches are, after all, held at the Security Council.  
 
6.3.2 The terrorist as homo sacer 
A severe consequence of representing the ‘terrorist’ identity as fundamentally illegitimate is 
that it clears the ground for the universal treatment of whoever is successfully interpellated 
into this identity. We see this suggested when U.N. Ambassador Ümit Pamir (2003c: 2) states 
that “as there are no good terrorists”, they all “deserve to be treated in the same manner”. A 
similar dynamic is reflected by President George W. Bush having, according to Desch (2008: 
33), represented ‘terrorists’ as “so evil that they have placed themselves ‘beyond the pale’ of 
civilization and thereby forfeit[ed] the protections due to its law-abiding citizens”. 
 
Here I argue that the ‘terrorist’ identity starts to resemble the archaic Roman homo sacer, as 
the concept is understood by Agamben (1998): a person that can be killed by anyone without 
incurring punishment, as he or she is placed outside of the boundaries of normal citizenry – 
“an outcast, a banned man, tabooed, dangerous” (Fowler quoted in Agamben 1998: 79). 
Historical dynamics in Turkey stand illustratively in relation to this: Many activists from the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) that were removed from state structures following the 
1980 coup became parts of ‘Grey Wolf’ paramilitary gangs, deployed to predominantly 
Kurdish areas under exceptional rule, and were involved in “murder, bombing, armed robbery, 
torture, kidnapping”, amongst others (Jacoby 2010: 102-104). Equally illustrative is the so-
called ‘village guard’ system of local militias fighting the PKK, “sponsored, equipped and 
managed by the Turkish state” (Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 10), which by 2000 included 65,000 
armed men and up to 400,000 family members (Jacoby 2010: 102). According to Human 
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Rights Watch (2003), these ‘village guards’ have been involved in “a wide range of lawless 
activities, including killing and extortion”.60  
 
The lacking emphasis on specific motivations of ‘terrorists’ plays a central role in constituting 
this position, as when the goal of a group or entity is represented as primarily to prolong 
conflict and create attention-drawing devastation, it can be sensibly dealt with in a different 
manner than if the goals emphasized were, for example, to fight ethnical discrimination. 
When Captain Engin Kiliç (2007: 16) argues about motivations of ‘terrorists’ that “[t]here is a 
symbolic goal of showing that the more powerful enemy can be touched and deeply harmed, 
but even that is not the real goal. The real goal is to provoke massive retaliation”, he is at the 
same time discursively closing the circuit; there is nothing to look for beyond these goals. As 
we have seen, this also makes it possible to lay the blame for the entirety of casualties in a 
conflict at the hands of the ‘terrorists’.  
 
This homo sacer is important also for Self-identity. Agamben’s (1998: 84) argues that “the 
sovereign and homo sacer present two symmetrical figures that have the same structure and 
are correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are potentially homines 
sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom all men act as sovereigns”. Put 
differently, what we see is exactly the constitutive function argued earlier for the ‘terrorist’: 
Though ‘terrorists’ are discursively excluded from the boundaries of normal citizenry, they 
are nonetheless included in an important relation between identities, performing a function as 
that “upon which a community or a society constitutes itself and its moral order” (Blom 
Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 296).  
 
The tainting of the ‘terrorist’ identity also makes it difficult to have any other identity. If 
‘terrorism’ is (e.g.) a threat to ‘humanity’ or the ‘security of the world’, it becomes extremely 
hard to simultaneously be a ‘freedom-fighter’ or a ‘political activist’; we even see actors in 
the analyses challenging such alternative identities. Because of this, the representations of the 
Turkish actors have a totalizing effect. Once established, the identity has significant impetus 
even without the association to any form of action. We see this when Deputy Ambassador 
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60!This is not to say that a given government knows or sanctions everything that goes on at every given time 
(much of what has taken place in Turkey has actually come to light through the Ergenekon investigations 
(Jacoby 2010: 108)). My point is rather hegemonic representations of the radical ‘terrorist’ Other can frame 
violent practices and affect for example to what extent it is sensible to prosecute those having targeted 
‘terrorists’.!
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Cengizer (2002c: 11) states that “it is important to ensure that there is no safe haven for 
terrorists in any country, regardless of their motivation or the type of crimes they have 
committed”. The identity of being ‘terrorist’ also becomes very hard to challenge, because 
attempts to do so are represented in a way where they end up proving the manipulative nature 
of ‘terrorism’. The ‘terrorist’ is an enemy to (e.g.) democratic rights and liberties, and does 
not have a legitimate right to them – they have to be ‘exploited’. The same is the case with the 
participation in activities that could challenge representations of ‘terrorism’ as ‘evil’ or 
without remorse, such as ‘humanitarian work’. The construction of the identity makes these 
acts a priori instrumental, grounded in some other ulterior (and illegitimate) motive.  
 
This is a relevant point for the conflict with the PKK specifically. When leader Abdullah 
Öcalan declared in 1993 that the goal of the PKK was no longer a separate nation-state, but 
“decentralisation and the democratic rights of Kurds where they live [...]” (quoted in ICG 
2012: 29), emphasizing the fight for Kurdish rights continuously after this, little was changed 
as a result. The Turkish population generally still views the party as separatist, as do several 
European politicians, police and ‘counter-terrorism’ officials (ICG 2012: 13; 29).61 What is 
interesting here is not whether or not the goals of the PKK are actually ‘separatist’, but that 
the persistence of such an opinion, notwithstanding the PKK insisting otherwise, can in part 
be explained by the construction of ‘terrorist’ identity. 
 
6.3.3 Marginalizing long-term solutions 
Another important consequence of how ‘terrorism’ as phenomenon and ‘terrorist’ as identity 
are represented by the Turkish actors is the marginalization of dialogue. A central aspect of 
discourse analysis is to note conspicuous absences, and representations of the importance of 
dialogue are most definitely absent in both sets of texts – except for between ‘civilizations’, 
which all constitute part of the common Self. When “terrorism does not have a set of rules to 
which the members of civilized societies in this room can relate” (Esenli 2002: 11), it is not 
surprising that dialogue becomes unviable. The following statement by former Vice President 
Dick Cheney reveals the same dynamic from the perspective of the United States: “Such a 
group [as al-Qaida] cannot be held back by deterrence, nor reasoned with through diplomacy 
[…] There will be no summit meeting, no negotiations with terrorists. This conflict can only 
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61 Öcalan had already stated that the goal was not a separate state three years before this, but at that point he 
added “at least not for another 40 years” (Gunter 1994: 4).!!
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end in their complete and utter destruction” (quoted in Desch 2008: 26). Again we see a point 
with an interesting parallel in the conflict between Turkey and the PKK. When Abdullah 
Öcalan stated in 1993 the wish of the PKK for “peace, dialogue, and free political action 
within the framework of a democratic Turkish state”; and the hope “that the Turkish 
authorities will understand that this question cannot be solved militarily and that the Kurdish 
people […] and their rights cannot be ignored” (quoted in Gunter 1994: 17), this was 
interpreted as a sign of weakness by Turkish officials and used as an incentive to crush the 
PKK, rather than as an opening towards a peaceful settlement (Gunter 1994: 18). 
 
A similar point could be made regarding arguments that ‘terrorism’ needs to be dealt with 
from a more long-term, structurally oriented perspective, which are present only to a very low 
extent in the analyzed material. However, we have seen that in parallel with the declining 
frequency of representations of ‘terrorist’ acts being impossible to justify amongst the 
politicians and diplomats, there is an appearance of such arguments. This suggests that if a 
significant amount of the most fundamentally delegitimizing representations of ‘terrorism’ – 
and, especially, ‘terrorist’ – were to be challenged and disappear, this would open up the 
discursive space for arguing for the need to address ‘root causes’.  
 
6.3.4 Involving the third party 
The way ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ are constituted also facilitates the castigation of specific 
states for not actively doing something about ‘terrorists’ inside its own borders, potentially 
opening for representing violent intervention into such states as legitimate.62 In November 
2001, Turkish Foreign Minister $smail Cem (2001a: 9) argues that  
[the] anti-terrorist struggle has to be all-encompassing and deal with all centres […] It should 
address all countries that harbour and tolerate terrorism or that are indifferent to terrorist groups 
that incite or actively plan, finance or command terrorist operations executed in another country. 
Similarly, when Chief of Staff Büyükanıt (2008: 10) argues that states’ “irrational practices 
and tolerance” should be met with U.N. sanctions, it shows clearly the potential effects of 
complacency – as well as how the United Nations can be represented as a protector of this 
stance. We thus see that even indifference can lead to actors or states ending up on the wrong 
side of the struggle against ‘terrorism’; the discourse places the threat in a position where one 
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62 The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan comes to mind here, where Turkey participated as part of the ISAF force, 
commanding it between June 2002 and February 2003, and between February and August 2005.!
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is forced into doing something about it – a clear manifestation of securitization, though here 
on an international level. Hansen (2006: 35) touches upon this with a pertinent argument: 
[Q]uestions that are included in the discourse of national security only if they pose a threat to the 
national Self […] are articulated as ‘international security problems’ which the international 
community has a responsibility for countering [...] Conceptually, this has led to the formulation of 
new security concepts that draw upon the traditional urgency, power, and responsibility of national 
security, yet indicates a distance by the use of terms such as ‘common security’ [emphasis added]. 
What happens here is exactly that which I emphasized in section 6.3.1; that “the issue is 
moved out of the realm of the strategic and ‘selfishly national’ and re-located within the 
‘higher grounds’ of the morally good” (Hansen 2006: 50) – though it is importantly still tied 
to state power.  
 
The last point I will make in this subsection is that representations of ‘terrorism’ as 
homogeneous and ubiquitous can affect to what extent international economical and military 
support is made politically sensible. Bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States 
can be understood through such a perspective. The successful representation of the two 
countries fighting the same ‘terrorist’ enemy – though there is no PKK presence in the United 
States – can make increased U.S. military support to Turkey more politically viable. Much of 
the historical support given by the United States has been used by Turkish governments for 
policing areas dominated by the PKK and involved in the insurgency. But from having peaked 
in 1993, military assistance to Turkey had gone down drastically in five years, to $5.7 million 
in 1998 (total assistance and arms sales was $2.46 billion in 1993) (Jacoby 2010: 102-103). 
From the mid-2000s, however (during the ‘war on terror’ and moving into my period of 
analysis), the two countries began cooperating more closely against the PKK. Turkey and the 
United States signed a “Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue To Advance the Turkish-
American Strategic Partnership”, which specifically included “the fight against PKK and its 
affiliates” (U.S. Department of State 2006). They also initiated other forms of cooperation, 
such as a retired U.S. Air Force General becoming “Special Envoy for Countering the PKK” 
(Jacoby 2010: 106).  
 
I am not arguing that these developments must be seen as simple and exclusive consequences 
of the PKK and (e.g.) al-Qaeda being represented as manifestations of the same phenomenon. 
Any such policy would have to be rendered sensible in a much more complex sense, and 
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would have to resonate with U.S. political discourse in general, as well as with the population. 
But strict rational considerations of strategic interests (such as the ‘stability’ of the Middle 
East) fail to grasp the way a discourse on ‘terrorism’ can take part in shaping the field of 
sensible policy, through distributing identities. As an example of this dynamic at play, Jackson 
(2006: 29) argues that the successful representation of Berlin as a “bulwark of ‘the West’ 
against ‘the East’” in the period following World War II made possible a policy proposal of 
increased financial support to the city by the government in West Germany. For the case of 
‘terrorism’, an example of the framing of such commonality is seen shortly after the 
September 11 attacks, when U.N. Ambassador Pamir (2001: 9) states that “[t]hroughout the 
tumultuous years of our fight against terrorism, the United States always stood, and at times 
singularly, by Turkey. Now, in the hour of need, Turkey firmly stands by the United States”, a 
statement practically copied by Deputy Ambassador Cengizer (2001b: 11). 
 
6.4 ‘Terrorism’ in the perspective of universalism 
Before giving some concluding remarks regarding the conflict between the Turkish state and 
the PKK, and on the possibility of changing the political language that frames it, I will briefly 
discuss what I see as problematic aspects of the universalism that is at play in the Turkish 
actors’ representations, and how they affect the constitution of the conflict. 
 
I argue that there are two universalisms at play in the representations of ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorist’. The first of these, though it does not explicitly propose universality, is the 
naturalization of the nation-state as the fundamental political unit and the legitimate source of 
violence and coercion – what Campbell (1998a: 199) refers to when he argues that political 
has been “subsumed by and made synonymous with the state”. The second is the liberalist 
universalism already discussed in the analyses, grounded in the expectation of the eventual 
convergence of all towards a set of universal values – what Mouffe (1993: 13) refers to as an 
“Enlightenment universalism of an undifferentiated human nature”, oriented towards “Man in 
the abstract”. Both of these are rooted in the Enlightenment imaginary that emerged in Europe 
during and after the Religious Wars, which I described in chapter 3, and they are thus related. 
For example, when the military officers are referring to ‘failed states’ or ‘weak states’ (Sarica 
2007: 18; Erün 2010: 16; Ba&bu! 2010: 8), they are reproducing elements of a debate rooted 
in the belief in the convergence of all on the ‘Western liberal democracy’ (Hagmann & 
Hoehne 2008: 43), and not only the primacy of the nation-state system. 
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Both of these universalisms are present in both sets of texts that I have analyzed. Though the 
politicians and diplomats – in contrast with the military – do not explicitly ground Self-
identity in the ‘nation-state’, they are nonetheless speaking from a perspective where its 
position as the lone source of legitimate violence is a priori given. This is not changed by 
their appealing to supra-national collective identities. For example, ‘Europe’ has always been 
grounded in specific cultural and ethnic values, with the nation-state being its enabling factor 
rather than an alternative to it; it is “constructed on the same symbolic and cultural terrain as 
nation states” (Shore quoted in Rumelili 2007: 55). As argued by Waltz (2000: 21), 
international institutions serve national rather than international ‘interests’ more than 
anything. Even Immanuel Kant (2009: 26), liberalist par excellence, argued in his proposition 
for a ‘league’ between nations, that it would not “aim to acquire any power like that of a state, 
but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself”. This supremacy of the 
nation-state did not appear out of nothingness in Turkey, but was brought into Ottoman 
discourse through interaction with Europe, subjecting the non-European to Otherness that was 
eventually grounded in forms of social organization (Jones 2013); the Ottoman “horizon of 
expectation” increasingly depending upon “the historical experience of Europeans” (Wigen 
2013: 26). 
 
The problem with this universalism is that ‘terrorism’ becomes a discursive threat; it 
destabilizes this naturalized position and thus the ontological security of the nation-state. 
From this perspective, organized non-state violence becomes very difficult to conceptualize, 
increasing the proclivity for representing ‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as a radical Other threatening 
existence (Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2006: 296). There is nothing new about this type of 
problematic. For instance, the hegemonic Christian framework at the time of Saint Augustine 
was discursively protected by representing the Manicheans – who challenged the idea of an 
omnipotent God – as the heretical Other which could be legitimately persecuted (Connolly 
1991: 3). ‘Terrorism’ as alternative mode of legitimizing violence can be regarded similarly, 
needing to be purged in order to contain integrity; the ‘terrorist’ becoming – as argued – the 
homo sacer. The organic ‘body politic’ metaphors used by the Turkish military officers are 
important here. According to Staun (2010: 413-414), such metaphors are common to “modern 
securitization language games”, supporting the construction of the nation-state as “something 
natural, necessary and unavoidable”. 
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Today it is not Turkey’s status as a proper nation-state that is questioned or used as grounds 
for Otherness; the exclusion is rather from a larger value-collective on the basis of cultural 
factors, whether we understand this as ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’. As noted in chapter 3, when the 
Ottoman Empire became included into the European states system, it was not fully included 
into ‘international society’, if understood as such a value-collective and not merely as a 
system of states. The inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923 on a new common myth that 
distanced Turkey from its Ottoman past brought Turkey closer, but did not complete this 
process: Insecurities related to the construction of Turkey as ‘different’ are understanding its 
international relations today as well (Bilgin 2009: 122). It is here liberalist universalism takes 
over most of the heavy lifting. It appeals to what Rumelili (2007: 66) refers to as the 
discourses emphasizing the ‘inclusive’ aspects of European identity, where it is acquired 
characteristics that are the grounds for ‘difference’, not inherent ones. These include its 
‘human rights record’, the degree of political stability and the military’s political involvement 
(ibid.). By the Turkish actors’ representing ‘terrorism’ as a threat to ‘human rights’, and by 
stressing the need for (e.g.) ‘democracy’, ‘individual liberties’ and ‘good governance’, they 
are thus talking within a discourse where there is room for movement towards Self. 
 
However, this liberalist universalism also entails problems for the position of ‘terrorists’. I 
agree with Mouffe (1993) that liberalism fails to see the fundamental role of the Self/Other 
distinction for the political – for the reproduction of a given political community. From the 
perspective of this thesis, a truly universal and ontologically secure political community – 
what Kant (2009: 19ff) referred to as “the objective goal of the human race” on the grounds of 
universal values – is a theoretical impossibility. Here a discourse on ‘terrorism’ plays an 
important role, however. By removing the ‘terrorist’ from the realm of the ‘universal’ 
altogether (for example as opposing ‘humanity’ in its totality), the role of a constitutive Other 
is upheld; as what is keeping the universal from truly unfolding. The problem is the radical 
and threatening Otherness that follows with this. This helps explain Desch’s (2008: 26) 
argument that the liberal tradition (of the United States specifically) has not been able to see 
the threat of ‘terrorism’ as something that can be contained, but instead must be eliminated.  
 
To sum up, the difference between insecurity and asecurity must be stressed: Insecurity is not 
the diametrical opposite of security; in both there is the presence of the “security 
problematique” (Wæver 1998: 56) – it is just a question of whether or not there is a response 
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to the threat. This is why ‘terrorism’ can serve both as a threat to the above universalisms and 
as a conditioning factor at the same time.   
 
6.5 Rewriting ‘terrorism’ 
I will end this thesis by offering some thoughts on how the issue of ‘terrorism’ can potentially 
be conceptualized in a way that does not support radical and threatening Otherness, and which 
suppresses rather than encourages cycles of violence. This is by no means an apology for 
violent acts perpetrated by the PKK, of which there is every reason to be critical. But if we 
accept that violent responses from two parties can enter into a mutually reproductive cycle, 
then there is every reason to point out how discursive constructions contribute to such cycles. 
 
Arguments have been made within new theoretical perspectives on the relation between 
identity and Otherness, that the Self/Other divide does not necessarily have to entail the 
delineation of a threat. Rumelili (2011) argues for moving away from the one-dimensional 
security dichotomy of e.g. Campbell (1998a), dividing instead between ‘security-as-being’ 
and ‘security-as-survival’. Here the question of whether the Self feels ontologically secure 
does not have to be related to whether it feels its physical security threatened. Because 
ontological security (having a secure identity) can be achieved without the representation of 
threat, this clears the ground for desecuritization. While this is a very welcome and important 
insight, the question is how applicable it is to the issue of ‘terrorism’. Due to the construction 
of the ‘terrorist’ identity, and to the naturalization of nation-state primacy discussed above, it 
seems highly unlikely for the ‘terrorist’ to become a non-threatening Other. If possible this 
would entail what Hansen (2011: 539) refers to as change through stabilization: “a rather 
slow move out of an explicit security discourse” requiring the mutual recognition of 
legitimacy. But judging from the analyses of this thesis, the concepts ‘terrorism’ and 
‘terrorists’ seem too saturated with negative articulations for desecuritization to be likely. 
Hansen (ibid.) even points this out, arguing that “the Global War of Terror does not entail a 
similar space for recognition and accommodation” as did the détente of the Cold War. The 
concepts are also abstract to an extent that facilitates the adaptation of an international 
discourse on ‘terrorism’ to specific (and far from ‘global’) conflicts, such as with the PKK.  
 
What is perhaps a more likely way to counter radical Otherness in the conflict with the PKK – 
or perhaps a precondition for what Rumelili (2011) is arguing for – is a direct challenging of 
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the discourse of ‘terrorism’ itself. One way of doing this is by emphasizing contingency and 
problematizing the social reality that this discourse reproduces, rejecting the crudeness of the 
categories being used and the dehumanization of the ‘terrorist’ identity. Here my thesis – in 
all its humility – is a contribution. But academia cannot carry this weight alone; critical 
perspectives would have to gain a stronger foothold within general public and political 
discourse. This does not mean seeing violent (‘terrorist’) acts as something that doesn’t have 
to be dealt with or taken seriously, but to re-conceptualize it as something else than for 
example “a very great danger to civilization as we know it [that] threatens the fundamental 
rights of the individual and endangers the fabric of societies everywhere and at all times” 
(Cengizer 2002b: 4).  
 
Here there is a potential in politicians rearticulating the identity of the PKK (to something else 
than ‘terrorist’), which could facilitate the identification of political solutions (Hansen 2011: 
542). This is of course far from an easy task and can incur severe political costs.63 There have 
been examples of this dynamic in Turkey, when attempts at political approaches towards the 
‘Kurdish question’ by the AKP have been followed by strongly critical rhetoric from the 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), declaring the AKP as dangerous and “accusing it of 
treason and weakness”, as well as of “bringing about more terrorism as they are saying more 
democracy” (Celep 2010: 136-138). For these reasons, such a move would take time. Though 
the conflict reached a cease-fire in March 2013, the prevalence of the language of ‘terrorism’ 
does not seem to have changed. Responding to the currently (June 2013) ongoing popular 
protests in Turkey, sparked on Istanbul’s Taksim Square in response to the government’s plans 
of building a shopping mall in Gezi Park, Prime Minister Erdo!an has referred to the 
protesters as “living arm in arm with terrorism” (Reuters 2013), even accusing some of them 
in being “implicated in terrorism” (The Telegraph 2013b). Again we see demonstrated the 
plasticity of this potent concept. 
 
For future research in this field, I consider three elements in particular to be of high interest. 
Firstly, it would be interesting to look more closely at developments to the representations of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$#!An example from the United States is illustrative here: In the second Presidential debate of the 2012 
campaign, Governor Mitt Romney accused President Barack Obama for spending 14 days before referring to the 
2011 attack on a U.S. diplomatic outpost in Benghazi, Libya – which illustratively took place on September 11 – 
as ‘acts of terror’ (CNN 2012). Afterwards there has been some controversy as to whether or not he did, but here 
the point is that this example shows how politically hurtful a seemingly arbitrary choice of words – the deviation 
from dominant discourse – can be.!
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‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in Turkish domestic discourse – and to compare it with the language 
used towards an international audience. This would illuminate further the role of 
‘terrorism’/’terrorist’ as constitutive for Self-identity, and it would allow for tracing changes 
that have rendered politically viable attempts made by the AKP to engage politically with the 
PKK – as well as how these are discursively challenged, for example by the MHP. Secondly, a 
discourse theoretical approach could be employed from the perspective of the ‘terrorists’, 
examining how central PKK actors construct the conflict they are a part of and how such a 
reality supports acts of violence, including against civilians. The third element is already 
suggested at the introduction to this thesis: to carry my theoretical approach over to other 
specific conflicts between nations states and ‘their terrorists’, seeing how a similar identity-
‘difference’ function plays out. 
 
My approach in this thesis has shown that a discourse theoretical approach can be employed 
not only one-dimensionally, in order to draw attention to problematic aspects of the labels 
being used in political discourse, but in a way that more fully respects identities as being 
relational; even opening for seeing how the identity of the Self can be reconstructed through 
the Other of the ‘terrorist’. The theory has also allowed me to see the myriad consequences of 
this function for representing the reality of a given conflict – to see who is put in a position of 
a priori illegitimacy, and who is put in a position of a priori legitimacy. A statement by $smet 
Ocakçıo!lu, President of the Turkish Court of Appeals in 1992, reflects this in telling 
simplicity and can serve as an endnote here: “It is entirely in keeping with the rules of the 
democratic State of Law for the State to use the instruments and methods used by the 
terrorists in order to prevent terror” (quoted in Gunter 1994: 13).  
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